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ABSTRACT 
This study interrogates the conceptualisation of board capital (Hillman & Dalziel 
2003) analysing its usefulness in understanding who, how and why board members are 
recruited onto boards and the nature of board dynamics. This investigation progresses 
current discussions and perspectives on the concept of board capital through a qualitative 
study that examines how board capital is created, its contextual influences and the way 
board dynamics shapes board capital.  
This research addresses the overarching question: What is the nature of board capital 
in the Australian context and how does board recruitment and dynamics influence the 
formation and utilisation of board capital? In so doing this thesis provides answers for 
the following questions: What are the contextual factors that shape the creation of board 
capital? What are the key considerations in the recruitment of board members? What are 
the human and social capital characteristics of board members? What are the factors that 
influence board dynamics and how do they shape board capital? 
Board capital is theorised as an amalgamation of board members’ human and social 
capital which has been operationalised in several ways. Currently there is no consensus 
on what constitutes human and social capital in the board context. Various proxy 
measures of board capital have been used to examine the relationship between boards 
and organisations with equivocal results. A qualitative study provides a basis for 
evaluating and rethinking assumptions about board capital and considerations of how 
governance actors and organisations function in particular contexts. 
This qualitative research analyses data from 20 semi-structured interviews with board 
members on four types of boards (profit, govt. not-for-profit and for profit) and 
documentary analysis of regulation and members of Australian boards. The study finds 
that social identity influences the composition of boards and is used as an important 
criterion in candidate matching. Closed social networks are used as the primary means 
of identifying board members, potentially excluding qualified outsiders. The findings 
suggest an emphasis on reputation and networks as factors used to influence perception 
on the usefulness of a board member to link a board and/or an organisation to its needed 
resources.  
The data shows that board dynamics is influenced by chair authority and conditioned 
by the power distribution among board members. Interviewees revealed that power 
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regulates board member interactions which appear to influence board cohesion, an 
antecedent of board productivity. Board members use various stratagems to exert control 
and that power plays a role in how board practices, processes and systems of rules are 
shaped, interpreted and controlled by board members. There is a tension created by 
influential stakeholders seeking to homogenise boards, an added complexity in the 
decision-making process of boards. 
The data suggests that boards are challenged to manage competing interests creating 
a quandary between self-interest and organisational stakeholder interests. The data 
highlights that challenges experienced by board members create role conflict, role 
confusion and role strain. There are a number of contextual factors that have bearing on 
how board members are recruited, how board activities are defined and how board 
members come to understand and execute their role. 
Working from a sociological perspective this study broadens the scope of the concept 
of board capital emphasising the importance of socio-political context. The findings 
challenge a number of arguments (Haynes & Hillman 2010) supporting the use of human 
and social capital to explain the inner workings of boards, by exposing complex 
interactions, interdependencies and interrelationships associated with boards. Findings 
highlight that the construct of board capital, by focusing on the individual characteristics 
of board members, ignores intrinsic factors such as group dynamics that influence the 
productivity of the collective.  
The qualitative data draws attention to the paucity of proxy measures linked to board 
capital which do not explain why board members are recruited and selected, challenging 
the importance of human capital. This raises awareness about the limitations of board 
capital in explaining the recruitment process and how boards operate. Findings suggest 
that board recruitment and dynamics are influenced by powerful actors shaping board 
composition and the quality of interactions within boards and their broader environment.   
This study provides vital insights to policy-makers about the board recruitment 
process. Board recruitment appears to be similar to other recruitment processes seeking 
the most qualified candidate. However, findings suggest that the board recruitment 
process is multifaceted, creating contradictions. Interviewees suggest that while there 
appears to be some emphasis on skill and gender diversity, boards recruit from within a 
closed circle restricting the pool of candidates. If this recruitment practice is widespread, 
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it has the potential to create a diversity paradox where increased skill and gender diversity 
do not lead to a diverse group of people on boards. Policies promoting a transparent board 
recruitment process and a broader view of diversity are required to meaningfully improve 
board diversity.  
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Board Capital, Board Dynamics, Human 
Capital, Social Capital
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 INTRODUCTION 
One of the least understood aspects of the corporate discipline has to do with 
corporate governance – the structure and functioning of the corporate polity. Of 
business administration we know much or pretend to. Of the governmental processes 
within the corporate polity and in the external relations of that polity with other kinds 
of polity, public and private, we know far too little. The lack is due partly to inadequate 
theoretical constructs and partly to paucity of empirical work. Governance is too 
generally thought of as a matter of public government exclusively.  
                                                                                          Eells (1960, p. 108) 
1.0 Domain of the Study 
 legitimate requirement for many organisations, boards are constituted as 
a system of control to safeguard the interest of an incorporated 
organisation which is legally recognised as an artificial person with rights 
and responsibilities (Hermalin & Weisbach 2001; Zubair Abbasi 2009). However, boards 
are also ‘endogenous’, in that boards are used by organisations as a governance 
mechanism to address agency problems associated with the separation of ownership and 
control, as well as a tool to procure scarce resources and acquire pertinent information 
(Berle & Means 1932; Hermalin & Weisbach 2001; Pfeffer, Jeffrey  & Salancik 2003).  
Accordingly, theories and empirical investigations on boards have been mainly 
concerned with three factors assumed to be related to organisational outcomes: board 
characteristics such as composition and size, board member attributes (human and social 
capital) and the evolution of boards (Hillman & Dalziel 2003; Jensen & Meckling 1976; 
McNulty, Zattoni & Douglas 2013; Pye 2001). These factors have led to the development 
of a multidisciplinary branch of organisational theory called ‘corporate governance’.  
The term ‘corporate governance’ in the academic literature seems to have been first 
used by Eells (1960). Eells, with wisdom ahead of his time, stated that ‘the time will soon 
arrive, if not already here when business leaders should welcome scholarly inquiry into 
corporate governance; for this will provide one of the most useful keys to an 
understanding of the future of an organisation’ (Eells 1960, p. 109). Corporate 
governance is explained as the ‘structure and functioning of corporate polity’ (Eells 1960, 
p. 108). Eells (1960, p. 108) argued that while business leaders understand or pretended 
to understand the business processes regarding organisational ‘polity’ there is much 
A 
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ambiguity of the governmental processes within corporate polity and the external factors 
influencing polity.  
Given the complexity surrounding corporate governance owing to its 
multidisciplinary nature, scholars have investigated many avenues in order to address 
issues concerning the role and functioning of boards. This thesis is concerned with the 
conceptualisation of board capital which is understood as ‘the composite of the human 
and social capital of the board of directors which is intended to capture the ability of the 
board to provide resources to the firm’ (Haynes & Hillman 2010, pg. 1145). While 
scholars have provided a simplified understanding of board capital as the human and 
social capital of board members, previous studies have noted challenges associated with 
isolating human and social capital as well as defining the components of human and 
social capital (Coleman 1988; Haynes & Hillman 2010; Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998).  
This thesis acknowledges that there are other capital that may be regarded as a part of 
board capital in a broader context such as cultural and financial capital, however this 
investigation is meant to include human and social capital only. This chapter provides an 
overview of the key issues confronting governance in relation to the conceptualisation of 
board capital, the methodological approach of this investigation, the scope and rationale 
for this study, research questions and the outline of chapters. 
 
1.1 Issues in Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance reform has been pursued with renewed interest over the past 
decade due to major organisational failures globally and the biggest failure in Australia’s 
history, HIH Insurance Group, which occurred in March 2001 (Abrahams, Horton & 
Millo 2017; Adams, 2016; Carnegie & O’Connell 2014; Damiani, Bourne & Foo 2015; 
Dibra 2016; Narayanaswamy, Raghunandan & Rama 2015; Primbs & Wang 2016; 
Sorensen & Miller 2017). Board members are mandated to monitor managers’ actions on 
behalf of ‘organisational stakeholders’ and contribute to the performance objectives of 
organisations (Freeman 2017; Jones, Wicks & Freeman 2017; Miles, 2017; Andriof et 
al. 2017; Connolly, Farrell & James 2017; Freeman, Wicks & Parmar 2004; Pigé 2017).  
It is noteworthy to highlight that governance issues and considerations date back to 
Frentrop (1600) and were given significant consideration during the industrial revolution 
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in the 18th century. Adam Smith (1776) has been credited for his contribution to the 
governance literature, and key concepts are documented in his book Wealth of Nations. 
Since the late 1990s, corporate governance studies (Bhagat & Black 1999; Epstein & 
Roy 2004; Kraakman & Hansmann 2017; Wagner Iii, Stimpert & Fubara 1998; Wang & 
Oliver 2009; Zajac & Westphal 1996) have focused on board characteristics (size, 
independence of board members, and multiple board memberships) in an effort to 
identify an ideal board structure (Aguilera, Judge & Terjesen 2018; Balsmeier, Bermig 
& Dilger 2013). 
Studies on corporate governance have not found any categorical relationship between 
board composition or leadership structure and organisational outcomes (Bhagat & Black 
1999; Dalton et al. 1998; Mahadeo, Soobaroyen & Hanuman 2012; Mandala et al. 2017; 
Mohan & Chandramohan 2018; Pearce II & Patel 2017; Wang & Oliver 2009). The lack 
of evidence to support a relationship between board structure and organisational 
outcomes underscores the need to consider different empirical approaches that could 
contribute to explaining the diverse relationship between boards and organisations. 
In recent times there has been a proliferation of studies investigating the resource 
based view of boards through the construct coined ‘board capital’ in various 
organisational contexts (Brown, Hillman & Okun 2012; Chen, 2014a; Dalziel, Gentry & 
Bowerman 2011; Dixon-Fowler, Ellstrand & Johnson 2017; Hillman & Dalziel 2003; 
Hobdari, Sun & Goodstein 2016; Line, Louise & Eduardo 2013; Muttakin, Khan & 
Mihret 2016; Reeb & Zhao 2013; Sørheim et al. 2017; Wasserman 2017). It is suggested 
that board members use their human and social capital to influence organisational 
outcomes and differences in board capital explain variations in organisational success 
(De Maere, Jorissen & Uhlaner 2014). 
Although the conceptualisation of board capital focuses on the heterogeneous 
characteristics of board members, there has not been much discussion about the board 
recruitment process and how it influences the quality of candidates recruited onto boards 
(Haynes & Hillman 2010; Hillman & Dalziel 2003). It is generally assumed that board 
composition explains the motivation of organisational actors in recruiting particular 
board members (Baysinger & Hoskisson 1990; Bear, Rahman & Post 2010; Bhagat & 
Black 1999; Mahadeo, Soobaroyen & Hanuman 2012). There is an unclear understanding 
of the board recruitment process and how and why particular individuals are recruited 
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onto boards. Discussions of board recruitment have been overshadowed by discussions 
of board composition (Dahya & McConnell 2007; Farrell & Hersch 2005; Lynch 1979; 
Walt & Ingley 2003). 
Additionally, corporate governance investigations lack key insights about ‘board 
dynamics’ as the discipline has been dominated by quantitative research techniques that 
rely primarily on inferences drawn from secondary data to explain board dynamics 
(Bathala & Rao 1995; Graham, Kim & Leary 2017; Lawal 2012; Pugliese, Nicholson & 
Bezemer 2015; Pye & Pettigrew 2005; Zajac & Westphal 1996). Not many researchers 
have been able to gain access to governance actors and boards, creating what has been 
referred to as the metaphorical ‘black box’ in corporate governance research (Crow & 
Lockhart 2016; Jain & Jamali 2016; Leblanc & Schwartz 2007; McNulty, Zattoni & 
Douglas 2013; Zona & Zattoni 2007).  
 
1.2 Objectives of the Research 
This thesis investigates the characteristics of Australian boards primarily seeking to 
identify those intrinsic factors that have bearing on board dynamics. Extant literature (e.g. 
Brown 2005; Khanna, Jones & Boivie 2014; Laoworapong, Supattarakul & Swierczek 
2018; Le, Kroll & Walters 2012; Sauerwald, Lin & Peng 2016) on corporate governance 
examining board effectiveness from a human and/or social capital perspective found that 
boards may be a source of competitive advantage and that organisations may benefit from 
board members’ capital in a number of ways. However, there is a need for further 
research to advance these discussions beyond board member characteristics, facilitating 
a better understanding of the systems and processes that are crucial to the functioning of 
governance mechanisms (Johnson, Schnatterly & Hill 2013; McNulty, Zattoni & 
Douglas 2013).  
This thesis examines the nature of board capital by investigating board members’ 
experiences, knowledge, intentions, networks and influence. Given that human and social 
factors varied across studies of board capital (e.g. Chen 2014; Dalziel, Gentry & 
Bowerman 2011; Hillman & Dalziel 2003; Jermias & Gani 2013; Kim & Kim 2015), this 
investigation focuses on identifying those factors that are crucial for the functioning and 
productivity of boards, including gaining an in depth understanding of the board 
recruitment process. Although this study has shifted focus away from generic discussions 
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of board composition, this investigation identifies factors that are important for the 
composition of boards and revisits those discussions with an intricate knowledge of the 
board recruitment process. 
The focus of this inquiry is to contribute to the body of knowledge on corporate 
governance by investigating board recruitment and dynamics, an embryonic research 
area which is at the core of discussions about boards. This investigation and analysis goes 
beyond the simple exploration of boards as homogenous units and discounts the dyadic 
classification of boards as consisting of independent and dependent board members. 
Instead this thesis explores whether the conceptualisation of board capital that examines 
the heterogeneous characteristics of board members through their human and social 
capital is useful in understanding the board recruitment process and board dynamics. The 
study examines the recruitment of board members and how it influences the creation of 
board capital, then evaluates how board dynamics shapes board capital.  
This interrogation of the conceptualisation of board capital reflects a significant shift 
in the theoretical and methodological structure of corporate governance research. 
Investigations on board capital have been primarily focused on quantitative methods with 
only one qualitative study during the 15 years from 2003 to 2017. This investigation 
seeks to identify and critically evaluate the key attributes of board members, recognising 
that although board capital has been investigated in the governance literature and is 
understood as the combination of board members’ human and social capital the existing 
construct does not explain differences in board productivity and in extreme cases failures 
at the organisational and/or governance level. There have been observed failures in 
organisations with boards with high levels of human and social capital and it is therefore 
not clear what factors are at play outside of board members’ human and social capital 
(Abrahams, Horton & Millo 2017; Bhasin 2016; Dibra 2016; Peng, & Talib 2017; Primbs 
& Wang 2016; Sorensen & Miller 2017).  
Quantitative studies (e.g. Chen 2014a; Haynes & Hillman 2010; Hillman & Dalziel 
2003; Jermias & Gani 2013; Johnson, Schnatterly & Hill 2013) examining board capital 
have reported inconsistent results and it is not known what combination of board 
members’ human and social capital is useful for boards or what other factors are 
important for the functioning of boards. Fundamentally, the conceptualisation of board 
capital ignores the collective by being overly focused on the characteristics of individual 
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board members. There is an implied assumption that, although boards differ based on 
board member characteristics, unitary governance systems are homogenous structures 
functioning in a similar fashion. 
While there are many types of capital which is understood as ‘anything that increases 
one’s ability to generate value’ (Haynes & Hillman 2010), the conceptualisation of board 
capital is operationalised using only human and social capital. Human capital is 
understood as ‘the knowledge, information, ideas, skills, and health of individuals 
(Becker 2002, p.3) and social capital ‘the aggregate of the actual or potential resources 
which are linked to possession of durable network of more or less institutionalised 
relationships of mutual acquaintance or recognition’ (Bourdieu 1985, p. 248). 
This study acknowledges that there are other types of capital that are excluded from 
this evaluation of board capital that may have bearing on board capital such as cultural 
capital which exists in three forms: ‘the embodied state, i.e. in the form of long-lasting 
dispositions of the mind and body; in the objectified state, in the form of cultural goods 
(pictures, books, dictionaries, instruments, machines, etc.) and in the institutionalized 
state, a form of objectification which must be set apart because, as will be seen in the 
case of educational qualifications, it confers entirely original properties on the cultural 
capital which it is presumed to guarantee’ (Bordieu, 1985 p.47). This study further 
excludes financial capital which is ‘the monetary value of assets utilised by an 
organisation to provide goods and services’ (Perez 2003, p.3). 
 
1.3 Rationale for the Study 
Despite the extensive research across various disciplines on boards, little is known 
about the board recruitment process (Bathala & Rao 1995; Bear, Rahman & Post 2010; 
Fan 2017; Wang & Oliver 2009). Theories on boards have been greatly influenced by 
quantitative assessments of boards in relation to organisational outcomes which has led 
to a scarcity of empirical work providing qualitative insights about boards (McNulty, 
Zattoni & Douglas 2013). While it is understood that boards are commissioned by law, 
the recruitment and selection of board members is not clearly understood. It is assumed 
that the characteristics of board members explain the process of selection. This study 
sheds light on how an individual becomes a board member. 
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Additionally, the archetypal exploration of boards focusing on the structural debate of 
independent versus dependent board members has not provided many insights about 
board dynamics (Chen, et al. 2016; Cotter, Shivdasani & Zenner 1997; Setia-Atmaja, 
Haman & Tanewski 2011). As a result, corporate governance researchers have made 
inferences about how board characteristics influence board productivity and 
organisational outcomes based on differences in board members. However, quantitative 
studies exploring board member attributes and organisational performance have not been 
able to unequivocally determine what factors influence board performance and 
organisational outcomes. There is no consensus regarding a framework to investigate 
these relationships, suggesting there is a need for a richer analysis of boards. 
Although board members’ human and social capital is theorised as board capital, there 
is much ambiguity regarding the board capital construct. Human and social capital 
theories were not developed in the board context and investigations on boards have 
neglected to explore how human and social capital varies in the board context. The 
findings from this study assist in articulating a better understanding of how the board 
recruitment process functions and factors crucial to the recruitment of board members. 
This information will aid researchers and practitioners in understanding issues of board 
composition and board dynamics. Of equal importance, the data facilitates the evaluation 
of assumptions about board capital and its usefulness in understanding organisational 
boards. 
 
1.4 Overview of Research Method 
Central to this thesis is the concept of board capital, principally what constitutes board 
capital and how it is created and used. This inquiry is based on a qualitative data 
collection exercise through semi-structured interviews with experienced board members 
and documentary analysis of participants’ curriculum vitae (CVs) and company profiles. 
The data helped gain an understanding of the board recruitment process and by extension 
provides insights about board member attributes, board activities and the process of 
decision-making (board dynamics).  
The documentary analysis included an examination of secondary data collected on 
Australian corporation law, governance principles and top 100 listed company boards 
(ASX100). This data offers awareness about the Australian context and characteristics of 
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board members serving on particular boards. In the preliminary stages of the 
investigation it was recognised there are four different forms of organisations which the 
study refers to as ‘categorical bands’: Australian listed companies (ASX), for profit 
(private), government/public, and not-for-profit organisations.  
The study recruited research participants from the four forms of organisational boards 
to acquire a holistic view of boards. Participants were recruited purposefully across the 
four categorical bands and a snowballing method was incorporated to increase the 
number of study participants. Information was collected from board members of all 
organisational forms to understand the role of governance, duties and characteristics of 
board members across different organisations and to ascertain whether these varied 
within different forms of organisations.  
Data collection consisted of 20 semi-structured interviews and 23 hours of interview 
recordings were transcribed and thematically analysed. Analysis was conducted on 
documents collected from the Centre for Corporate Law University of Melbourne, 
Australian Securities Exchange, Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Council of 
Superannuation Investors, Investment and Financial Services Association and World 
Bank. The study explicated how board members come to understand, account for, take 
action and manage their governance duties. Themes were isolated through a socially 
constructed process that assumes all knowledge is constructed and all learning is a 
process of that construction (Kukla 2013; Miles & Huberman 1994). The data collection 
exercise provided rich data that was used to evaluate the board recruitment process, board 
dynamics and the usefulness of the construct board capital.  
The early stage of the study found that organisations in Australia, regardless of 
corporate objective, follow the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) governance 
principles as a benchmark for their governance structure and look to the ASX as a guide 
to implementing a robust system of governance (Lee & Shailer 2008). Accordingly, many 
of the ASX principles and procedures are adopted by government, not-for-profit and 
private organisations and the websites of various organisations confirmed that 
organisations in Australia have governance and sustainability policies that mirror the 
ASX principles. 
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1.5 Scope of Study 
The overall results of this investigation are specific to Australian organisations but 
have implications for boards in other Commonwealth jurisdictions where statutory and 
legislative codes are similar. While the legal systems in Commonwealth countries may 
be similar, board dynamics may vary widely as the study emphasises that social context 
is important in understanding organisational boards. Knowledge is socially constructed 
based on unique experiences and perceptions of the board recruitment process, shaped 
by the activities of board members serving on particular boards. 
The study limits data collection to two qualitative types: semi-structured interviews 
and documentary analysis. As a result, other qualitative methods such as case study were 
not used due to time constraints and issues relating to access to boards. The study did not 
gain direct access to board proceedings and relied primarily on reflections from 
participants about their personal experiences as board members on different forms of 
organisational boards. Being a qualitative investigation, this study cannot contribute to 
discussions about a relationship between boards and organisational outcomes but 
provides data that has implications for how board dynamics may influence the 
productivity of boards.  
While this study has implications for discussions about board composition, the study 
was primarily focused on understanding the board recruitment process and does not 
explain how boards are structurally designed in terms of size and proportion of insiders 
versus outsiders. Additionally, the goal of this study to critically evaluate assumptions 
about the conceptualisation of board capital was achieved by understanding how boards 
are created and used. The study does not contribute to discussions about proxies of board 
capital and makes no recommendations about appropriate measures of human and social 
capital in the context of boards. This is an area that requires further qualitative research. 
 
1.6 Research Questions 
This study progresses discussions on the concept of board capital by understanding its 
fundamental attributes and dynamics. This investigation recognises there are contextual 
factors that have bearing on the conceptualisation of board capital. For that reason, the 
research questions are designed to identify the qualities of board capital, uncovering 
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strengths and weaknesses. By using a qualitative approach this study seeks to understand 
how board capital is influenced by the broader context of interactions, interdependencies 
and interrelationships. Using a social constructionist lens, this study uses an interpretative 
approach in evaluating how board capital is shaped by broader context.  
 Overarching Question 
What is the nature of board capital in the Australian context and how does board 
recruitment and dynamics influence the formation and utilisation of board capital? 
 Sub-Questions 
1. What are the contextual factors that shape the creation of board capital? 
a) What are the key considerations in the recruitment of board members?  
b) What are the human and social capital characteristics of board members?  
2. What are the factors that influence board dynamics and how do they shape board 
capital? 
 
1.7 Outline of Study 
Chapter 1: Introduction brings to focus the objectives and rationale for the study 
outlining the research problems and questions to be addressed, highlighting that previous 
studies have not found unequivocal evidence to explain the relationship between boards 
and organisational outcomes. The chapter provides an overview of the research methods 
and the structure of the thesis. 
Chapter 2: Board Capital draws attention to the primary focus of the study, the 
interrogation of the conceptualisation of board capital. The chapter begins by discussing 
the conceptual development of board capital introduced by Hillman and Dalziel (2003), 
an empirical construct created by combining the agency and resource dependency view 
of boards. The chapter then critically reviews the concept of board capital evaluating its 
usefulness in understanding organisational boards. The chapter then examines human 
and social capital theories, the bedrock of the board capital construct. Human and social 
capital theories are examined within the context in which they were introduced, outlining 
an economic and sociological origin respectively. The chapter then provides a systematic 
review of the literature on board capital covering all the studies conducted to date.  
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Chapter 3: Methodology outlines a multi-method qualitative approach to the research 
inquiry justifying a paradigm shift in the study of boards. Seminal studies on boards have 
taken a deductive approach, which has contributed to inadequate theoretical constructs 
and a paucity of empirical work. Chapter 2 provided a roadmap of the development of 
studies on boards highlighting a crisis within this strand of research. Given the 
multifaceted nature of boards an inductive approach is emphasised. The focus of this 
inquiry concerns the nature of boards and the proposed resources embedded within 
(board capital). The chapter begins by discussing the research design that is motivated 
by the goal to ensure research rigour and transparency, while uncovering and defining 
the key elements of boards evaluating the notion of capital within. The process of board 
member selection, board sampling, data collection, coding and analysis is discussed in 
detail. 
Chapter 4: The Australian Context examines the role of board members by first 
elucidating how the establishment of company boards is informed by law in Australia. 
The chapter evaluates the development of principles of corporate governance and 
organisational stakeholders that have had significant influence on the development of 
corporate governance in Australia. The chapter summarises the current state of studies 
on boards in Australia and provides descriptive data about the top 100 boards in 
Australia. The chapter concludes emphasising the importance of context and 
demonstrates that board composition does not provide much insights about the board 
recruitment process and dynamics. 
Chapter 5: Becoming a Board Member begins with an overview of the qualitative 
findings from interviews conducted with 20 board members in the context of the board 
recruitment system. This chapter details factors that are crucial to the Australian board 
recruitment system and answers the research questions: What are the factors that are 
considered important for the creation of board capital? How are people recruited onto 
boards? Why are particular individuals recruited onto boards? The themes to emerge are: 
skills, qualifications and experience; gender and diversity; reputation and background; 
and organisational philosophy. The chapter ends with a summary of the key research 
findings. 
Chapter 6: Board Dynamics begins with an overview of the qualitative findings from 
interviews conducted with 20 board members in the context of board capital dynamics. 
Beyond Board Capital: Probing Inside the Black Box of Australian Board Recruitment and Dynamics         Chapter 1 
12 | P a g e  
 
This chapter details factors that are crucial to board members’ interactions and activities 
in the boardroom and answers the research question: How does board dynamics shape 
board capital? Themes that emerged are: group interaction process; power plays; chair 
authority; role clarity and expectation; role conflict; role confusion; role strain; and 
influencers and decision-makers. The chapter ends with a summary of the key research 
findings. 
Chapter 7: This chapter begins with a reiteration of the issues confronting governance 
research and the focus of the investigation. This chapter suggests that board capital is a 
fluid concept that is influenced by organisational goals and board member attributes. The 
research findings have highlighted some key implications for the proposed relationship 
between boards and organisations. Factors such as power and values are difficult to 
observe and measure and may help to explain differences in board productivity. The 
chapter provides an evaluation of the research findings in the context of the literature and 
the research questions. The chapter is structured as follows: chapter overview; 
assumptions about boards and board capital; benefits of a sociological approach; the 
creation of board capital; answers for research Q1 and research Q2. 
Chapter 8: Conclusion and Implications for Further Research identifies key theoretical 
and policy implications for board recruitment and dynamics. While the study benefited 
from an interaction with key governance actors it was limited by not gaining access to 
observe boards in action. But observation would significantly alter the behaviours of 
board members and may not provide the perceived benefit. The study highlights the 
implications for corporate governance and the need for a more socio-political approach 
in investigating the relationship between boards and organisations. The chapter 
concludes by charting the way forward. 
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 BOARD CAPITAL 
While the initial conceptualization of board capital as the sum of the directors’ human 
and social capital appears to be appropriate, a closer examination reveals gray areas 
that warrant additional in-depth inquiry…many research studies use proxies of the 
board’s human and/or social capital that limit our understanding of the construct. 
Haynes and Hillman (2010, pp. 1146-1147)                                                                                                                                                                                               
2.0 Chapter Overview 
his chapter draws attention to the primary focus of this investigation, the 
interrogation of the conceptualisation of board capital. The main objective 
of this chapter is to reveal and evaluate assumptions about board capital 
through an examination of the construct, its historical origin and underlying theories that 
inform how the concept is defined, understood and developed since being coined by 
Hillman and Dalziel (2003). The chapter begins with an examination of agency and 
resource dependency theories as the main influences of the debate around the purpose of 
boards and the bedrock of the board capital construct.  
Figure 2-1: Theoretical Framework of Board Capital 
 
 
 
The conceptualisation of board capital was created out of a fusion of agency and 
resource dependency theories which explains factors that influence a board’s ability to 
monitor and provide resources to an organisation. Figure 2-1 shows that the concept of 
T 
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board capital assumes that boards execute two main roles: monitoring managers and 
agents on behalf of owners and organisational stakeholders (the agency perspective) and 
providing scarce resources to an organisation including pertinent information (the 
resource dependency perspective). Board decision-making is assumed to be influenced 
by board incentives, equity compensation and board dependence which in turn influences 
the quality of monitoring and the ability of board members to influence organisational 
outcomes. The interaction of board members’ human and social capital shaped by 
moderating factors (incentives, compensation, and board dependence) explains the value 
to be derived from a particular board and the resource referred to as board capital. Human 
and social capital theories are integrated into the concept of board capital to facilitate 
operationalisation which allows the resource embedded within boards to be quantified 
for economic purposes (Hillman & Dalziel 2003, pp. 390-392).  
This chapter traces the development of the conceptualisation of board capital which 
includes exploring human and social capital theories which explain how the construct is 
operationalised. Human and social capital theories are discussed within the context in 
which they were introduced, outlining an economic and sociological origin respectively, 
both fused to facilitate an examination of boards. The operationalisation of the concept 
of board capital advances an understanding that there is intangible ‘capital’ associated 
with human beings (Becker 1962; Bourdieu 1985). More importantly, board capital is 
recognised as a hybrid construct that has moved discussions of human and social capital 
from an individual examination to an analysis of group behaviour.   
This chapter then progresses to provide a systematic review of literature identifying 
empirical studies that have investigated the concept of ‘board capital’. The state of the 
literature on board capital is evaluated, analysing findings and arguments to date. In 
concluding this chapter offers an assessment of contemporary issues that have a bearing 
on board capital and ends with a critical assessment of the board capital construct, 
evaluating its usefulness in understanding board recruitment and dynamics. 
 
2.1 Historical Influences on the Concept of Board Capital  
The conceptualisation of board capital has roots in agency theory, a concept 
formalised by Berle and Means (1932) and later contested by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976). Agency theory has proved to be arguably the most influential theory in 
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understanding issues concerning dispersed ownership structures. The concept was given 
much attention because of the profit crisis and leverage buyout movement that disrupted 
economies in the 1970s. At the time investigations such as (Fama & Jensen 1983b; Jensen 
1978) sought to uncover how public organisations systematically endeavoured to 
maximise value in times of crisis.   
In order to understand the fundamental assumptions of the concept of board capital it 
is pertinent to explain the historical developments of agency theory and factors that have 
shaped an understanding of how organisational agents are assumed to behave when faced 
with various alternatives and demands. In the mid-1970s Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
began a stream of research which sought to recast the neoclassical theory of an 
organisation with specific focus on the role of boards, managers and their relationship to 
organisations (Baker, Jensen & Murphy 1988; Fama & Jensen 1983b; Jensen 1978; 
Jensen & Meckling 1976; Jensen & Ruback 1983). Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
questioned the existing market orientated analysis of an organisation, seeking to provide 
an enhanced understanding of the inner workings of organisations which was referred to 
by neoclassical theorists as a ‘black box’ (Demsetz 1997).  
Prior to Jensen and Meckling (1976) investigation, agency theorists had proposed a 
narrow view of the role of boards and managers which was understood as a job to direct 
the factors of production (land, labour, capital, raw material). One of the important 
implications of the reframing of agency theory is that empirical tests of agency are also 
joint tests of the neoclassical theory of an organisation which are equally important to 
these discussions. Neoclassical theory suggests that an organisation does not play a 
critical role in understanding how resources are allocated and used efficiently. The 
neoclassical theory of an organisation is best explained by Coase (1937): 
The normal economic system works itself. For its current operation it is under no 
central control, it needs no central survey. Over the whole range of human activity 
and human need, supply is adjusted to demand, and production to consumption, by 
a process that is automatic, elastic and responsive (Coase 1937, p. 387).  
Although neoclassical theorists (Coase 1937; Jevons 2013; Weintraub 1993) maintain 
that the system ‘works itself’, economists have conceded that there is a role for 
individuals to play in maintaining order in the system. It is understood that individuals, 
and by extension boards, play a role in decision-making (Jensen 2000). Organisational 
agents (managers and boards) are expected to exercise prudence in evaluating production 
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options, which involves selecting the best alternative that will ensure the most gains 
(Coase 1937). In the context of the conceptualisation of board capital this means that 
board capital is one of the inputs that explains organisational decisions which involve 
some amount of expertise and access to the factors of production including pertinent 
information.  
While neoclassical theorists acknowledge that organisational agents play a role in 
decision-making it is maintained that organisational resources are principally allocated 
by the price mechanism (Blanchard 1997; Coase 1937). In other words, the price 
mechanism explains how the factors of production are distributed, suggesting that 
demand and supply determines how boards are exploited. An implication of this 
argument is that boards are structured and used based on the demands imposed by market 
forces. The neoclassical perspective ignores social relationships and discounts their 
importance in the functioning of boards and organisations. 
The distinctiveness of the neoclassical perspective lies in the notion that individuals 
inherently possess the ability to produce maximum wealth in society (Wolff & Resnick 
2012). Neoclassical theory is built on the premise that there is an ideal social organisation 
that will freely enable individuals to realise their optimal potential (Wolff & Resnick 
2012). Optimal potential is defined by the ‘greatest possible wellbeing of the greatest 
number’ (Wolff & Resnick 2012, p. 51). However, the theory does not explain the 
internal workings of the social organisation or how individuals achieve their optimal 
potential (Coase 1937). The deficiency of neoclassical arguments provides key points for 
this study that seeks to understand how board capital explains board recruitment and 
dynamics.  
While neoclassical theorists admit that internal organisational decisions are not 
directly dictated by the price mechanism there has not been much interest in the process 
of decision-making within organisations (Coase 1937; Demsetz 1997; Ferguson 2008). 
It is understood that the assignment of labour within organisations is not explained by 
the price mechanism but it is assumed that decisions will reflect the demands being 
imposed by market forces. In other words it is theorised that market factors will weigh 
meaningfully on the choice and allocation of labour within organisations and ultimately 
the types of indviduals who are recruited onto boards.  
Beyond Board Capital: Probing Inside the Black Box of Australian Board Recruitment and Dynamics         Chapter 2 
17 | P a g e  
 
There are a number of limitations identified in neoclassical arguments. Firstly, market 
forces do not explain institutional or cultural factors that have a bearing on organisational 
decisions. Unless it is assumed for example that organisational philosophy or culture is 
influenced by market forces then there is a deficiency in the neoclassical understanding 
of how organisations function and define their role in society. Secondly, boards, although 
treated as tools in the neoclassical conceptualisation, are inherently not fixed or stagnant. 
The diverse nature of boards challenges the neoclassical application which relies on the 
concept of ceteris paribus, all other things held constant (Cartwright 1995). Thirdly, 
boards make decisions as a collective and neoclassical constructs are not designed to 
explain group behaviour. Based on the neoclassical reliance on simplicity, group 
behaviour is essentially ignored. Established on these identified limitations the concept 
of board capital is inherently reliant on factors that can be explained by market forces. 
While economists recognise that neoclassical theory does not explain the internal 
mechanisms of an organisation, it is suggested that internal organisational activities are 
associated with planning which differs from economic planning (Coase 1937). 
Neoclassical theory suggests that an organisation is the fourth factor of production 
coordinated by an entrepreneur (Coase 1937). However, the intricacies of the 
entrepreneurial process are essentially ignored. Demsetz (1997) explained:  
Neoclassical theory’s objective is to understand price-guided, not management-
guided, resource allocation. The firm does not play a central role in the theory. It 
is that well known ‘black box’ into which resources go and out of which goods 
come, with little attention paid to how this transformation is accomplished (p. 426). 
The neoclassical conceptualisation of organisations views social relationships as a 
product of necessity created to satisfy individual needs (Coase 1937). It is assumed that 
social interactions are in principle more transactional than relational. The neoclassical 
perspective consequently ignores the nature of relationships and their potential benefit or 
associated strain created. Neoclassical theory posits a more individualistic than collective 
view of organisations (Hughes & O'Neill 2008). The theory suggests that individuals are 
driven by their desires based on nature. Shapiro (1976) explained: 
The world of exchange is the product of individuals’ needs and, conversely, it is 
within this world that the needs of individuals are expressed or revealed. In 
neoclassical economics, the exchange relationship is the expression of individual 
need, and the principle of exchange in all its particular forms is the satisfaction or 
expression of this need (pp. 71-72). 
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While there is some merit in these arguments, social and economic organisations are 
noted to be complex and idiosyncratic although operating with some degree of control 
(Barnard 1938; Mintzberg 1989; Weber 1947). The treatment of an organisation as a 
‘black box’ has resulted in a scarcity of empirical work in the board context that sheds 
light on the social processes within boards and organisations. As organisations have 
evolved to become more diverse, neoclassical assumptions and propositions have 
become less practical but remain fundamental to systems that have some economic 
implications.  
The revival of agency theory with the work of Jensen and Meckling (1976) came at a 
time when it was believed that amendments to the Corporation Act in the early 20th 
century in US had given power to management at the expense of the owners of capital 
(Jensen 1994). The dominant viewpoint at the time was that board members were 
operating according to a broad ambit which did not benefit owners (Fama & Jensen 
1983a). Boards were assigned the responsibility of balancing a range of competing 
interests between organisational stakeholders (Fama 1980).  
The issue of competing interests is embedded in the conceptualisation of board capital 
which does not directly take into account how organisational stakeholders influence the 
decisions of board members. The board capital construct assumes that board decisions 
are mainly shaped by the human and social capital of board members ignoring the 
influence of organisational stakeholders. Although the concept of board capital is 
founded on neoclassical arguments, and as such inherits the concerns highlighted by 
neoclassical theorists, these are not included in the construct. This study evaluates 
whether interactions, interdependencies and interrelationships associated with 
organisational stakeholders affect board dynamics and influence the board decision-
making process.  
It should be highlighted that competing interests among organisational stakeholders 
create a duty paradox because the neoclassical theory of an organisation argued that the 
only role of managers and by extension boards is to maximise profits for owners 
(Friedman & Friedman 2002). However, it is pertinent to highlight that English law 
articulates a different view and there is an inherent conflict between the neoclassical and 
legal view of boards. In Australia, the case of Gas Lighting Improvement Co Ltd v Inland 
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Revenue Commissioners (1923) [AC 723 at 740 – 741] has established legal precedent; 
Lord Summers expressed the legal position: 
Between the investors, who participate as shareholders, and the undertaking carried 
on, the law interposes another person, real though artificial, the company itself, and 
the business carried on is the business of that company, capital employed is its 
capital and not in either case the business or capital of the shareholders. Assuming, 
of course, that the company is duly formed and is not a sham (of which there is no 
suggestion here), the idea that [the company] is mere machinery for effecting the 
purpose of the shareholder is a layman’s fallacy. It is a figure of speech, which 
cannot alter the legal aspect (Zubair Abbasi 2009, p. 403).  
Despite the conflict between neoclassical theory and law, Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
is one of the most widely cited works in corporate governance. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) analysis was a resurgence of the debate that took place in the 1950s (Berle 1947; 
Friedman 1953) regarding the purpose of an organisation. Economic investigations 
aimed at understanding management behaviour and organisational success or failure 
have primarily focused on solving the agency problem associated with the separation of 
ownership and control (Berle & Means 1968). The agency view has been guided by the 
conviction that principals (owners) and agents (managers) will seek ‘utility 
maximisation’ and as a result, agents’ interests will not always coincide with that of 
principals (Berle & Means 1968). The concept of board capital is founded on these 
arguments. 
Agency theorists assume that managers are motivated by self-interest and as a result 
will satisfy their personal needs at the expense of an organisation, an outgrowth of 
neoclassical arguments. Agency theorists postulate that principals (owners) may reduce 
the ‘self-optimising’ behaviours of agents by providing suitable incentives and by 
sustaining ‘monitoring costs’ (Jensen & Meckling 1976). It is, however, not entirely clear 
in these discussions whether boards are principals or managers. Although it is generally 
assumed that boards exist to monitor agents, boards are legally designed to function with 
an obligation to an organisation: 
We have reached a condition in which the individual interest of the shareholder is 
definitely made subservient to the will of a controlling group of managers even 
though the capital of the enterprise is made up out of the aggregated contributions 
of perhaps many thousand individuals. The legal doctrine that the judgement of the 
directors [board members] must prevail as to the best interest of the enterprise is in 
fact tantamount to saying that in any given instance the interest of the individual 
may be sacrificed to the economic exigencies of the enterprise as a whole, the 
interpretation of the board of directors as to what constitutes an economic exigency 
being practicably final (Berle & Means 1932, p. 244).  
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The above statement by Berle and Means (1932) emphasises that boards are the 
highest authority governing organisational affairs and not shareholders. This is an 
important point as this echoes the spirit of law which identifies an organisation as a 
stakeholder with privileges. Although law has not provided an in depth understanding of 
the role of board members, it is suggested that decisions of a board must preserve the 
economic life of an organisation (Berle & Means 1932). This is important for the 
conceptualisation of board capital because law provides the fundamentals that explain in 
some respects how board members come to understand and define their role. However, 
neoclassical arguments have been quite influential, creating an inherent conflict. This 
study seeks to understand what factors influence board dynamics and how they shape 
board capital and decision-making within boards. 
The agency perspective assumes that conflict is an inherent part of decision-making 
and is built on the supposition that incentives and resources (boards) expended to monitor 
agents (managers) will align the agent’s interest with that of the principal (shareholder) 
(Jensen & Meckling 1976). Agency theorists assert that incentives should provide 
reasonable assurance that an agent (manager, board) will not act in a manner that will 
harm the principal (Jensen & Meckling 1976). If an agent deviates from the interest of a 
principal, the theory suggests there should be compensation for the principal (Jensen & 
Meckling 1976). For that reason, the conceptualisation of board capital is built on the 
premise that incentives will moderate and influence the strength of the relationship 
between board capital and organisational outcomes. Board capital is hence the motivation 
of boards to use their human and social capital to achieve the goals of the principal 
(narrow view) and, in the broader conceptualisation, organisational stakeholders.  
Consequently, there have been a significant number of studies (Agrawal & Knoeber 
1996; Aguilera et al. 2008; Baker, Jensen & Murphy 1988; Bathala & Rao 1995; 
Baysinger & Hoskisson 1990; Conyon, Judge & Useem 2011) conducted to explain the 
differences in organisational actions and outcomes. However, the success or failure of 
organisations remains difficult to explain. Theories have not been able to adequately 
explain the diverse nature of board and management behaviour in large organisations. 
The conceptualisation of board capital is another such attempt to explain economically 
how board members contribute to organisational outcomes by influencing decision-
making. However, it is not clear how board members are selected by organisations and 
Beyond Board Capital: Probing Inside the Black Box of Australian Board Recruitment and Dynamics         Chapter 2 
21 | P a g e  
 
stakeholders and how these decisions influence the creation of board capital and 
influence board dynamics.  
There has been some debate by researchers regarding whether boards should have an 
expanded role beyond monitoring managers (Conyon, Judge & Useem 2011; Hillman, 
Withers & Collins 2009). Using the agency lens, a board’s role is classified as a 
performance role that involves guiding management to ensure that the correct decisions 
are made regarding strategy and business culture that will lead to profit maximisation 
(Conyon, Judge & Useem 2011). However, this conceptualisation does not consider the 
‘self-optimising’ behaviour of board members or how competing stakeholder interests 
may influence board decisions (Dobbin & Jung 2010). Agency theory assumes that a 
board’s interests are aligned with that of the organisation and/or its owners 
(shareholders). The agency treatment of boards inherently creates the principal/principal 
problem (Miller 2005).  
The principal/principal problem is created by competing interests that may exist 
among individuals with a vested interest in an organisation (Young et al. 2008). The 
principal/principal problem is ignored by agency theorists, who are primarily concerned 
with the principal/agent problem (Miller 2005; Young et al. 2008). This has implications 
for the conceptualisation of board capital which assumes that all board members have 
similar motivations and, where differences arise, that incentives, equity and remuneration 
resolve conflicts. This study evaluates whether these assumptions hold true and sheds 
light on how board members come to rationalise and make decisions as a collective. 
While there have been several debates about the role of boards and how board 
members define their role, the most influential arguments have been made by agency and 
resource dependency theorists. Resource theorists have extended an ‘olive branch’ for 
those commentators that assert that boards are much more involved in organisational 
affairs and are not just monitoring agents (Pfeffer & Leblebici 1973). Although resource 
dependency theory owes its genesis to the same period as agency theory, it was not until 
the 1990s, and particularly since the 2000s, that both traditions could be said to stand as 
serious alternatives to each other. Also, it should be emphasised that the 
conceptualisation of board capital supports that both arguments are valid and are much 
more useful combined than separated, being treated as competing views (Hillman & 
Dalziel 2003).  
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The conceptualisation of board capital is founded on the premise that boards are a 
means used by organisations to influence outcomes (Hillman & Dalziel 2003; Hillman, 
Withers & Collins 2009). These ideas are principally built on the resource dependency 
perspective of organisations introduced by the seminal work of Pfeffer, Jeffrey  and 
Salancik (2003) first published in 1978. The Pfeffer, Jeffrey  and Salancik (2003) study 
was primarily conducted to explain how organisations deal with uncertainty and manage 
their dependence on the environment. Pfeffer, Jeffrey and Salancik (2003) suggested that 
the environment plays a key role in understanding how organisations make decisions. 
The main difference in these discussions from that of agency is the acceptance that social 
actors and power (Figure 2-2) have a distinct role to play in organisational decisions 
(Hillman, Cannella & Paetzold 2000). 
Figure 2-2: An Integrative Resource Base Model 
 
 
Adopted and modified from Nienhuser (2008, p. 11) and Pfeffer and Salancik (2003, p. 229) 
Resource dependency theorists place much weight on organisational decisions which 
include the selection of board members (Pfeffer, Jeffrey  & Salancik 2003). The theory 
asserts that decisions are crucial to organisational success and as a result is focused on 
understanding how organisations form partnerships and achieve acceptance from 
organisational stakeholders by modifying internal processes (Pfeffer, Jeffrey  & Salancik 
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2003). The resource dependency perspective focused on shedding light on factors that 
economic theorists had ignored, primarily associated with the metaphoric ‘black box’. 
Figure 2-2 above shows that the distribution of power and control is of key interest to 
resource dependency theorists. Although the conceptualisation of board capital has 
embraced the resource dependency view the construct does not shed light on board 
recruitment and provides no insights about power and control within organisations. By 
investigating board recruitment and dynamics this qualitative study provides awareness 
about the board recruitment process and the role of organisational actors, uncovering 
factors that shed light on the power dynamics within boards. 
The term ‘resource dependence’ was born of the idea that organisations require 
resources from the environment, such as information to aid decision-making, skilled 
personnel to execute strategies and material to produce goods and services (Pfeffer, 
Jeffrey  & Salancik 2003). This inherent need of organisations creates a reliance on the 
environment and is proposed to provide an alternative explanation for organisational 
success or failure (Pfeffer, Jeffrey  & Salancik 2003). It is purported that although there 
is much reliance on the environment, boards and managers can exert power to reduce 
uncertainty and environmental dependence (Hillman, Withers & Collins 2009). Resource 
dependency theorists propose that a board or manager’s primary role is to control crucial 
resources by increasing their power over others (Hillman, Withers & Collins 2009).  
The theory suggests that board members and managers who can act to reduce 
uncertainty reduce the chance of organisational failure (Hillman, Withers & Collins 
2009). However, it is suggested that each decision creates additional dependence and 
interdependence on others (Pfeffer, Jeffrey  & Salancik 2003). The resource dependency 
theory of an organisation stresses the importance of networks and the potential embedded 
within relationships (Pfeffer, Jeffrey  & Salancik 2003). The recognition of the 
importance of networks has been considered in the concept of board capital with its 
inclusion of social capital (Hillman & Dalziel 2003). Although social capital has been 
considered in the conceptualisation of board capital, it is not clear how social capital 
explains the board recruitment process and how social capital shapes board dynamics. 
The resource dependency theory suggests that the homogenisation of boards by 
agency theorists neglects to recognise the role of power within organisations (Hillman, 
Withers & Collins 2009). Homogenisation is the treatment of boards as fixed structures, 
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ignoring the dynamic characteristics of individuals and social relationships. Conversely, 
resource dependency theory identifies those heterogeneous characteristics of boards that 
matter for organisational success (Drees & Heugens 2013). The theory proposes that 
boards are used by organisations to achieve ‘sovereignty’ (Hillman, Withers & Collins 
2009). Sovereignty is achieved by applying various negotiating tactics aimed at 
eliminating restrictions imposed by the environment (Pfeffer, Jeffrey  & Salancik 2003). 
Although board capital is founded on these arguments, the construct does not shed light 
on how boards achieve and use sovereignty. 
While it has been argued that outside board members may be ideal candidates for 
providing guidance in crisis situations (Daily & Dalton 1995), there are several reasons 
why they may not do a good job. Hart (1995) has noted that external board members 
possess insufficient information for effective decision-making. However, resource 
dependency theorists contend that networking is central to obtaining needed information, 
a notion referred to as ‘co-opting’ (Pfeffer, Jeffrey  & Salancik 2003). The patterns of 
behaviour created by co-opting are suggested to produce inter-organisational and intra-
organisational power which in turn influences organisational behaviour (Hillman, 
Withers & Collins 2009). It should be noted that the construct of board capital is not 
equipped to explain how co-opting works in principle or whether these assumptions hold 
true. It is assumed that board members with high social capital will be better able to form 
useful alliances and partnerships. 
Resource dependency arguments are primarily built on findings from Pfeffer and 
Leblebici (1973) that many of the factors that impacted organisational results were not 
directly associated with major players within organisations (Pfeffer & Leblebici 1973). 
The researchers assert that many policies and regulations that influenced organisational 
outcomes were skilfully ordered through indirect persuasion (Pfeffer & Leblebici 1973). 
Power is a crucial factor in resource dependency arguments but has not been directly 
included in the conceptualisation of board capital. It is assumed that human and social 
capital are the factors used to influence decisions and organisational outcomes. 
Based on resource dependency arguments, the conceptualisation of board capital 
suggests that boards are a mechanism for critically assessing the resources that are 
important for an organisation’s success (Hillman & Dalziel 2003). This facilitates a board 
adapting to organisational changes and structuring itself in such a way that it has the 
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needed resources to achieve organisational goals (Hillman & Dalziel 2003). It is 
postulated that when resources are sufficient conflict is reduced and there is less 
dependency on key players such as boards (Nienhüser 2008). Accordingly, power 
dynamics are defined by the availability of resources and how boards choose to minimise 
uncertainty and dependence on the environment (Nienhüser 2008).  
A key attribute of resource dependency theory is that decisions made by key players 
of organisations are suggested to explain organisational behaviour and success, in other 
words the outcome explains the means (Hillman & Dalziel 2003). As a result, when 
organisations succeed, this suggests that behaviours by key players were conducive to 
fulfil organisational goals and the converse is also true. However, the theory does not 
facilitate an understanding of the social process of decision-making. This study provides 
insights about factors that influence decision-making on board recruitment and dynamics 
and how they influence the conceptualisation of board capital. The data collected from 
this qualitative investigation facilitates a further evaluation of the underlying 
assumptions about board capital. The following section examines human capital theory 
and how it influences the board capital construct. 
 
2.2 Historical Origins of Human Capital Theory 
Gary Becker and his studies investigating the economics of education made human 
capital theory popular although the term seems to have been first used by Pigou (1928). 
Becker (1962) was concerned with those activities that impacted the future wellbeing of 
individuals. He argued that individual activities may impact either earnings or 
consumption (Becker 1962, p. 9). 
Becker (1962) was focused on those activities that may influence future ‘real income 
through the imbedding of resources in people’, which he referred to as investing in human 
capital (Becker 1962, p. 9). He postulated that ways to invest in human capital included: 
‘schooling, on-the-job training, medical care, vitamin consumption, and acquiring 
information about the economic system’ (Becker 1962, p. 9). Later, Becker (2002) 
refined his analysis of human capital which he explained ‘refers to the knowledge, 
information, ideas, skills, and health of individuals’ (Becker 2002, p. 3).  
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Becker’s interest in human capital theory and main contribution to knowledge was 
motivated by the realisation that improvements in gross domestic incomes in most 
countries were associated only in part with growth in physical capital (Becker 1964). 
This sparked an interest in identifying other factors that may be used to measure physical 
capital and drew attention to less tangible causes (Becker 1964). At the time Becker 
(1964) identified that few countries, if any, realised a sustained period of economic 
growth without investing substantial amounts in their labour force. This highlighted the 
importance of human capital and inspired Becker to do further research into this 
phenomenon. However, Table 2.1 highlights that ideas at the foundation of the concept 
of human capital existed as far back as the 18th century. 
Becker (1964) examined the monetary gain that was achieved by attending college by 
investigating American employees who were either high school or college graduates. 
Findings suggested that employees can improve their level of productivity by learning 
new skills or honing existing ones while being on the job (Becker 1964). The data 
proposed that improvement in individuals is not only associated with formal education 
but also explained by on-the-job training. 
Empirical findings showed that white male college graduates’ earnings were 
approximately 14.5 per cent higher when compared to their counterparts who only had a 
high school diploma in 1939 (Becker 1964, p. 77). In addition, the study proposed that 
non-whites had less of an incentive to go to college as this group realised a rate of return 
on income of approximately 6.6 per cent to 10 per cent in the US Northern states and 
between 10.6 per cent to 14 per cent in the US Southern states in 1939 (Becker 1964, p. 
94). Generally, the study found that there were earning differentials associated with 
gender and race. This highlights that gender has implications for human capital. 
Both the US North and South non-whites realised less than the 14.5 per cent return on 
income when compared to urban native white males (Becker 1964, p. 94). The data 
highlights that racial discrimination was predominant at that time. Furthermore, the study 
found that women spent less time in the labour force than men and therefore had less of 
an incentive to invest in market skills (Becker 1964). Women were keener to acquire 
skills that would be useful as both a housewife and contributor in the labour force (Becker 
1964, p. 51). This finding has some relevance to this study as there is currently a gender 
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imbalance on boards (Walt & Ingley 2003), which suggests that issues of the 20th century 
have continued into the 21st century. 
Becker (1964) also investigated the effect of education on individual abilities; his 
findings suggest that there was a significantly higher ability in college graduates than 
high school graduates (p. 79). While there is a presumed positive correlation between 
education and ability, it is also proposed that intelligent individuals invest more in 
education. This finding suggests that individuals who have benefited from education due 
to their human experience are conditioned to invest in education. 
 Becker (1964) conceded that the rate of return on education may be grossly 
overestimated as there are many other differences in characteristics of individuals he 
studied that may cause a systematic difference in income (p. 79). The study noted that 
factors such as ranking of college made incremental differences in earnings (Becker 
1964, p. 83). Becker’s findings may be relevant to the current investigation into boards 
to evaluate how human capital influences getting onto boards in the Australian context.  
Although Becker (1964) reported limitations with the conceptualisation of human 
capital, this did not discredit his contribution to knowledge and Becker won the Nobel 
Prize in 1992. As a result, Becker’s study has been the point of first reference in 
discussions of human capital regardless of the context. The lack of unequivocal data 
available on the board context provides a good basis for this research. 
Human capital theory has survived over four centuries and has become a 
multidisciplinary concept with roots in neoclassical economics (Tan 2014). The primary 
proposition of the concept is that education increases human capacity which in turn 
increases earnings (Becker 1962). Therefore, it is proposed that education is an 
investment that influences a nation’s capacity for growth (Becker 1964). Having its 
origins in neoclassical economics, human capital theory makes certain assumptions:  
1. Individuals are motivated by self-interest. 
2. Individuals invest in education to earn higher incomes (Tan 2014). 
These factors are important points when considering board capital which is based on 
collective notions of human capital and which is fundamentally built on two theories: 
methodological individualism and rational choice theory (Tan 2014).  
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Human capital has been the subject of much debate and cynicism even before its 
formalised recognition, notably discussed by British philosopher John Stuart Mill (1806–
1873). Mill, a liberal political economist, noted the issues associated with the treatment 
of human beings as a commodity: 
It seems to me, however, that the skill of an artisan (for instance) being both a 
desirable possession, and one of a certain durability, there is no better reason for 
refusing to it the title of wealth because it is attached to a man, than to a coal pit or 
manufactory because they are attached to a place. Besides, if the skill itself cannot 
be parted with to a purchaser, the use of it may; if it cannot be sold, it can be hired; 
and it may be, and is, sold outright in all countries whose laws permit that the man 
himself should be sold along with it. Its defect of transferability does not result 
from a natural but from a legal and moral obstacle. I do not class as wealth. He is 
the purpose for which wealth exists. But his acquired capacities, which exist only 
as means, and have been called into existence by labour, fall rightly, as it seems to 
me, within that designation (Mill 1909, p. 30). 
The sentiment in the above argument highlights that while human beings may possess 
the capacity to create wealth treating human beings as a commodity is somewhat 
problematic, although it is emphasised that treating ‘labour’ simplistically is equally 
troubling. It is argued that the conceptualisation of human beings as capital may provide 
a justification for slavery (Tan 2014).  
The idea of capital is built on the fundamental premise that objects of wealth have the 
characteristic and/or capacity to be transferred or sold. Mill (1909) highlights that in the 
case of human beings this may present an ethical or legal challenge. Mill’s closing 
statement suggests that, while the capacity possessed by humans is a means to create 
wealth, the vessel itself should not be classified as wealth for obvious reasons, although 
human ability is of categorical value. The development of the concept of human capital 
over the years has sought to overcome the moral obstacle and facilitate policies geared 
towards mobility (Tan 2014).  
While the survival of the concept is justifiable, the conceptualisation of human capital 
ignores the influence of social relations on the development of individuals. The concept 
of human capital purports that social phenomena is best understood through 
understanding the individualistic characteristics of human beings (Hodgson 2004). 
Scholars as far back as the 18th century have argued that human nature has an inherent 
tendency towards self-preservation. Bentham (1789) explains: 
It is in vain to talk of the interest of the community, without understanding what is 
the interest of the individual. A thing is said to promote the interest, or to be for the 
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interest, of an individual, when it tends to add to the sum total of his pleasures: or, 
what comes to the same thing, to diminish the sum total of his pains (Bentham, 
Burns & Hart 1970, p. 4). 
The above argument laid the foundation for the theory of ‘methodological 
individualism’ which, over the years, has been the crux of economic arguments regarding 
human capital (Udehn 2002). The economic argument ignores the nurturing of human 
beings and the socialisation process that has been found to influence how individuals 
interact within their environment. Socialisation has been found to influence choices made 
by individuals (Ashforth & Mael 1989; Green 1991).  
Methodological individualism maintains that individual motivation and preference 
reside at the core of understanding economic and social phenomena (Tan 2014). 
Furthermore, outcomes are best explained by individual choices which are influenced by 
individual impetus to maximise self-interest (Tan 2014). It should be noted that 
methodological individualism is overly focused on individuals and not groups in 
understanding economic and social phenomena. As a result the construct of board capital 
is built on this inherent limitation of human capital theory.  
Table 2-1: Evolution of Human Capital Theory 
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2.3 Empirical Evidence of Human Capital in Boards 
Applying Becker’s principle in the context of boards, Khanna, Jones and Boivie 
(2014) argued that human capital can be a source of competitive advantage. They posit 
that board members with high levels of human capital are more competent in monitoring 
and providing advice which in turn leads to improved organisational performance 
(Khanna, Jones & Boivie 2014, p. 566). Human capital, an independent variable in the 
study, comprised an aggregated measure that evaluated board members’ level of 
education and top-management-team experience measured by number of years each 
board member served as a top executive for the period 2001–2003 (Khanna, Jones & 
Boivie 2014, p. 567). Human capital measures were operationalised by using two 
proxies: a board’s average number of years of schooling which is consistent with Becker 
(1964) and a board’s average experience in top-management-teams. 
Khanna, Jones and Boivie (2014) used secondary data from 650 randomly selected 
Fortune 1000 companies with approximately 5,700 board members. Organisational 
performance, the dependent variable, was measured using return on equity (ROE) and 
return on assets (ROA) for the period 2003–2005 (Khanna, Jones & Boivie 2014, pp. 
566-567). The difference in periods of the independent and dependent variables was used 
to observe the actual effect of human capital in the boards being studied. The researchers 
assumed that it would take a board two years for board members’ influence to be 
manifested in organisational performance (Khanna, Jones & Boivie 2014, p. 566). 
However, the rationale for two years was not explained scientifically. A second 
independent variable was tested in the investigation referred to as ‘information 
processing demands’ measured by: size of board member other board appointments, 
number of businesses of board member other board appointments and number of board 
appointments (Khanna, Jones & Boivie 2014, p. 573).  
The study (Khanna, Jones & Boivie 2014) advances the discussion on board 
effectiveness as previous studies (Chhaochharia & Grinstein 2009; Dahya & McConnell 
2007; Dalton et al. 1998; Setia-Atmaja, Haman & Tanewski 2011; Westphal 1998) on 
board effectiveness focused their attention on board size and level of independence, 
making an association between those characteristics and organisational performance. 
However, studies have not provided unequivocal evidence which created a need to 
evaluate assumptions about boards. It is noted that studies (Carpenter, Pollock & Leary 
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2003; Hillman 2005; Jensen & Zajac 2004) that investigated the influence of human 
capital used context specific measures such as experience working on international 
assignments, political experience and functional background experience in finance, while 
Khanna, Jones and Boivie (2014) opted to use two more general measures. This 
highlights that there is no consensus on human capital measures and it is not entirely 
clear what constitutes a good measure within the context of boards.  
Khanna, Jones and Boivie (2014) suggest that level of education and top-
management-team experience is a conceptually good match for the construct of human 
capital and board membership, assuming that board members were recruited for their 
senior management experience (Khanna, Jones & Boivie 2014, p. 569). The criterion for 
good match was not explicitly explained but it is inferred from the researchers’ argument 
that organisations require board members with senior management experience. Although 
experience on its own is a general concept, Khanna, Jones and Boivie (2014) suggest that 
previous studies (Kor & Misangyi 2008; McDonald, Westphal & Graebner 2008) on 
boards have provided a good basis for its use. 
The study advanced discussions about board effectiveness by including the concept 
of ‘information processing demands’ (Khanna, Jones & Boivie 2014). The researchers 
assert that the benefit to be derived from board members’ human capital and by extension 
boards is dependent on the ‘information processing load’ that is imposed on board 
members as a result of their multiple board membership roles (Khanna, Jones & Boivie 
2014, p. 557). In order to identify what factors enhanced or undermined board members’ 
capacity to contribute effectively to organisations, Khanna, Jones and Boivie (2014) posit 
that individuals are susceptible to information overload when they have reached their 
information processing capacity, resulting in the inability to process additional 
information. Therefore, any additional information that is received after an individual has 
reached full information capacity becomes a liability that impairs performance (Khanna, 
Jones & Boivie 2014, p. 558).  
It is further purported that board member human capital may be irrelevant if studies 
evaluating board effectiveness do not consider the ‘negative spill over’ effect that may 
be associated with serving on multiple boards (Khanna, Jones & Boivie 2014, p. 559). It 
is further suggested that information overload may prevent organisations from leveraging 
board members’ human capital (Khanna, Jones & Boivie 2014, p. 559). However, there 
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were some inconsistencies in the Khanna, Jones and Boivie (2014) findings as while 
there was a positive relation between board members’ general human capital and 
organisational performance, the study found contradictory results when examining the 
impact of ‘information processing load’ and organisational performance (p. 575).  
When all three proxy measures for human capital were aggregated, it was revealed 
that information processing overload has a negative effect on organisational 
performance, suggesting that information overload reduced the benefit to be derived from 
human capital. However, when the proxy measures were evaluated individually they 
communicated a different story (Khanna, Jones & Boivie 2014, p. 577). The size of board 
members’ other board appointments had a positive effect on organisational performance, 
suggesting that it may be the complexity of information that matters (Khanna, Jones & 
Boivie 2014, p. 577). The researchers purported that these results suggest that the size of 
board members’ other board memberships may provide a benefit that outweighs the cost.   
Principally, the findings suggest that when information processing demands are 
increased, greater levels of board education adversely affect organisational performance 
(Khanna, Jones & Boivie 2014, p. 577). The researchers speculate that individuals with 
low levels of education may require more access to information which is used as a 
substitute for enhanced knowledge and experience (Khanna, Jones & Boivie 2014, p. 
577). Furthermore, they theorise that while board members provide lower quality advice 
when faced with high information processing demands, recommendations from board 
members who are highly educated will be given more weight by an organisation (Khanna, 
Jones & Boivie 2014, p. 578). While they posited that education and experience are 
important factors of human capital for boards, their investigation presented inconsistent 
results when examined with information processing demands (Khanna, Jones & Boivie 
2014, p. 575).  
The study (Khanna, Jones & Boivie 2014) demonstrated that education on its own 
may not be adequate to influence organisational outcomes. On the contrary, the study has 
shown that experience may be more valuable in situations where there is high information 
demand (p. 575). However, it should be noted that Khanna, Jones and Boivie did not 
evaluate education in any specific context. It is not known the specific specialisation of 
education that board members possess or alternatively what type of education is of value 
for boards. Khanna, Jones and Boivie used a simplistic method of analysing education 
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by mathematically counting and aggregating the level of education on boards, failing to 
capture quality over quantity (Khanna, Jones & Boivie 2014, p. 569). Given that the study 
demonstrated that human capital varies across boards, it would be useful to have some 
insight into these variances and an understanding of how they may or may not influence 
organisational performance. 
Lastly, the study found that governance controls (outsider ratio, institutional 
ownership, board size and CEO duality) did not significantly influence organisational 
performance on their own as shown in Model 1 of their analysis (Khanna, Jones & Boivie 
2014, p. 573). However, when human capital factors and information processing demand 
proxies are included in the investigation, governance controls have a significant impact 
on organisational performance as shown in Model 2 (Khanna, Jones & Boivie 2014, p. 
573). They were unable to explain this effect as they did not examine these relationships. 
However, they speculated that governance controls on their own are unable to explain 
board effectiveness unless the board’s abilities and limitations are known (Khanna, Jones 
& Boivie 2014, p. 578). It may also be useful to gain some insight on how governance 
controls work in principle to influence board effectiveness. The study did not evaluate 
board processes and presented more questions than answers. 
Human capital investigations in the context of boards have commonly suggested that 
human capital influences board effectiveness. Chen 2014b proposes that independent 
board members with human capital have the skill and motivation to monitor managers’ 
actions and provide organisations with valuable resources (p. 1380). It is assumed that 
higher levels of human capital enable better monitoring but investigations have ignored 
instrinsic factors such as power that may influence the ability of board members to 
monitor.  
Chen 2014b used three proxy measures (education level, CEO experience and 
international experience) to investigate the effect of independent board members’ human 
capital on internationalisation (p. 1382). Education level was determined in a similar 
manner to (Becker 1964; Khanna, Jones & Boivie 2014) which was based on board 
members’ number of years of schooling (Chen 2014b, p. 1382). Secondly, the number of 
independent board members with experience as a CEO was apportioned as a percentage 
of the board (Chen 2014b, p. 1383). Chen included a category for independent board 
members with international sales experience or experience working abroad which was 
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treated as a dummy variable to measure the direct effect of international experience on 
board effectiveness (Chen 2014b, p. 1383).  
The dependent variable internationalisation was measured using international sales as 
a proportion of total sales with the assumption that internationalisation reflects an 
organisation’s dependence on foreign markets (Chen 2014b, p. 1382). The study was 
primarily focused on independent board members in the electronics industry serving on 
company boards listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange during the period 2008–2010 
(Chen 2014b, p. 1382). Unlike Khanna, Jones and Boivie (2014), Chen did not 
incorporate a time lag for board influence, assuming that board influence would be 
manifested immediately. 
Notwithstanding the differences in empirical approach, the findings tell a similar story 
to that of Khanna, Jones and Boivie (2014). Chen 2014b found that independent board 
members having CEO and/or international experience was positively and significantly 
associated with organisational internationalisation (Chen 2014b, p. 1385). Although 
education was noted as positive, it was not significantly associated with organisational 
internationalisation (Chen 2014b, p. 1385) These findings highlight that experience may 
be a useful measure of human capital in order to evaluate board effectiveness but also 
that this factor is context sensitive. This suggests that board members’ human capital 
should be tailored to meet organisational needs as different organisations will have 
diverse goals. While this may be a practical approach in principle, it may be challenging, 
given that boards are appointed for fixed periods, usually three years. Also, there is no 
consensus on what experience will lead to effective governance within a specific context 
as there are different proxies of experience across studies and not enough industry 
specific investigations. 
Other researchers have explored other avenues to evaluate the effect of human capital 
which are relevant to these discussions. Peng Sun and Markóczy (2015) found that a 
CEO’s compensation package is a reflection of how board members view the value of a 
CEO’s human capital. In their study CEO human capital was measured using two 
variables: CEO’s international experience similarly to Chen 2014b and CEO political ties 
(Peng, Sun & Markóczy 2015, p. 124). While this is somewhat a deviation from the 
previous discussions (Becker 1964; Chen 2014b; Khanna, Jones & Boivie 2014) 
understanding of human capital with the introduction of political ties, political ties in the 
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Chinese context are an important human capital component (Peng, Sun & Markóczy 
2015). This approach again highlights the context sensitive nature of human capital and 
that it is difficult to isolate social capital from examinations of human capital.  
Findings show that having at least one board membership with political ties on boards 
increases CEO compensation by approximately 4 per cent when the CEO has 
international experience (human capital) (Peng, Sun & Markóczy 2015, p. 135). The 
writers argue based on evidence from the literature (Carpenter, Sanders & Gregersen 
2001) that during institutional transitions emerging economies such as China rely on 
international experience to boost organisational performance (Peng Sun & Markóczy 
2015). This shows that institutional factors weigh meaningfully on the types of human 
capital required by organisations. 
CEOs with international experience are valued because they are uncommon and 
possess skills that are hard to replicate (Peng, Sun & Markóczy 2015). While Becker 
(1964) introduced other proxy measures to investigate ‘market-based’ capabilities 
(human capital), context is of significant importance. It is shown that both organisational 
and country factors influence board decisions and competing on a global scale puts 
additional demands on organisations and influences the types of human capital recruited 
onto boards (Peng, Sun & Markóczy 2015).    
The study findings demonstrated that having political board memberships on boards 
did not weaken the salary of CEOs with political ties. Therefore, board members’ 
political ties (human capital in this context) did not substitute for that of the CEO or 
discount the perceived benefit of a CEO with political ties. Results illustrate that a CEO 
with political ties earns approximately 6.5 per cent more when there is a compensation 
committee within the board (Peng, Sun & Markóczy 2015, p. 135). Furthermore, findings 
show a 4 per cent increase in CEO salary when there is a compensation committee 
established on the board and the CEO has international experience (Peng, Sun & 
Markóczy 2015, p. 135). While these findings do not explicitly explain board 
effectiveness, they provide some insights about the decision-making mechanisms within 
boards and how they are influenced by human or social capital dependent on how these 
are defined by researchers. 
Additionally, the findings suggest that having board compensation committees 
positively benefits CEOs with high human capital within the Chinese context. The study 
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sample consisted of 10,329 organisational yearly observations from companies traded on 
the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges during the period 2001–2008. The study 
excluded financial services organisations as these were state owned and state owned 
organisations rarely use performance-based pay structures (Peng, Sun & Markóczy 
2015). The study presented an unconventional perspective of human capital by the 
inclusion of political ties as a proxy measure (Peng, Sun & Markóczy 2015) and proposed 
that board decisions regarding CEO compensation are based somewhat on institutional 
factors and perceptions. Given that the study did not specifically evaluate the 
effectiveness of the boards investigated, it is not known whether these decisions are 
characteristic of effective governance.  
Investigations that have focused on finding a relationship between human capital and 
governance have presented various perspectives. Human capital has been described in 
several ways and is shown to be influenced by many factors. One such example is Liu, 
McConnell and Xu (2017) who found that the media plays a role in corporate governance 
by influencing the value of CEO human capital (p. 175). The study investigated the level 
of media coverage (media attention) given to organisations during the four years prior to 
their CEO’s departure from their role (Liu, McConnell & Xu 2017, p. 177). The analysis 
evaluated the tone of the coverage (media tone), proposing that the media influences 
managers’ actions by influencing the value of their human capital (Dyck, Volchkova & 
Zingales 2008; Liu, McConnell & Xu 2017).  
The study postulates that a CEO’s current actions influence future board membership 
opportunities (Liu, McConnell & Xu 2017, p. 175). This is due to the perceived value of 
human capital which is hypothesised as the present value of the expected return in the 
future (Liu, McConnell & Xu 2017, p. 175). Findings show that 12.5 per cent of CEOs 
whose organisations received positive media coverage in the four years prior to their exit 
experienced a net increase in board seat appointments post-retirement (Liu, McConnell 
& Xu 2017, p. 181), compared to the 7.1 per cent of CEOs whose organisations received 
negative media coverage (Liu, McConnell & Xu 2017, p. 181).  
These findings suggest that boards, in recruiting members, evaluate an individual who 
has had previous experience as a CEO based on the good or bad publicity their previous 
employing organisation received. Media coverage is therefore used as a tool to assess the 
value of the potential board member’s human capital. Furthermore, findings revealed that 
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14.4 per cent of CEOs whose organisations received negative media coverage prior to 
their departure experienced a net decrease in board seats (Liu, McConnell & Xu 2017, p. 
181), compared to 8.5 per cent of CEOs whose organisations had positive media coverage 
but experienced a net decrease in board seats (Liu, McConnell & Xu 2017, p. 181). This 
provides some insights about the board recruitment system and suggests that prominent 
members in society with senior management experience are desirable for boards but there 
remains a vague understanding of the board recruitment process. 
Although there is a notable relationship between media coverage and number of board 
seats held by previous CEOs, the findings also suggest there are other factors that may 
influence the perception of human capital and/or an individual seeking to become a board 
member. There were 8.5 per cent of CEOs whose organisations received favourable 
media coverage yet experienced a decrease in board seats. This may be for several 
reasons: the simplest reason is these individuals may not have actively sought to increase 
their board roles. There are additional questions that arise from these findings such as: 
how does one become a board member? The following section evaluates social capital 
theory and discusses its relevance to the discussion of board capital. 
2.4 Historical Origins of Social Capital 
The term ‘social capital’ was popularised by sociologists (Bourdieu 1985; Coleman 
1988) and was later applied in economic studies (Knack & Keefer 1997; Woolcock 1998) 
that sought to quantity its benefit. It has not been confirmed who coined the term, but it 
was first documented in a publication by Hanifan (1916), who was a state supervisor of 
rural schools in West Virginia. At the time Hanifan (1916) identified social capital as a 
factor that contributed to the success of schools. Specifically, he put forward the concept 
to emphasise the importance of community involvement. He explains the use of the term: 
In the use of the phrase social capital I make no reference to the usual acceptation 
of the term capital, except in a figurative sense. I do not refer to real estate, or to 
personal property or to cold cash, but rather to that in life which tends to make these 
tangible substances count for most in the daily lives of a people, namely, good-
will, fellowship, mutual sympathy and social intercourse among a group of 
individuals and families who make up a social unit, the rural community, whose 
logical centre is the school. In community building as in business organization and 
expansion there must be an accumulation of capital before constructive work can 
be done (Hanifan 1916, p. 130).  
The term later emerged in Jacobs (1965) study that investigated urban communities 
that progressed and survived due to strong networks based on trust and cooperation. 
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Jacobs (1965) highlighted the benefit of social capital for individuals who had access to 
additional resources made available through family. Access to social capital was found 
to be critical to a child’s development (Jacobs 1965, p. 80). She proposed that the renewal 
of societies was greatly dependent on communities being able to retain their citizens and 
attract newcomers (Jacobs 1965). She stated: 
If self-government in the place is to work, underlying any float of population must 
be a continuity of people who have forged neighbourhood networks. These 
networks are a city’s irreplaceable social capital. Whenever the capital is lost, from 
whatever cause, the income from it disappears, never to return until and unless new 
capital is slowly and chancily accumulated (Jacobs 1965, p. 138).  
While these discussions were not made in the organisational context, they are 
important in acquiring an understanding of the nature of social capital. Group cohesion 
is an important characteristic of social capital and the suggestion in Jacob’s statement is 
that there is an income component associated with social capital which is lost whenever 
there is an absence of ‘cohesive communities’ (Jacobs 1965).  
There are many factors that have been noted to contribute to an individual’s social 
capital. Loury (1977) suggests that individuals who have the resources of greater parental 
income and who are white have the advantage of earning higher incomes. These 
arguments are important as context provides an understanding of the nature of social 
capital and may be relevant in explaining who is recruited onto boards. Loury (1977) 
noted that the concept of social capital may be useful in evaluating human capital given 
that not everyone has access to the same resources thus explaining the differences in 
human capital and income: 
An individual’s social origin has an obvious and important effect on the amount of 
resources that is ultimately invested in his or her development. It may thus be useful 
to employ a concept of “social capital” to represent the consequences of social 
position in facilitating acquisition of the standard human capital characteristics. 
While measurement problems abound, this idea does have the advantage of forcing 
the analyst to consider the extent to which individual earnings are accounted for by 
social forces outside an individual’s control. However, for precisely this reason 
such analysis is unlikely to develop within the confines of traditional neoclassical 
theory (Loury 1977, p. 176).  
Loury (1977) highlighted the inherent issues associated with measuring the value of 
social capital but noted that it should not be restricted to traditional economic theories. 
He argued that traditional economic theories are remiss in proposing that variances in 
income among employees are explained by individual differences in education and 
experience (Loury 1977, p. 176). This reiterates that examinations of human capital in 
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isolation of social capital may not be particularly insightful. The conceptualisation of 
human capital was further criticised by Bourdieu (1985) who found the concept to be a 
reductionist view of ‘mechanical equilibria between agents who are treated as 
interchangeable particles’ (p. 15). He argued that the notion of capital should be 
reintroduced showing the different dimensions and effects: 
Capital is accumulated labour (in its materialized form or its “incorporated”, 
embodied form) which, when appropriated on a private, i.e., exclusive, basis by 
agents or groups of agents, enables them to appropriate social energy in the form 
of reified or living labour. It is a vis insita, a force inscribed in objective or 
subjective structures, but it is also a lex insita, the principle underlying the 
immanent regularities of the social world. It is what makes the games of society –
not least, the economic game – something other than simple games of chance 
offering at every moment the possibility of a miracle (Bourdieu 1985, p. 15).  
Bourdieu (1985) emphasised that economic theories have not accounted for the 
structure and functioning of the social world. He further argues that ‘economic theory 
has allowed to be foisted upon it a definition of the economy of practices which is the 
historical invention of capitalism’ (Bourdieu 1985, p. 16). These arguments have 
implications for board capital as it is not clearly understood how board capital is created 
given that the construct is an amalgation of human and social capital theories. The 
process has evaded discussions on board capital. 
The main criticism of economic theories is that they are narrowly focused on profit 
maximisation and self-interest (Bourdieu 1985). This has resulted in the reductionist 
application of discounting the ‘universe of exchanges to mercantile exchange’, ignoring 
the other forms of exchanges and disregarding their economic nature (Bourdieu 1985, p. 
16). Fundamentally, human capital theory does not take into account the influence of 
social relationships that facilitate the exchange of goods and services. It is argued that 
the ‘disinterested forms of exchange which ensure transubstantiation whereby the most 
material types of capital…those which are economic in the restricted sense can present 
themselves in the immaterial form of cultural capital or social capital and vice versa’, 
emphasising the interconnected nature of human and social capital (Bourdieu 1985, p. 
16).  
The association between governance and social capital appears to have been first made 
by Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti (1993) who found that ‘quality of governance was 
determined by longstanding traditions of civic engagement or lack thereof (Putnam, 
Leonardi & Nanetti 1993, p. 66). The writers investigated the rapidly growing economies 
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within Asia and highlighted that it was the ‘dense’ social networks that appear to drive 
the society’s development (Putnam, Leonardi & Nanetti 1993). These networks have 
been classified as a new brand of ‘network capitalism’ (Putnam, Leonardi & Nanetti 
1993). It is purported that the rate of development in countries such as China was not due 
to formal institutions but instead associated with personal connections that underlie 
investment and business contracts (Putnam, Leonardi & Nanetti 1993).  
In contemporary times the term social capital was brought back to life by Robert 
Putnam (2000) in his bestselling book, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of 
American Community. Putnam highlighted that Americans were spending less time in 
social activities and spending more time watching television and commuting to work. He 
validated this argument by observing how Americans played 10-pin bowling, a popular 
sport at the time. He noted that while bowling leagues were increasing considerably, 
Americans were no longer competing against each other; they were literally ‘bowling 
alone’ (Putnam 2000, pp. 112-113). The significance of ‘bowling alone’ was in the 
revelation that a reduction in civil engagement contributed to social problems. 
Empirically the study revealed that a decline in social engagement has several 
implications for society and causes a number of social problems (Putnam 2000, p. 309). 
However, what is relevant for this investigation of boards and the concept of board capital 
is the suggestion that social capital causes ‘social stratification’: 
We have not always reckoned with the indirect social costs of our policies, but we 
were right to be worried about the power of private associations. Social inequalities 
may be embedded in social capital. Norms and networks that serve some groups 
may obstruct others, particularly if the norms are discriminatory or the networks 
socially segregated. A recognition of the importance of social capital in sustaining 
community life does not exempt us the need to worry about how that “community” 
is defined – who is inside and thus benefits from social capital and who is outside 
does not (Putnam 2000, p. 358).  
The issue of social stratification identified by Putnam (2000) is not unique to the 
context being studied as organisations and boards have been found to exhibit some of the 
issues outlined. Studies on boards (Bazerman & Schoorman 1983; Robins & Alexander 
2004; Zajac & Westphal 1996; Zona, Gomez-Mejia & Withers 2015) over several 
decades have found that interlocking directorships (a measure of social capital in the 
board context) has both positive and negative effects on organisations. An investigation 
into how social capital affects board recruitment and dynamics and the concept of board 
capital in the Australian context should provide new insights into these issues. 
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Table 2-2: Definitions of Social Capital 
 
 
2.5 Empirical Evidence of Social Capital in Boards 
Investigating the board recruitment and selection process has been an embryonic area 
in governance research. Johnson et al. (2011) investigated the factors that influenced 
board membership by analysing outside board members that were newly appointed on 
publicly listed companies during the period 1993–2007 in the United States. They 
compiled a sample from 106 companies with 336 outside board members. Johnson et al. 
(2011) found that the number of board ties and status of new board members was 
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categorically connected to an organisation’s complexity: scale (revenue, assets, number 
of employees) and scope (number of different lines of business) (p. 1788). The status of 
a board was categorically linked to the appointment of new board members with high 
status (Johnson et al. 2011, p. 1783). 
Social capital was defined as a ‘person’s socially valuable personal attributes and 
network connections’ (Johnson et al. 2011, p. 1784). (Johnson et al. 2011, p. 1790) 
measured new board members’ social capital with two proxy variables: board ties (total 
number of other board memberships) and board member status. Board member status 
was perceived as a complicated factor to measure and the researchers therefore relied 
heavily on mandated publicly disclosed information (Johnson et al. 2011). In order to 
capture the various components of board members’ status the researchers categorised 
status in five ways: high academic status (work experience as a dean of a college or 
president of a university), high business status (CEO of an organisation), high military 
status (general/admiral), high political status (held state or national level political office) 
and high social status (prominent roles in community or service on notable not-for-profit 
boards such as opera or museum) (Johnson et al. 2011, p. 1790). 
(Johnson et al. 2011) also included compensation in their analysis as a possible 
motivation for board membership. Although board compensation was categorically 
associated with organisational complexity (i.e. scale and scope of an organisation), the 
researchers could not find a connection between compensation and board members with 
high social capital (Johnson et al. 2011, p. 1795). This is an important point as the 
conceptualisation of board capital theorises that compensation will influence board 
members’ ability to monitor and provide resources to an organisation, although it is not 
clear to what extent compensation influences decision-making. 
 Conversely, board status and board ties were highly correlated with each other 
(Johnson et al. 2011, p. 1795). They argue that status and board ties are two distinct 
variables and as a result should not be measured as a single construct (Johnson et al. 
2011). Furthermore, the data suggests that individual board members with either form of 
social capital (status or board ties) will achieve board membership on similar 
organisations (Johnson et al. 2011, p. 1795).  
Johnson et al. 2011, (p. 1787) assumed that board members who were contemplating 
board membership would be more likely drawn to a board with high-status board 
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members. It is assumed that high-status board members provide an incentive for 
prospective board members because of the benefit of being associated with an 
organisation with high-status board members (Johnson et al. 2011, p. 1787). 
Furthermore, they posit that high-status board members would be reluctant to 
compromise their reputation and therefore this indicates to the prospecting board 
members that the firm is of high value (Johnson et al. 2011, p. 1787). They further 
proposed that a board with high-status board members would be motivated to seek out 
board members with high social capital to come onto their board (Johnson et al. 2011, p. 
1787). This is perceived to be a two-way relationship as board members with high social 
capital would be more receptive to a board with high-status board members (Johnson et 
al. 2011, p. 1787).  
The findings provide some insight into how and why particular board members gain 
membership on boards with other board members with high social capital (Johnson et al. 
2011). In addition, the data indicates that complex organisations (defined by scale of 
revenue, assets and employees as well as number of different lines of business) will seek 
to recruit new high-profile board members (Johnson et al. 2011). Specifically, the data 
validates the reasoning that board members with high social capital will be drawn to 
organisational boards with high profile members (Johnson et al. 2011). Furthermore, 
board members are perceived to be more skilled when they have high social capital and 
also membership on a board of a complex organisation (Johnson et al. 2011). Complex 
organisations are perceived as having more complex tasks which helps to support the 
notion that board members are more skilled (Johnson et al. 2011). The data also suggests 
that complex organisations require high profile board members because of their standing 
and that this aids in sustaining and/or improving business reputation (Johnson et al. 
2011).  
The effect of independent board member social capital was further explored by (Tian, 
Haleblian & Rajagopalan 2011) who investigated both the effect of independent board 
members’ human and social capital. The study evaluated how the human and social 
capital of board members influenced the perception of an appointment of a new CEO 
(Tian, Haleblian & Rajagopalan 2011). Perception was measured by examining how an 
appointment of a new CEO by a board with high human and social capital influenced 
stock market reactions (Tian, Haleblian & Rajagopalan 2011). The researchers took a 
sample of 208 manufacturing companies in the United States publicly traded during the 
Beyond Board Capital: Probing Inside the Black Box of Australian Board Recruitment and Dynamics         Chapter 2 
44 | P a g e  
 
period 1999–2003 with average sales revenue in excess of US$50 million three years 
prior to a new CEO appointment (Tian, Haleblian & Rajagopalan 2011).  
Human capital was measured using two proxy variables: board CEO experience 
(board member with CEO experience) and board industry experience. Board CEO 
experience was used under the premise that board members with CEO experience would 
be better equipped to determine whether a potential CEO candidate had the requisite 
attributes to implement organisational strategy (Tian, Haleblian & Rajagopalan 2011, p. 
733). Furthermore, board industry experience was perceived as a good measure of a 
board’s knowledge of their business environment (Tian, Haleblian & Rajagopalan 2011, 
p. 733). On the other hand, social capital was measured by board members’ internal and 
external networks. This was perceived to facilitate the acquisition of additional plus 
richer quality information through strong internal and external ties (Tian, Haleblian & 
Rajagopalan 2011, p. 734).  
Internal networks were measured by board members’ experience of working together 
in the observed organisation (Tian, Haleblian & Rajagopalan 2011). This was done under 
the premise that shared co-working experience enables the development of a bond within 
the board membership group (Tian, Haleblian & Rajagopalan 2011, p. 734). 
Furthermore, shared experience was posited to provide the board with ‘ability and 
opportunity benefits’ (Tian, Haleblian & Rajagopalan 2011, p. 734). A board member’s 
ability was perceived to improve when they are able to cultivate an understanding of the 
organisation they are elected to govern (Tian, Haleblian & Rajagopalan 2011). Also, 
given the episodic nature of board roles, working together on a board provides an 
opportunity to learn about the nature of an organisation’s business (Tian, Haleblian & 
Rajagopalan 2011).   
While the researchers acknowledge that board members may access other sources of 
information such as company reports, they argue that board members will not be able to 
adequately process second hand information without a keen understanding of an 
organisation (Tian, Haleblian & Rajagopalan 2011, p. 734). Each organisation is 
confronted with a distinctive challenge when there is a change in the CEO (Tian, 
Haleblian & Rajagopalan 2011). Boards without internal social capital are perceived to 
be vulnerable to misusing generic information regarding the strategic needs of the 
organisation (Tian, Haleblian & Rajagopalan 2011).  
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Also, the researchers argue that working together over time allows board members to 
better share and coordinate board activities as each board member will develop credibility 
in a specific area of expertise (Tian, Haleblian & Rajagopalan 2011). There is an inherent 
assumption in the writers’ argument that suggests that the longer individual board 
members on a board work together the greater the internal social capital (i.e. board 
members’ experience of working together). 
External social capital was measured by interlocking board memberships that was 
perceived to reduce the cost of acquiring information (Tian, Haleblian & Rajagopalan 
2011). Boards may benefit from independent board members who have access to 
information by serving on multiple boards (Tian, Haleblian & Rajagopalan 2011). It is 
asserted that board members are more likely to have information on a broader CEO 
candidate pool through their interaction with other board members and senior managers 
of other organisations (Tian, Haleblian & Rajagopalan 2011).  
Furthermore, (Tian, Haleblian & Rajagopalan 2011) argue that given the sensitivity 
of the hiring decision a trusted source is a valuable resource for boards. This demonstrates 
the disconcerting nature of social capital to which Putnam (2000) alluded. (Tian, 
Haleblian & Rajagopalan 2011) suggested that the net is not cast wide enough in the 
recruitment and selection process of a CEO, with the implication that individuals 
belonging to a specific social circle will have access to information regarding board 
positions and outsiders are inadvertently excluded.  
The researchers’ findings support their theory that there is a categorical relationship 
between independent board members’ CEO experience, board industry experience 
(human capital) and investor reaction to a new CEO appointment measured by the 
cumulative abnormal return on stock (Tian, Haleblian & Rajagopalan 2011, p. 740). 
Furthermore, the study found that board co-working experience (internal social capital) 
and external board membership ties (external social capital) have a categorical 
relationship with the cumulative abnormal return on stock (Tian, Haleblian & 
Rajagopalan 2011, p. 740). In the context of board capital the findings suggest that 
particular types of human capital are beneficial in shaping the perception of 
organisational stakeholders and that group dynamics is influenced by the number of years 
board members have worked together. However, the study did not provide much insight 
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about board dynamics beyond co-working experience, and it is not clear how this type of 
social capital influences decision-making. 
The study found that stock prices responded positively around a two-day window to a 
new CEO appointment when the board had high human and social capital (Tian, 
Haleblian & Rajagopalan 2011, p. 740). The positive relationship between social capital 
and cumulative abnormal return was moderated by internal social capital (Tian, Haleblian 
& Rajagopalan 2011). Specifically, the categorical relationship between internal social 
capital and investor response to a new CEO appointment was stronger when the candidate 
was appointed from within an organisation. It is suggested that investors view internal 
social capital more positively when the new CEO is promoted from within an 
organisation (Tian, Haleblian & Rajagopalan 2011, p. 743). The study asserts that board 
capital (human and social capital) provides a valid explanation of board effectiveness in 
the selection of a CEO as perceived by the market (Tian, Haleblian & Rajagopalan 2011).  
A similar study conducted by Chen and Chang (2016) investigated the effect of 
independent board members’ human and social capital on internationalisation in the 
Taiwanese context using a sample of 173 electronics companies listed on the Taiwan 
Stock Exchange during the period 2008–2011. The study used two proxy variables to 
measure board members’ human capital: industry specific experience (independent board 
members who have occupied two or more posts in the electronics industry measured as 
a percentage of the board) and international experience (percentage of independent board 
members with international experience) (Chen & Chang 2016). Also, the study 
operationalised social capital with two variables: independent board member tenure 
overlap and interlocking board membership ties (average number of external board 
membership ties held by independent board members of an organisation during a 
particular year) (Chen & Chang 2016).  
The study found a relationship between board members’ human capital and 
internationalisation. Specifically, having board members with industry and international 
experience was positively associated with an increase in overseas sales and assets 
(internationalisation) (Chen & Chang 2016, p. 867). The findings suggest that board 
members with human capital are better able to understand the nature of an organisation 
which enables prudent decisions regarding international expansion (Chen & Chang 
2016). The results indicated that board members with more market experience are more 
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likely to expand internationally (Chen & Chang 2016, p. 867). The study highlighted that 
an average of 27 per cent of board members are highly experienced and an average of 47 
per cent have international experience (Chen & Chang 2016, p. 866).  
The study reported some inconsistencies when examining the effect of social capital 
on internationalisation. Particularly, the study found no significant relationship between 
board members’ overlap and internationalisation (Chen & Chang 2016).  Specifically, 
the researchers posit that a categorical relationship between independent board members’ 
tenure overlap and internationalisation reduces at increasing levels and that it may even 
become negative (Chen & Chang 2016, p. 867). 
 
2.6 A Systematic Review of Board Capital Literature 
This study has conducted a systematic review of studies examining boards using the 
construct of board capital since it came to prominence in 2003. A systematic review of 
current evidence was needed to establish whether the approach of studies using the model 
of board capital are comparable and consistent with the proposed definition of board 
capital (board members’ human and social capital). The review identifies all factors that 
have been considered in empirical investigations of board capital and how these vary 
across context and studies. It has been identified that studies generally adopt and accept 
that board members’ human and social capital constitute board capital. There is 
consensus in the literature that board capital is a collective resource representative of a 
board’s ability to influence organisational outcomes in different ways. 
However, it should be reiterated that while human and social capital theories have 
survived many decades and are considered to be theoretically sound, these concepts were 
not developed based on investigations into boards. Based on the review of literature there 
is no agreement on what constitutes human and social capital in the board context. 
Proxies of human and social capital vary considerably and there are instances where 
definitions of social capital overlap with explanations of human capital.  
This systematic review enables methodological rigour in assessing research bias and 
facilitates an analysis of empirical studies on board capital in a standardised and 
transparent way to identify weaknesses in investigations and to make recommendations 
for future research. Based on a review of the literature there are uncertainties regarding 
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whether board capital can be adequately measured in practice given the complexity of 
the notion. This study evaluates the current state of the literature and explores whether 
the concept is useful in explaining board recruitment and dynamics. 
 
2.7 Evidence Acquisition and Synthesis 
The concept of board capital was explored through a systematic review and conceptual 
analysis of academic literature that explicitly included the three constructs: board capital, 
human capital and social capital. This process consisted of four steps. First, a data log 
was developed by undertaking a comprehensive and systematic search to extract all 
relevant literature on board capital published in peer reviewed academic journals. The 
Google Scholar database was searched for all studies containing the key words ‘board 
capital’ for the period 2003–2018. This search was repeated in databases Business Source 
Complete (EBSCO), The Scholarly Journal Archive (JSTOR), Science Direct (Elsevier) 
and Social Science Databases (ProQuest) to identify additional publications within the 
research parameters.  
Second, an iterative procedure was conducted which included theoretical concepts of 
human and social capital which helped to empirically capture and verify that all pertinent 
publications were identified in the board context. Third, a content analysis of the 
retrieved studies was used to extract descriptive and qualitative theoretical data. Abstracts 
and full text articles were screened, coded based on research methodology, context and 
type of journal and filtered for deviations from the research parameters. Fourth, the 
results were interpreted and findings meaningfully synthesised. A scoping search is 
performed every three months to identify recent publications and is current to June 2018.  
 
2.8 Emergence of Board Capital Research 
The results of this investigation on board capital are reported in Figure 2-3 below (see 
also Table 2-3) which shows a gradual increase in the topic over time until a decline in 
2014 and 2015. This study identified three research phases: an incubation period which 
begun with the seminal work of Hillman and Dalziel (2003) to 2007 (23%), a period of 
incremental growth 2008–2012 (42%) and then a period of steady decline in recent years 
2013–2017 (35%). By surveying the development in publications over a 15 year period 
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this study was able to identify periods when interest surged and periods of decline when 
empirical findings offered no new insights suggesting a need for alternative empirical 
approaches. Only one qualitative study was conducted over the 15 year period which 
appears to have contributed to the decline in interest as no new perspectives have 
emerged in an area in which 84 per cent of studies are quantitative and 14 per cent are 
conceptually based arguments.  
Figure 2-3: Board Capital Publications (2003–2017) 
 
 
 
The North American region has dominated research on board capital accounting for 
an even 50 per cent of the investigations, followed by Asia (23%) and Europe (21%). 
Australian and UK researchers have not done much work in the area with each country 
producing 3 per cent of studies. The majority of articles identified are empirical research 
articles (86%), with only 14 per cent identified as conceptual articles. The incubation 
period had the most conceptual articles (36%) out of the three phases reported, and the 
growth phase (88%) had the most quantitative investigations. The only qualitative article 
was published in 2013 , at the beginning of decline period with no more identified 
investigations to date, providing an opportune time for a qualitative study to retrace and 
evaluate the assumptions of board capital. Table 2-3 reports the main characteristics of 
board capital research. 
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Table 2-3: Board Capital Research Characteristics by Period of Publication 
 
Note. Values = number of articles; values in bracket = % of total articles 
Table 2-3 above shows that journals in business and ethics have dominated 
investigations of board capital with management journals close behind. The main focus 
of investigations was to identify a relationship between board capital and board 
performance, organisational performance and growth. The following section evaluates 
the empirical findings on board capital. 
 
2.9 Empirical Evidence of Board Capital 
There have been various empirical approaches used to understand the nature and 
influence of board capital on outcomes in different organisational contexts. This section 
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provides a sample of studies that have used diverse empirical approaches to define and 
understand board capital. This evaluation begins with Line, Louise and Eduardo (2013) 
who conducted a 10 year (1997–2006) longitudinal case study of Bombardier Inc., a 
publicly traded global transportation company, to examine the relationship between 
board capital, strategy and organisational environment (p. 378).  
The researchers assert there are four dimensions of board capital: expertise, work 
experience, knowledge of product and supply markets, and prestige. Firstly, expertise is 
explained as the different skills acquired by board members through training, excluding 
administration skills which are assumed to be a prerequisite for board membership (Line, 
Louise & Eduardo 2013, p. 382). The skills acquired are assumed to assist in making 
recommendations regarding particular environmental uncertainties (Line, Louise & 
Eduardo 2013).   
Secondly, work experience refers to the professional experience that board members 
amass over their career which is assumed to provide a strategic contribution to an 
organisation (Line, Louise & Eduardo 2013). It is presumed that board members develop 
transferable skills throughout their professional life that are useful for formulating 
strategies and aiding management in implementing appropriate plans in response to the 
changing needs of an organisation (Line, Louise & Eduardo 2013). Professional 
experience is suggested to be enhanced through an involvement in the strategic decision-
making process. Accordingly, board members are uniquely equipped by virtue of making 
decisions whether as ‘business experts who advise decision-makers or knowledgeable 
experts who have studied relevant management and operational issues’ (Line, Louise & 
Eduardo 2013, p. 382) 
Thirdly, the measure of ‘specific knowledge of product and supply markets’ refers to 
the informational and relational resources about targeted markets that have been gathered 
by board members (Line, Louise & Eduardo 2013). The researchers assume that board 
members with this type of knowledge can assist an organisation in formulating and 
implementing strategies at different strategic levels (Line, Louise & Eduardo 2013). 
Additionally, knowledge of product and supply markets facilitates the development of 
relationships with existing and prospective markets (Line, Louise & Eduardo 2013). This 
in turn is assumed to improve corporate image and enhance institutional strategy (Line, 
Louise & Eduardo 2013). 
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The final component of board capital, prestige, is created from board members’ social 
and professional networks. Board members who are considered to be respected in their 
professions and communities are assumed to be a source of timely information (Line, 
Louise & Eduardo 2013). Having access to pertinent information is theorised to aid 
management in decision-making and board members having prestige are considered to 
be resourceful in influencing external factors that are critical to an organisation’s business 
(Line, Louise & Eduardo 2013). This in turn provides ‘legitimacy’ (acceptance by 
organisational stakeholders) for an organisation which may be desired by large 
organisations especially those who want to have considerable impact on society (Line, 
Louise & Eduardo 2013). Prestigious board members are also expected to validate 
strategic decisions made by managers and improve the perception that people have of an 
organisation, which is another component of institutional strategy (Line, Louise & 
Eduardo 2013). 
The study found that Bombardier responded to changing circumstances imposed by 
the external environment by adjusting the resources provided by their board members 
(Line, Louise & Eduardo 2013). The researchers assert that Bombardier tailored their 
board’s human and ‘relational capital’ (social capital) according to their business needs. 
Also, it is suggested that board capital influenced strategies and that the board’s human 
and relational capital was influenced by the strategies that Bombardier adopted, 
demonstrating a reverse relationship. There were significant changes observed in board 
capital over the period of analysis although board independence remained constant (Line, 
Louise & Eduardo 2013). There were three components of strategy defined. Firstly, 
institutional strategy was defined as vision, pursued objectives and all decisions 
concerning corporate mission (Line, Louise & Eduardo 2013). These were explained as 
the values and image that an organisation aspires to project to all organisational 
stakeholders (Line, Louise & Eduardo 2013).  
Secondly, corporate strategy involves decisions regarding an organisation’s targeted 
area of operation, such as resource allocation and diversification (Line, Louise & 
Eduardo 2013). It is suggested that organisations must choose between four types of 
corporate strategy: hold, harvest, divest and build (Line, Louise & Eduardo 2013, p. 383). 
Lastly, strategic decisions include business strategy which denotes an organisation’s 
competitive strategy, or how an organisation chooses to position itself in relation to its 
competitors (Line, Louise & Eduardo 2013).  
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The researchers suggest that organisational stakeholders and regulators should give 
thoughtful attention to the factors that facilitate an effective strategy when appointing 
board members and developing board policies (Line, Louise & Eduardo 2013). Implicit 
in these arguments is the notion that there is a relationship between board capital and 
board recruitment and that organisational goals should influence the board recruitment 
process. However, strategy is noted to be a fluid multi-dimensional concept that is 
influenced by board capital with the reverse also true. As a result, it is not entirely clear 
how strategy influences the board recruitment process or how order of primacy is 
established. The study lacks key insights about how the board recruitment process 
operates or how board rules are established. 
An alternative approach to evaluating board capital in relation to organisational 
outcomes was provided by Reeb and Zhao (2013). The researchers deconstructed board 
capital into what they referred to as ‘insiders and outsiders capital’ (Reeb & Zhao 2013, 
p. 195). They assume that inside board members and outside board members have 
different characteristics and board roles (Reeb & Zhao 2013). As a result, the influence 
of inside and outside board members’ human and social capital will not be the same based 
on differing roles (Reeb & Zhao 2013). It is theorised that insider board members will 
have in depth knowledge and appreciation of organisational affairs, while independent 
board members will function primarily as monitors (Reeb & Zhao 2013).  
The researchers assume that inside board members are the ‘information initiators and 
decision-makers’ of an organisation and therefore there are specific types of human 
capital that will enhance their information handling and decision-making capability 
(Reeb & Zhao 2013, p. 195). They assume that ‘educational capital’ is associated with 
‘intellectual rigor’ which allows an individual to learn and process information (Reeb & 
Zhao 2013, p. 195). Additionally, the researchers theorise that more work experience 
should allow a manager to be better equipped to collect, screen and process various 
information that is ‘embedded in a complex environment’ (Reeb & Zhao 2013, p. 195). 
Also, better organisational knowledge through work experience should improve the 
communication with outside board members. Additionally, managers with more work 
experience are better able to evaluate and integrate the views of outside board members 
which facilitates prudent decision-making (Reeb & Zhao 2013).  
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Accordingly, Reeb and Zhao (2013) assert that education and work experience are 
important human capital proxies for inside board members, while both human and social 
capital proxies are important for outside board members based on the importance of their 
external reputations. The researchers emphasise that outside board members are different 
from inside board members as they are required to monitor inside managers in order to 
provide an impartial outlook on management decision-making (Reeb & Zhao 2013). 
Also, outside board members are more concerned about their reputation, providing an 
incentive for more vigilant monitoring (Reeb & Zhao 2013). The collective nature of 
boards is ignored in this investigation and it is assumed that there are unwritten rules of 
engagement for inside and outside board members. However, the Reeb and Zhao (2013) 
analysis is based on secondary data and so there is no way to determine if these are 
accurate assumptions. 
In addition, it was assumed that outside board members who have experience in 
diverse environments would use better judgement in analysing reports, plans and 
proposals from inside board members (Reeb & Zhao 2013, p. 195). It is suggested that 
outside board members are better able to identify possible issues (Reeb & Zhao 2013). 
Hence, the researchers found that increases in outside board member human capital was 
positively associated with disclosure quality (Reeb & Zhao 2013). The findings suggest 
that there are clear demarcation of roles between inside and outside board members but 
this is implied and not a reflection of what happens in principle. It is not clear how board 
dynamics are shaped by inside versus outside board members.  
Reeb and Zhao (2013) used a board capital measure which incorporated a cumulative 
measure of board members’ education, work experience and social capital (Reeb & Zhao 
2013). The measure for social capital was defined as board members’ external networks 
comprising outside institutions, corporations or governments (Reeb & Zhao 2013, p. 
195). The researchers used several board member characteristics to develop a measure 
for social capital which they also referred to as networking (Reeb & Zhao 2013). Firstly, 
they counted the number of current corporate board appointments for each board member 
in a given year (Reeb & Zhao 2013). Secondly, they took into account the total number 
of not-for-profit board memberships for each board member over their career (Reeb & 
Zhao 2013). They suggest that not-for-profit boards are more diverse in their board 
member composition which facilitates greater networking ties during a person’s career 
(Reeb & Zhao 2013).  
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Thirdly, the researchers identified all current or prior government positions held by 
board members, such as department secretary, member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or 
other elected or nominated official, including government board appointments (Reeb & 
Zhao 2013). Government board memberships are explained as being elected by 
government agents, such as the president, governor or mayor, or agencies such as 
Congress, state and municipal governments (Reeb & Zhao 2013). Lastly, they compiled 
information about board members’ professional affiliations, such as IEEE and honours 
or awards (Reeb & Zhao 2013, p. 196). They argue that ‘reputational’ board members 
have more social connections and networking ties than board members who are not 
linked to professional organisations (Reeb & Zhao 2013, p. 197). However, in the context 
of board capital and board dynamics it is not clear how social capital influences decision-
making but it is assumed that board members with greater social capital are better able 
to acquire pertinent information and resources for an organisation which leads to better 
decision-making (Reeb & Zhao 2013). 
The researchers also collected data on the ‘educational capital’ of board members 
(Reeb & Zhao 2013). Similar to Becker (1964), the researchers evaluated the level of 
education (bachelor’s degree, master’s degree, law degree or medical degree, PhD) of 
board members and suggested that people who are educated by elite institutions are more 
likely to climb the upper level of ‘social hierarchies’ including acquiring board 
memberships and senior management positions (Reeb & Zhao 2013, p. 198). 
Furthermore, board members with educational capital are more likely to have direct and 
indirect social ties to the elite class (Reeb & Zhao 2013). While these arguments have 
implications for boards in the context of power and control, Reeb and Zhao (2013) did 
not consider how social class may influence board dynamics and decision-making. 
In addition to education, the researchers also included a third type of board capital 
which was associated with board members’ working experience (Reeb & Zhao 2013). 
Work experience was defined as the diversity of board members’ expertise proven during 
their careers (Reeb & Zhao 2013). The researchers captured board members’ expertise 
by investigating their employment history in five areas: law, investment bank/venture 
capital, management consulting, accounting or academia (Reeb & Zhao 2013, p. 197). 
The chosen five areas which included professional certifications such as CPA were not 
explained and so it is not clear why other employment expertise such as marketing or 
human resource management was not considered useful for the creation of board capital. 
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Therefore, it is not known whether the sample influenced the defined dimensions of 
expertise or whether they were predetermined. Based on the empirical approach, insights 
about what types of human capital are crucial for the creation of board capital were not 
obtained.  
Also, the researchers’ dataset was limited to industrial organisations trading on the 
Russell 1000 Index for the years 2003, 2005 and 2007 (Reeb & Zhao 2013, p. 196). They 
imposed a two-year gap to capture the possibility of board member changes (Reeb & 
Zhao 2013). In addition, for organisations to be included in the sample they had to list 
their board members in their proxy statement and these organisations had to be ‘non-
controlled’ entities (an entity that is not subject to the control of another entity) (Reeb & 
Zhao 2013, p. 196). The final sample consisted of 687 industrial organisations and 6,872 
unique board members which suggests that findings are representative of board capital 
in industrial organisations. In comparing organisations with high and low board member 
capital (based on statistical differences), Reeb and Zhao (2013) found that high board 
capital organisations ‘have statistically better disclosure quality than organisations with 
low board capital’ (p. 202). 
Additionally, the researchers assert that organisations with higher networking, 
education and experience capital have better disclosure quality than low capital firms. 
Particularly, the findings suggest that an organisation’s disclosure quality varies 
significantly when outsiders’ capital is different, with a gap of 0.25 between high 
outsiders’ capital organisations and low capital organisations (Reeb & Zhao 2013, p. 
202). The researchers make several implicit assumptions about board recruitment and 
dynamics without qualitative insights, such as outside board members are recruited 
because of their particular types of human and social capital and that outsiders are better 
decision-makers than inside board members (Reeb & Zhao 2013). The findings suggest 
that board capital is controlled and is capable of manipulation to achieve particular 
outcomes. 
In the context of family owned businesses Sciascia et al. (2013) argues that family 
involvement in boards influences board capital because of three factors: ‘stewardship’ 
(level of family involvement in boards), ‘stagnation’ (caused by restricting board roles 
and senior management positions to family members which limits an organisation’s 
external social capital) and ‘upper echelons’ (explaining board dynamics when board 
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members have competing interests because the board has family and non-family 
members) (p. 86).  
The researchers collected data from family organisations in the United States by 
independent survey (Sciascia et al. 2013). Organisations were classified as family 
organisations if the percent of equity held by family members was higher than 20 per 
cent and the organisation had more than one family member in management or on the 
board (Sciascia et al. 2013, p. 89). The survey yielded 1,035 responses with one 
participant per organisation who was typically in a senior management role such as CEO, 
President, CFO or Chief Operations Manager. It should be noted that this approach is 
fundamentally different from that of Line, Louise and Eduardo (2013) and (Reeb & Zhao 
2013) which included in their sample a percentage of independent outsiders.  
While Sciascia et al. (2013) acknowledged that board capital is board members’ 
human and social capital, it was not explicitly measured in their study. The study 
evaluated the relationship between board capital and the dependent variable sales 
internationalisation which was measured as the percentage of sales generated from 
international markets (Sciascia et al. 2013, p. 87). Family board involvement was 
measured by the percentage of board members belonging to the controlling family 
(Sciascia et al. 2013, p. 87). The researchers also controlled for two board characteristics 
which were considered to be critical drivers of organisational performance: board 
activism and perceived board effectiveness (Sciascia et al. 2013, p. 87).  
Board activism was measured using the number of board meetings held per year and 
perceived board effectiveness was measured statistically by asking respondents to 
evaluate the contribution of the board to organisational success on a five-point Likert 
scale ranging from ‘poor’ to ‘outstanding’ (Sciascia et al. 2013, p. 88). Secondly, the 
researchers controlled for family presence (family involvement in the workforce and 
family ownership) (Sciascia et al. 2013, p. 88). Family involvement in the workforce was 
measured by the percentage of an organisation’s employees that were part of the 
controlling family and family ownership was measured based on the percentage of equity 
owned by family members (Sciascia et al. 2013). The findings suggest that a low level 
of family involvement in boards improves sales in international markets (Sciascia et al. 
2013, p. 93). It is therefore assumed that board capital is better in organisations that have 
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less family involvement, although it is not quite clear how the quality of board members’ 
human and social capital is shaped by family members. 
Also, Sciascia et al. (2013) found that in boards that were only comprised of family 
members the levels of international sales were far less than in mixed membership boards 
(p. 93). The limitation in drawing conclusions about board capital based on this finding 
is that the goals of these family owned businesses is unknown. International sales may 
be lower in these organisations because the organisation has different priorities (target 
markets) or business strategies. While (Sciascia et al. 2013, p. 93) suggest that family 
involvement in boards ‘constrains board capital by limiting human and external social 
capital’, without qualitative insights this argument is not well supported by evidence.  
Boesso, Cerbioni and Kumar (2014) asserted that board capital is a key driver of good 
governance practices (p. 163). They evaluated the role of board capital in an 
organisation’s charitable and philanthropic activities and explained that board capital is 
the ‘appointment procedure’ of boards (Boesso, Cerbioni & Kumar 2014, p. 168). Using 
a Likert scale to measure board capital ranging from one to five the researchers examined 
the appointment procedures (board capital) for board members consisting of the 
following factors: definition of researched profile before CV analysis; relevance of public 
visibility in selecting a new board member; relevance of political connection in selecting 
a new board member; relevance of business success in selecting a new board member; 
and relevance of grant-making competence in selecting a new board member. These 
factors are directly linked to the perceived resources a board member brings to an 
organisation in line with the resource dependency view of boards introduced by (Pfeffer, 
Jeffrey  & Salancik 2003). It was theorised that board members who are well connected 
are more desirable for philanthropic organisations. 
The findings show that ‘higher board capital and more elaborate and complex 
operating processes are associated with a foundation’s preference towards the 
development of complex social projects, such as the launch of operational partnerships 
with external third agents and other local institutions for the relief of specific social needs 
such as better education, health care, better art management’ (Boesso, Cerbioni & Kumar 
2014, p. 175). The researchers argue that governance systems that are comprised of 
‘extended board capital and elaborate board processes’ are associated with a more 
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effective strategic approach causing better financial outcomes (Boesso, Cerbioni & 
Kumar 2014, p. 175).  
Boesso, Cerbioni and Kumar (2014) provided some key insights about the board 
recruitment process suggesting that high profile candidates create board capital and 
influence recruitment and selection criteria in the philanthropic sector. There was no clear 
distinction made between board members’ human and social capital which suggests that 
these factors are intertwined in many respects. It was also not clear if board members 
belonged to particular social groups. These findings have provided a basis for further 
research into the board recruitment process as the researchers only examined one type of 
board and asked close-ended questions, limiting the quality of information that may be 
obtained about the board recruitment process. 
In an unconventional analysis De Maere, Jorissen and Uhlaner (2014) investigated 
whether there was a relationship between certain proxies of board incentives, board 
capital and bankrupt organisations. Based on the data examined over a five-year period 
with a sample of 232 unlisted organisations, (De Maere, Jorissen & Uhlaner 2014, p. 
388) found that organisations with boards led by an independent chair, including longer 
tenured board members, and board members with fewer additional directorships on 
average (board capital) were less likely to become bankrupt.  
They began their investigation by identifying incorporated companies that were 
officially declared bankrupt in Belgium (De Maere, Jorissen & Uhlaner 2014). They then 
identified three indicators of board capital: director tenure, average number of 
directorships and board size. It is assumed that board members with longer tenures have 
accumulated more organisational specific knowledge while serving on a board which is 
a proxy for human capital. Secondly, the researchers highlight that codes of good 
governance often include a restriction on the number of outside directorships a board 
member is allowed to hold (De Maere, Jorissen & Uhlaner 2014, p. 391). It is suggested 
that board members who are burdened with too many directorships may not give 
sufficient time and attention to any one organisation negatively influencing monitoring 
and a board’s ability to provide strategic advice (De Maere, Jorissen & Uhlaner 2014). It 
should be noted that there is no rule based restriction imposed by Australian regulators 
on the number of outside directorships a board member is allowed to hold.  
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Lastly, De Maere, Jorissen and Uhlaner (2014) used board size as their final indicator 
of board capital. They assert that board size is an appropriate proxy to measure diversity 
of expertise and a board’s ability to access limited resources on behalf of an organisation 
(De Maere, Jorissen & Uhlaner 2014). They assume that larger boards are more likely to 
have a broader range of skills which should contribute to better monitoring and advisory 
service. Additionally, they argue that a larger board may ‘counter the weight of a CEO 
increasing the level of control especially in privately owned organisations’ (De Maere, 
Jorissen & Uhlaner 2014, p. 391). This study redefines the dimensions of human and 
social capital and highlights that there is no well-defined theory of what constitutes 
human and social capital in the board context, emphasising a need for further research. 
In another atypical study on board capital conducted by Jermias and Gani (2014), 
board capital was measured as the ratio of outside board members who also serve as a 
CEO or board member for another S&P 500 firm and/or who are either a university 
professor or a government officer, in relation to the number of board members on a board 
(p. 141). The study found that organisations benefit from board capital on the basis that 
highly qualified outside board members possess the ability to monitor and provide advice 
and counsel to managers (Jermias & Gani 2014, p. 135). It is suggested that inside board 
member do not possess the objectivity or motivation to monitor managers and are easily 
swayed by managers, similar to the arguments of Reeb and Zhao (2013). 
The data shows that CEO duality, where the chair and CEO is the same person, is 
negatively and considerably associated with organisational outcomes but that the 
negative association is mitigated by board capital (Jermias & Gani 2014). While board 
dependence (CEO duality) has been discouraged by regulators, Jermias and Gani (2014) 
suggest that ‘prominent individuals on boards such as a board member of another S&P 
500 firm, the CEO of another S&P 500 firm, a university professor, or a government 
officer can reduce the damaging effects of board dependence’ (p. 136). 
Jermias and Gani (2014) highlighted some implications for the board recruitment 
process in that there needs to be a thoughtful evaluation about the criteria for board 
membership and about the kinds of individuals who should be recruited onto boards. 
However, it is not clear how a university professor or government officer influences 
board dynamics as further qualitative insight is needed on what skills are beneficial for 
prudent decision-making. This study interrogates these assumptions about board capital 
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and the following section presents other factors that should be taken into account in 
evaluations of board capital. 
 
2.10 The Role of Contemporary Issues in Understanding Board Capital 
Attributable to globalisation and the spread of capitalism, debates about boards have 
focused on discussions relating to board effectiveness and organisational performance 
with a focus on shareholder maximisation (Lee & Shailer 2008). As a result, there has 
been a proliferation of studies focused on evaluating the importance of gender and 
diversity in board decision-making and their influence on organisational outcomes 
(Adams & Ferreira 2009; Adriaanse 2016; Bear, Rahman & Post 2010; Carter et al. 2010; 
Dunn 2012).  
While there has been global focus on diversity which has ‘an infinite number of 
dimensions ranging from age to nationality, religious background to functional 
background, task skills to relational skills and from political preference to sexual 
preference’ (Rao & Tilt 2016b, p. 183), the focus on board diversity has been primarily 
on gender. It is suggested that this is because of the social implications of an unequal 
distribution of opportunity and power in particular social systems (Iannotta, Gatti & Huse 
2016). Also, it was highlighted that women do not have the same professional 
experiences as men and as a result their values are different which influences the types 
of resources women bring to boards (Hillman, Cannella & Harris 2002; Selby 2000).  
Although evidence is equivocal on the value of women on boards, Hillman, Cannella 
and Harris (2002) found that ‘female and African-American directors are more likely to 
come from non-business backgrounds, hold advanced degrees, and join multiple boards 
at a faster rate than white male directors’ (p. 747). Based on these findings it is theorised 
that gender diversity will in some way influence board decision-making. Diversity has 
been branded as a ‘double-edged sword’ or a ‘mixed blessing’ because it has both good 
and bad implications for group behaviour and functionality (Nielsen & Huse 2010, p. 
17). While discussions on board capital have embraced the heterogeneous characteristics 
of board members, it is not clear how gender affects board dynamics or how the 
proportion of men versus women on boards is influenced by board recruitment practices, 
highlighting a need for further qualitative research.  
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Although there is the suggestion that gender influences outcomes, this is not 
necessarily simply a result of adding more women onto boards. A qualitative study with 
92 board members on 66 arts boards in Australia suggested that gender and ethnic 
diversity on arts boards makes organisations more responsive to corporate responsibility 
(Azmat & Rentschler 2017, p. 317). However, the presence of diverse board members 
does not always lead to corporate responsibility (Azmat & Rentschler 2017, p. 317). The 
findings suggest that in order for diverse boards to influence corporate responsibility, 
board members must exhibit attributes of passion and skill and have the ability to develop 
networks (Azmat & Rentschler 2017, p. 317). Passion, skill and networking appear to be 
crucial, irrespective of gender and ethnicity (Azmat & Rentschler 2017, p. 317). These 
findings provide key insights about the nature of board capital in the Australian context 
and highlight the importance of board member attributes which has implications for the 
construct board capital which does not examine intrinsic attributes of individuals. While 
the qualitative study of Azmat and Rentschler (2017) provided key insights, it lacks 
insights about intrinsic factors related to the group dynamics of boards.  
The perception that women make a difference for board effectiveness has continued 
to motivate policy and the research agenda in Australia. While there has been a steady 
increase of women on boards, male dominance on boards is still a troubling social 
phenomenon: 
In the Australian jurisdiction, progress is being made belatedly towards increasing 
gender diversity on corporate boards. However, substantial challenges are 
envisaged if significant progress is not made imminently to increase the number of 
women serving on corporate boards (du Plessis, O'Sullivan & Rentschler 2017, p. 
1). 
It is argued that the representation of women on boards should broadly reflect their 
workforce participation and that this is justified by their contribution as economic citizens 
(Spender 2012). The lack of female representation on boards reflects the role that women 
play in democratic leadership and low rates of representation undervalue civic 
participation by women (Spender 2012, p. 22). However, Spender (2012) asserts that 
justifications for higher rates of participation which are based on organisational 
performance are methodologically doubtful and potentially condescending to women 
(Spender 2012, p. 22). 
Another study conducted in the Australian context by Rao, Tilt and Lester (2012) 
found that there is a significant positive relationship between the extent of environmental 
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reporting and the ratio of independent and female board members on a board (p. 143). 
However, the researchers also found that the extent of the relationship between 
independent and female board members was also influenced by institutional investors 
and board size, showing a multilevel relationship (Rao, Tilt & Lester 2012, p. 143). This 
suggests that the involvement of organisational stakeholders and the number of 
independent board members on a board influences the decision-making of boards, but it 
is not clear how and in what way they influence decision-making. This investigation into 
board capital and board dynamics should shed some light. 
Rao, Tilt and Lester (2012) suggest that regulators should consider expanding 
governance guidelines to include consideration for the environment which is argued to 
be an important aspect of board members’ responsibilities. This argument highlights the 
changing nature of board roles which are not set in stone. The study also found that 
organisations that included a commitment to the environment in their mission and 
strategies gave more attention to board structure and composition and that this influenced 
the amount of environmental information that was disclosed by these organisations (Rao, 
Tilt & Lester 2012, p. 143). However, these findings provide no new insights about board 
recruitment which has been overshadowed by discussions of board composition. 
A later study by Rao and Tilt (2016b) on board diversity (gender, tenure and multiple 
directorships) found that diversity has the potential to influence corporate social 
responsibility reporting (p. 182). Although the findings suggest there are possible 
‘interaction effects’ between genders, these influences are unclear (Rao & Tilt 2016b, p. 
182). It should be noted that although gender has not been explicitly included in 
discussions about board capital, studies suggest that gender is an inherent attribute of 
board capital worthy of qualitative evaluation which explains its prominence in 
governance research and policy discussions (Bertrand et al. 2014; Iannotta, Gatti & Huse 
2016; Nielsen & Huse 2010; Torchia, Calabrò & Huse 2011).  
Ahmed et al. (2017) found evidence in the Australian context that female board 
members improve the frequency and volume of all types of continuous disclosure (p. 89). 
However, for boards to have any significant effect on continuous disclosure the board 
requires more than one female board member which is consistent with the theory of 
critical mass (Ahmed et al. 2017, p. 89). The theory of critical mass suggests that female 
board members will not be able to influence board decisions if there are not at least three 
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women on a board (Konrad, Kramer & Erkut 2008). While this extends previous 
arguments about the benefit of women on boards there is still an imprecise understanding 
of how women influence board dynamics. 
Comparable to the board capital construct, there have been several empirical attempts 
to explain how the heterogeneous characteristics of board members influence 
organisational outcomes. A study on diversity in the Australian context found that 
diversity of professional expertise has implications for shareholder value as the most 
common types of expertise on boards are business executives, accountants, bankers, 
scientists, lawyers and engineers (Gray & Nowland 2017, p. 427). However, being a 
quantitative study, the researchers were not able to provide any insights on why boards 
are dominated by particular types of skillsets. The findings do not shed light on board 
recruitment and dynamics. 
In addition, although the findings indicate that diversity in expertise is primarily 
related to board size, industry and location, this does not explain their influence on board 
activities and decision-making (Gray & Nowland 2017). The study argues that 
‘shareholders benefit when boards diversify their expertise within a subset of specialist 
business expertise (lawyers, accountants, consultants, bankers and outsiders) and that 
diversity beyond the aforementioned subset of expertise is associated with lower 
organisational value and performance’ (Gray & Nowland 2017, p. 427). However, there 
are many unanswered questions on how board dynamics are influenced by the 
professional characteristics of board members and ultimately how these shape board 
capital, which is understood as a board’s ability to create value for organisational 
stakeholders.  
After the collapse of Australia’s largest insurer HIH in 2001, regulators mandated that 
there be a majority of independent board members on boards suggesting that independent 
board members will be more likely to consider a broader range of views leading to better 
decision-making (Lee & Shailer 2008; Sharma 2004). As issues with organisational 
governance continue to affect various sectors, more recent initiatives have focused on 
board diversity (Le Mire & Gilligan 2013). In the United Kingdom, the Walker Review 
suggested that diverse expertise is the solution to the growing problem of ineffective 
boards but highlights that diversity without independence may not solve issues (Le Mire 
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& Gilligan 2013, p. 443). There are several factors that have implications for the concept 
of board capital which go beyond arguments of human and social capital.  
While there have been many empirical arguments on the heterogeneous characteristics 
of board members, assertions about gender have been the most influential on regulatory 
systems globally. Table 2-4 summarises a global survey of women on boards, with 
Norway being the first country to pass a gender quota law in 2007 (Bertrand et al. 2014).  
Table 2-4: Global Survey of Women on Boards 
 
Data retrieved from: GMI Ratings 
Research in Norway has provided key insights on the influence of women on boards. 
Nielsen and Huse (2010) found that female board members influence strategic 
involvement through their contribution to board decision-making (p. 16). This influence 
is primarily due to diversity in expertise and differences in values of female board 
members (Nielsen & Huse 2010). However, findings also suggest that the ‘perception of 
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women as unequal board members may limit their potential contribution to board 
decision-making’ (Nielsen & Huse 2010, p. 16). These are thought-provoking findings 
that highlight the need to gain a better understanding of the subtleties associated with 
board capital. It is reiterated that gender is an inherent part of the heterogeneous 
characteristics of board members and an important factor that weighs meaningfully on 
the conceptualisation of board capital.   
More importantly, context appears to be an important factor in understanding board 
diversity and was echoed in the study by Grosvold and Brammer (2011) on 38 countries 
during the period 2001–2007. The researchers found that ‘fifty percent of the variation 
in the presence of women on boards across countries is attributable to national 
institutional systems’ (Grosvold & Brammer 2011, p. 116). The findings suggest that 
cultural and regulatory systems play a significant role in shaping board diversity 
(Grosvold & Brammer 2011, p. 116). These arguments support an evaluation of board 
capital in the Australian context.  
A comparative study of Japan and Australia found that board size and age of directors 
was negatively associated with the reported outcomes of Japanese organisations (Bonn, 
Yoshikawa & Phan 2004, p. 14). However, for Australian organisations, the proportion 
of outside (independent) female board members was positively associated with 
organisational outcomes but board size and board member age had no influence on the 
performance of the organisations studied (Bonn, Yoshikawa & Phan 2004, p. 105). This 
emphasises that context influences understanding board capital and gender appears to be 
a significant factor that influences board activities and decision-making, weighing 
meaningfully on the potential of board capital to influence outcomes. 
Although debates about the contribution of women on boards remain current and there 
are various views about how women influence board dynamics (Bear, Rahman & Post 
2010; Galbreath 2018; Hillman, Cannella & Harris 2002; Nielsen & Huse 2010; Rose 
2007; Shehata, Salhin & El-Helaly 2017), there is not sufficient evidence to explain the 
implications of women on boards in different contexts. There is also not a clear 
understanding of board recruitment and why there is a disparity between men and women 
on boards. Huse (2018) reminds researchers that ‘we should challenge borders in topics, 
methods and theories. We need to approach important and unexplored issues, and not 
only make sophisticated replications of what we already know’ (p. 4).  
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While studies on board diversity are archetypal of developments in examinations of 
board composition (Bathala & Rao 1995; Baysinger & Hoskisson 1990; Kiel & 
Nicholson 2003; Rao & Tilt 2016a; Shivdasani 1993; Vermeer, Raghunandan & 
Forgione 2006), board composition does not explain board recruitment and dynamics. 
Voordeckers et al. (2014) studied a cross-country sample of SMEs in Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Norway and found that ‘board structures are largely decoupled from 
actual board behaviour’, in other words board composition does not explain board 
conduct (p. 197).  
Voordeckers et al. 2014 suggest that it is important to conduct board research across 
countries despite general differences in board structures as this may provide key insights 
about boards that operate in similar regulatory contexts. These arguments are based on 
the assumption that context explains board behaviour but it was not recognised that 
context is much more complex than similarities in regulatory systems as context includes 
sociocultural systems. There needs to be a fine-grained evaluation of social actors in the 
board context to lead to a better understanding of boards and the notion of board capital. 
Studies on boards have provided various arguments about the influence of gender and 
diversity on board activities and decision-making (Ahmed et al. 2017; Azmat & 
Rentschler 2017; Rao & Tilt 2016a; Shehata, Salhin & El-Helaly 2017; Sheridan, Ross-
Smith & Lord 2014). However, arguments require a deeper understanding of the board 
recruitment process and board dynamics. While the conceptualisation of board capital 
focuses on the human and social characteristics of board members, studies suggest that 
gender and diversity are implicit factors that influence the value to be derived from board 
members, with implications for board capital (Gray & Nowland 2017; Kang, Cheng & 
Gray 2007). There is a need for a holistic investigation that takes into account factors that 
have bearing on the composition and functionality of boards. 
 
2.11 Assessment of Board Capital 
In exploring the concept of board capital and how the construct explains the usefulness 
of boards, it is noted that the concept has two distinct components: the whole and its 
parts. Specifically, the concept of board capital explores boards collectively by 
examining the individual characteristics of board members and assumes that the whole 
is the sum of its parts. The concept of board capital suggests there is a resource embedded 
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within boards associated with board member characteristics (Hillman & Dalziel 2003). 
Based on studies that have examined board capital, boards are perceived to execute two 
main functions: monitoring agents on behalf of stakeholders (the agency perspective) and 
providing resources to organisations known as the resource dependency perspective 
(Hillman & Dalziel 2003).  
Although the focus of this study is not to test how board capital influences 
organisational outcomes it is pertinent to highlight that the concept of board capital is 
hypothesised as influencing monitoring and the provision of resources which in turn 
influences organisational performance (Hillman & Dalziel 2003). It is theorised based on 
the seminal work of Hillman and Dalziel (2003) that the strength of the relationship 
between board capital and organisational performance may be explained by one of three 
moderating variables: board incentives, equity compensation and board dependence (pp. 
390-392).  
The conceptualisation of board capital (Hillman & Dalziel 2003) assumes that board 
capital is a combination of board members’ human and social capital. However, there is 
no consensus on what constitutes human and social capital in the board context. Studies 
(Chen 2014a; De Maere, Jorissen & Uhlaner 2014; Haynes & Hillman 2010; Jermias & 
Gani 2014) investigating the relationship between board capital, board effectiveness 
and/or organisational performance have used various proxy measures to examine board 
member human and social capital such as level of education, work experience, 
knowledge of product and supply markets, director tenure, number of directorships, 
prestige, board size, CEO of a prominent firm, university professor, government officer 
and political connections. 
This study does not contribute to discussions that examine associations between 
boards and organisational performance. Instead, the focus of this study is to explore and 
evaluate the concept of board capital and its usefulness in understanding the qualities of 
organisational boards. This study offers an analysis of the concept of board member 
human and social capital to determine whether these are factors that influence board 
member recruitment and dynamics. The study seeks to explore how board members come 
to work together by acquiring a detailed account of board member experiences and 
behaviours in the boardroom, a perspective not currently provided by the existing 
construct. 
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Furthermore, based on the existing construct the study seeks to understand how board 
member human and social attributes explain how organisations are controlled and 
managed. Although embracing the existing conventions, the study recognises that human 
and social capital are both multi-dimensional concepts and therefore there is an inherent 
risk in using the language of capital. Human and social capital differ from financial 
capital and assets as it is fundamentally assumed that human and social capital are not 
depleted by use and are not transferable to another party unlike economic capital. Human 
and social capital, while analogous in some respects, are diversely complex concepts and 
as a result this study questions whether all things of value should be called capital. This 
investigation identifies several challenges with the existing conceptual framework and 
limitations of current understandings of board capital: 
1. The variability in measures of human and social capital has produced inconsistent 
results (Barroso, Villegas & Perez-Calero 2011; Dalziel, Gentry & Bowerman 2011; 
Kim & Kim 2015). It is unclear what combination of human and social factors are 
beneficial in explaining board usefulness and/or organisational outcomes. It is not clear 
what factors ought to be included; propositions of human and social capital are not 
based on a theory of boards.  
2. Organisational performance and/or board effectiveness is explained using several 
variables because of differences in organisational goals across different organisational 
structures. The variability in explaining organisational outcomes has also caused 
inconsistencies in results. The concept of board capital may positively influence one 
performance variable and adversely influence another in the same study 
(Sundaramurthy, Pukthuanthong & Kor 2013). 
3. The use of proxy measures poses a challenge for concept validity as human and social 
items should measure what they are hypothesised to measure (board 
effectiveness/usefulness). Therefore, proxy items used in investigations should be 
defined and understood to represent the value of a board member. Given the variability 
in board capital measures, the rationality and credibility of the concept is questionable. 
4. Board capital is principally derived from an amalgamation of board member 
characteristics. There are inherent characteristics associated with groups that are not 
able to be quantified or examined independently of the collective. Factors intrinsic to 
groups such as the social status of members, assigned or adopted roles, patterns of 
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communication and dominance (Thibaut 2017) are inadvertently ignored in the 
conceptualisation of board capital.  
5. While the concept of board capital captures the heterogeneous characteristics of board 
members, it does not directly consider gender and diversity. Attributes associated with 
the sexes are essentially disregarded. 
6. The concept of board capital neglects all other factors that may influence the usefulness 
of boards. Internal processes and/or institutional factors are assumed to be irrelevant to 
board productivity. Thus, the current conceptualisation of board capital does not 
support the understanding of the internal mechanisms of boards and/or organisations. 
The following chapter discusses the research methodology for this investigation.  
 
 
 
Beyond Board Capital: Probing Inside the Black Box of Australian Board Recruitment and Dynamics         Chapter 3 
71 | P a g e  
 
 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Methodology should not be a fixed track to a fixed destination, but a conversation 
about everything that could be made to happen. The language of the conversation must 
bridge the logical gap between past and future, but in doing so it should not limit the 
variety of possible futures that are discussed nor should it force the choice of a future 
that is unfree. 
Jones (1981, p. 73) 
3.0 Chapter Overview 
his chapter explains the research methodology used in this investigation, 
detailing how data was collected and analysed. The study adopts a social 
constructivist approach emphasising the importance of context in 
understanding organisational boards. Accordingly, this study analysed the regulatory 
system to gain an understanding of the nature of Australian boards and the legal context 
in which boards operate. By collecting secondary data and executing a documentary 
analysis this study provides a descriptive overview of the top 100 company boards in 
Australia (ASX100) to understand the composition of certain forms of Australian boards 
including the characteristics of their board members. The data analysis culminates with 
20 semi-structured interviews with board members on various types of boards to explain 
board recruitment and dynamics. 
 
3.1 Research Design and Strategy 
Being a constructivist investigation the focus of this study is not on material reality; 
instead the study gives attention to social composition which defines board members 
within the social context in which they operate (Keaton & Bodie 2011). Communication 
with particular board members influences how boards are perceived and the range of 
potential meanings boards embody (Keaton & Bodie 2011). This study provides an 
understanding of board recruitment and dynamics by socially constructing the activities 
of certain board members (Kukla 2013).  
The principle that governs constructivism is ‘epistemic relativism’ which is the view 
that ‘there is no absolute warrant for any belief…that rational warrant makes sense only 
relative to a culture, or an individual, or a paradigm’ (Kukla 2013, p. 4). This 
T 
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investigation makes the following assumptions about knowledge acquisition: 1) boards 
are constructed through human activity and members of society together create the 
characteristics of boards, 2) knowledge about boards is a product of socially and 
culturally constructed ideas and board members create meaning through their interactions 
with each other and with the environment they live in, and 3) board dynamics is shaped 
by a social process that occurs when board members are engaged in social activities. 
It should be noted that constructing social meanings involves ‘inter-subjectivity’ 
among individuals where knowledge is shaped and evolves through a negotiation within 
the subject group (Kukla 2013; Young 2007). Inter-subjectivity in the study context is a 
collective understanding that is derived from board members whose interaction is based 
on common interests (board involvement) and assumptions that define their experience 
and communication of that experience (Rogoff 1990). Communications and interactions 
with board members involve socially approved ideas about boards based on board 
members’ social patterns and rules of language (Kukla 2013; Reckwitz 2002). Also, there 
are personal meanings that are shaped by individual board member experiences which 
are influenced by the inter-subjectivity of the social context to which a board member 
belongs (Kukla 2013; Reckwitz 2002). 
Fundamentally, inter-subjectivity not only provides the basis for gathering 
information but also provides support for board members to share their understanding of 
the board recruitment process and their activities as members serving on boards (Kukla 
2013; Rogoff 1990). Knowledge is derived from the discussions with board members 
and an understanding of their environment residing within a particular social context 
(Kukla 2013; Reckwitz 2002). It is emphasised that the construction of knowledge is also 
influenced by inter-subjectivity which is shaped by social and historical factors unique 
to Australia (Kukla 2013; Reckwitz 2002).  
This study is designed to understand both the context in which board members operate 
and also the social contexts they bring to the boardroom. This approach involves 
collaborating with research participants facilitating practical knowledge of boards and 
the social organisations in which they belong. This knowledge allows an evaluation of 
the concept of board capital within the Australian context through the social construction 
of board recruitment and dynamics. Using multi-methods of qualitative data collection 
the study offers a nuanced approach to assessing assumptions about board capital. The 
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multi-method design for the data collected in line with the research questions is illustrated 
below (Figure 3-1). There was no integration or triangulation of the two data sets; both 
sets of data were analysed independently in order to examine the development of jointly 
constructed understandings of Australian boards that form the basis of shared 
assumptions about board capital. Phase 1 of the investigation seeks to understand the 
contextual factors that have bearing on board capital as well as to identify: 1) the 
principles that govern boards 2) the human and social characteristics of board members 
in the research sample.  
The unavailability of publicly available data about board members serving on not for 
profit, government and for profit boards does not permit the triangulation of data in 
phases 1 and 2. As a result, a multi-method research design was adopted instead of a 
mixed-method approach. The key distinction between a multi-method and mixed method 
approach is that there is no triangulation of data in multi-method studies as per Figure 3-
1 (Corbin & Strauss 2008; Miles & Huberman 1994). However, the data collected on 
publicly listed companies provided key insights about board members in the Australian 
context who are noted to serve across different forms of boards.  
Figure 3-1: Multi-method Research Design 
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Phase 1 of data collection provided key insights about the Australian context and 
identified fundamental governance drivers in Australia. The data assisted in formulating 
interview questions and the development of an interview protocol for Phase 2 of data 
collection. Additionally Phase 1 provided the human and social capital characteristics 
of board members serving on Australian top one hundred boards and helped to focus 
Phase 2 on 1) confirming the human and social capital factors of importance for boards 
2) the goal boards set out to achieve with particular types of human and social capital 3) 
probing into cultural factors that shape board capital. 
Phase 2 of data collection, primarily focused on 1) the intrinsic factors that influence 
board activities 2) factors that influence board dynamics 3) how board members come 
to understand their roles. The analysis of a range of data sources uncovered paradoxical 
factors that provided awareness about contextual aspects of Australian boards that 
shape board capital. 
 
3.2 Theoretical Approach 
Corporate governance has been studied across many disciplines including economics, 
management, finance, law and accounting. The most frequently cited work in the 
corporate governance literature has primarily taken a quantitative approach to research 
design. The foundation theories on how board members interact with organisations have 
focused on boards as a resource for achieving organisational goals (resource dependency 
theory) (Pfeffer, Jeffrey  & Salancik 2003) and/or boards as overseers of managers 
(agency theory) (Jensen 2000).  
Both perspectives (agency and resource dependency) provide a retroactive evaluation 
of boards based on superficial factors, lacking key insights about the board recruitment 
process and the internal dynamics of boards. Too often discussions about board 
composition are treated as knowledge of the board recruitment process. One of the 
innovations of this study is using a qualitative approach (Figure 3-2) to advance an 
understanding of: how and why boards are organised in a particular way; factors that are 
considered important in the board recruitment process; and the factors that shape board 
dynamics. 
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Figure 3-2: Qualitative Research Process 
 
There has been much doubt as to whether corporate governance research is a discipline 
in and of itself or the subject of multidisciplinary research (Durisin & Puzone 2009). 
There are also uncertainties about the intellectual structure of corporate governance 
research (Durisin & Puzone 2009). The inability to generate robust findings using extant 
approaches suggests there is need to recast the methodological approach. This study takes 
a sociological approach, investigating board recruitment and dynamics by interacting 
with board members sharing their experiences as well as evaluating factors that provide 
insights about the Australian context. A qualitative approach allows a researcher to 
advance theory by interacting with actors and settings to gain a better understanding of 
complex practices (Shah & Corley 2006).  
 
3.3 Data Sources 
In the literature human and social capital has been discussed in various contexts and 
examined in a number of ways using various proxies (Becker 2002; Carpenter, Sanders 
& Gregersen 2001; Nahapiet & Ghoshal 1998; Putnam 2000; Soo-Hoon, Poh-Kam & 
Chee-Leong 2005; Woolcock 1998). Fusing these two terms together in the board context 
changes the dynamics of discussions and creates a hybrid concept with complex factors 
that are not clearly understood in the context in which they are being studied. Based on 
the complexity of the construct board capital, construct evaluation is one of the key goals 
of this research. McNulty, Zattoni and Douglas (2013) highlight there is much scope and 
need for rigorous and relevant qualitative studies that explore the range of relationships 
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and practices involved in corporate governance across diverse stages of analysis and 
contexts. 
Qualitative investigation permits a researcher to derive meaning by investigating the 
nature of the subject being studied (Blumberg, Cooper & Schindler 2011; Darlington & 
Scott 2002; Lewis 2015; Merriam 2002). In order to advance understanding of board 
capital, data was collected using several methods: semi-structured interviews with board 
members serving on various forms of organisational boards and secondary data collection 
which included a documentary analysis of Australian law, the top 100 publicly listed 
boards, and interview participants’ company profiles and curriculum vitae (CVs) to gain 
insights about the sample prior to interview.  
Recruitment of Board Participants. A purposeful method was used to identify board 
members to be interviewed (Coyne 1997; Draucker et al. 2007; Shah & Corley 2006). 
The initial data collection process involved identifying that there are different forms of 
organisational boards with four main classifications of boards: listed (ASX), government, 
private and not-for-profit. For this reason random sampling was not appropriate. A 
participant sample comprising board members serving on the four different forms of 
organisational boards was important to determine whether board processes and practices 
are similar across different forms of organisations and also to capture a diversity of views. 
Once board members that were currently serving on Australian boards were identified 
through advertisements posted on the websites of Victorian Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry, American Chamber of Commerce in Australia and Women on Boards, the 
participants were asked to provide additional relevant contacts, resulting in a snowball or 
chain sampling method being used (Patton 2002) to increase the number of respondents 
participating in the study.  
The sample of participants was purposefully selected to capture data about Australian 
company boards and enable validity of findings. This study is externally valid as it 
describes the true state of affairs outside its own setting by gather secondary data about 
the institutional context (Coyne 1997; Draucker et al. 2007; Shah & Corley 2006). Both 
the primary and secondary data collected facilitated an evaluation of board capital in the 
Australian context by selecting participants serving on Australian company boards. 
Generalizability describes the extent to which the research findings can be applied to 
settings other than that in which they were originally tested (Blumberg, Cooper & 
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Schindler 2011; Darlington & Scott 2002; Lewis 2015; Merriam 2002). The selected 
participants had a range of experience serving on different forms of boards across a wide 
cross section of organisations in Australia which they compared and contrasted. This 
enabled the findings to be applied to other settings outside of the dataset.  
Data Refinement. As the fieldwork progressed it became necessary to ensure there 
was a balance of respondents across board classifications. Some interviewees had 
experience across the four board groupings (bands). This information informed the 
strategy which emerged, where interviewees were asked questions in the context of the 
type of boards they served on. This allowed respondents to compare and contrast 
experiences which enriched the data collected and eliminated biases that could result 
from discussing a specific board or form of organisation. It was identified at the point of 
12 interviews that there needed to be a balance of participants. At this point there was 
sufficient discussion about not-for-profit and private boards and it was decided to focus 
on board members’ experiences on government and ASX organisational boards. 
Documentary Analysis. The study collected secondary data from the Centre for 
Corporate Law University of Melbourne to track the development of Australia’s 
corporate law providing an understanding of boards from a legal perspective. This 
assisted in providing contextual information and explains regulatory factors that have 
influenced the development of boards. Data was collected from the Australian Council 
of Superannuation Investors (ACSI), Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) and the 
Investment and Financial Services Association Ltd (IFSA), the three main bodies that 
have been influential in the development of principles to guide the actions of board 
members. Statistical data was also collected from ACSI, ASX, Australian Bureau of 
Statistics and the World Bank to explain the characteristics of the top 100 company 
boards in Australia. 
The CVs and company profiles of board members were an important source of 
information in preparing for interviews and highlighting information gaps in the data 
throughout the fieldwork. This also eliminated the time spent asking demographic and 
general questions in the interview. CVs and biographies were obtained from company 
websites prior to interviews or requested directly from interviewees. A documentary 
analysis was conducted to understand the wealth of board experience across the sample. 
This ranged from a minimum of six years to a maximum of over 40 years. The data from 
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participant CVs was also used to develop a profile of board members, including their 
gender, age, education, training, types of board roles, awards and honours. Table 3-1 
below provides an overview of participant profiles and Table 3-2 following provides in-
depth information about participants human and social capital characteristics. 
Table 3-1: Summary of Research Participants 
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Table 3-2: Participant Profiles 
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3.4 Data Collection 
Interview data collection commenced in June 2015 and was completed in March 2016. 
There were 20 semi-structured interviews that lasted between 45 and 150 minutes 
depending on the experience of the board member. All interviews were digitally recorded 
and transcribed, producing 23 hours of recordings and 368 pages of transcriptions. 
Snowball sampling proved very effective in recruiting board members across the four 
board bands. When data saturation occurred for some groups it proved meaningful to ask 
interviewees to compare and contrast their experience across boards, primarily 
highlighting the different types of boards during the discussions. According to Corbin 
and Strauss (2008) the researcher should let the method of analysis guide the research, 
and as a result data was collected and analysed on an ongoing basis.  
The ‘analytic trail’ technique guided what data needed to be collected and when 
saturation was occurring for specific groups (Corbin & Strauss 2008). When it was 
confirmed that saturation had occurred within some bands and themes, the focus then 
shifted to identifying variations in discussions. It is recommended (Corbin & Strauss 
2008; Miles & Huberman 1994) that the researcher examine beyond the surface, 
explaining in depth the various elements that have emerged. Data collection facilitated 
this process by progressively identifying and focusing on the differences in board 
member experiences.  
In order to gain an understanding of board recruitment and dynamics in the context of 
board member experiences, the interview questions were divided into four categories: 
governance and boards, value, behavioural intentions and performance. The category 
‘governance and boards’ was designed to identify key features of boards, understand how 
board members define their role and factors that enable boards to function successfully. 
The second category ‘value’ was focused on understanding how one becomes a board 
member, how and why boards members are recruited, considering any specific education 
or training program that board members perceived as being important. This category of 
inquiry also concentrated on identifying factors that may have a positive or negative 
influence on board dynamics and outcomes such as board tenure, multiple directorships, 
networking and community involvement. 
Thirdly, the category ‘behavioural intentions’ focused on understanding why 
particular individuals pursued board membership and what board members set out to 
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achieve in their roles. There was also an open question category where board members 
could speak freely about their experience as a board member, current developments and 
contemporary issues about boards. Appendix 1 outlines the interview protocol and full 
guide to the questions asked. 
 
3.5 Data Analysis 
In applying the theoretical recruitment method, data collection and analysis was 
executed synchronously. Data analysis commenced in June 2015 and the process of 
analysis involved working between themes using an inductive approach and refining it 
as data collection progressed until a comprehensive set of high level themes emerged 
(Boyatzis 1998; Braun & Clarke 2006; Creswell 2003; Miles & Huberman 1994).  
Creswell (2007) recommends that the inductive process may be enhanced by 
collaborating with interviewees in a synergised manner to solicit their input in shaping 
the themes that are developed. This approach was applied throughout the data collection 
phase facilitating the emergence of multi-level themes (Guest, MacQueen & Namey 
2011). Gaining a deeper understanding of the phenomena that emerged was the primary 
focus of the data collection and analysis. The primary goal of data analysis in this study 
is concept evaluation and as a result an interpretive approach was used. The interpretive 
approach is based on the premise that a phenomenon is only possible through 
understanding the interpretations of that phenomenon from those board members 
experiencing it (Altheide & Johnson 1994; Shah & Corley 2006; Walsham 2006).  
In applying the interpretive approach the primary focus is to understand the nature of 
board capital through board members’ experience of being recruiting onto boards and 
participating in board duties. The process of analysing the data was executed in a 
systematic manner which involved scrutinising the data collected against the literature, 
comparing the data to documentary support (CVs and biographies) and coding and 
recoding the data in order to develop themes. It is inherent in interpretive research that 
the researcher will have a unique interpretation of the results (Lincoln 1995; Shah & 
Corley 2006). It therefore means that diverse social truths may exist within themes 
identified, as both participants and researcher may interpret phenomena differently (Shah 
& Corley 2006; Willis, Jost & Nilakanta 2007). 
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A thematic analysis was used to code interview transcripts and written documents and 
according to (Teddlie & Tashakkori 2009) ‘themes are dominant features of the situation 
or person, those qualities of place, person or object that define or describe identity’. In 
operationalising a thematic approach within the context of this study data coding was 
done in two ways. The CVs and biographies of board members were first analysed for 
features identified in the literature, which were then compared with transcripts to identify 
similarities and differences. This method is based on the two principles of thematic 
analysis, ‘similarity and contrast principles’, proposed by (Spradley 1979) which suggest 
that a meaning of a symbol can be discovered by finding out how it is similar or how it 
is different from other symbols. The initial stages of the data coding process involved 
identifying similarities, while the contrast principle as recommended by (Spradley 1979) 
was used at the end to identify unique factors emerging from the themes.  
Thematic analysis is greatly dependent on observation. This meant that some analysis 
was also done in the field while the data was being collected and then later verified 
against transcripts and documentary evidence. Boyatzis (1998, p. 1) asserts that 
observation precedes understanding, recognizing an important moment precedes 
encoding it which in turn precedes interpreting it’. It was observed in the early stages of 
data collection that boards span across four categorical bands: ASX, government, not-
for-profit and private; a categorical data coding strategy was also incorporated, using the 
‘constant comparative method’ which is also part of the protocol associated with the 
contrast principle (Teddlie & Tashakkori 2009).  
In the first stage of data analysis, CVs and biographies were coded based on an in text 
analysis facilitated by NVIVO software. Then transcripts were coded based on 
descriptions provided by interviewees which focused on board recruitment practices 
pertaining to board member identification and selection, characteristics of board 
members, behavioural intentions of board members and decision-making. These formed 
the first order codes.  
In the second stage of data analysis corresponding interview transcripts were then 
compared for ‘incidents’ applicable to each board band (Glaser & Strauss 1967). Each 
incident was then compared to a category that it may or may not belong to (Glaser & 
Strauss 1967) in order to group similarities and differences across board bands. Guba and 
Lincoln (1982) outlined some strategies to refine data, referred to as ‘unitising and 
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categorising’. These strategies were used to divide the data into units of information, and, 
where possible, statements were grouped according to type of board. This involved 
identifying words and/or phrases that may be associated with themes and coding 
according to each type of board referenced.  
In the third stage of data analysis statements from the four categorical board bands 
were integrated by comparing and contrasting the descriptive rules of the board bands 
(Glaser & Strauss 1967; Walsham 2006). This resulted in the extraction of statements 
that were then reduced to a ‘parsimonious set of more inclusive saturated set of themes’, 
forming the higher-level themes (Glaser & Strauss 1967). Figure 3-3 below shows 
statements were refined based on context, roles and objectives.  
Figure 3-3: Data Analysis 
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The fourth stage of data analysis involved grouping the emerging conceptual themes 
into overarching themes that informed the study’s main findings and theoretical 
reflections. Three groups of factors were identified that were classified as human and 
social capital factors from the conceptual framework of board capital and one new group 
(political factors) emerged based on the interviews conducted. It was discovered during 
the investigation that board recruitment and dynamics are idiosyncratic processes that 
have both human and socio-political implications and this influenced the formation of 
the overarching themes. 
Consulting with interview participants during the analysis process facilitated a deeper 
understanding of board recruitment and dynamics and assisted the study in gaining a 
fuller appreciation and deeper understanding of board processes. This collaborative 
exercise assisted in defining the overarching themes. Human factors are defined as the 
expertise of the board members who participated in the study and social-political factors 
are based on their interactions with their internal and external environment.  
The analysis process was diverse as while saturation had occurred within some bands 
and themes, other themes developed and presented some variation. It is therefore 
recommended by Corbin and Strauss (2008) that the researcher examines beyond the 
surface, explaining in depth the various elements that have emerged. The analysis process 
was done systematically by applying logical ordered techniques of coding to uncover 
patterns and facilitated the social construction of data. The following chapter illustrates 
the findings of the documents analysed in this investigation. 
Trustworthiness or rigor of this investigation is understood as the ‘degree of 
confidence in data, interpretation, and methods used to ensure the quality of a study’ 
(Shah & Corley 2006). This was ensured by following the criteria outlined by Guba and 
Lincoln (1982), a  procedure that involved ensuring ‘credibility’ which is the adoption of 
standard procedures for thematic analysis;  ‘dependability’ which involved maintenance 
of an interview protocol, interview notes and process logs of all activities that occurred 
during the study and decisions about data collection and analysis; ‘confirmability’ by 
keeping detailed notes of all decisions and analysis as it progressed and transferability 
which involved ensuring that the findings are useful for researchers in other setting by 
detailing thoroughly reporting coding and analysis procedures.  
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 THE AUSTRALIAN CONTEXT 
Any study of action and meaning must pay attention to context because, as the classic 
case of ‘waving not drowning’ reminds us, behaviour gains meaning in situations that 
are also importantly located in time. There is a variety of elements of context with/in 
which a board operates that have significant bearing on the role and conduct of the 
board and its directors as well as, most importantly, the criteria against which it/they 
may be judged to be effective, both individually and collectively. 
Pye and Pettigrew (2005, p. S31) 
4.0 A Regulatory Understanding of Boards 
he nature of Australian organisations and the establishment of boards are 
governed by laws that came into existence in the 19th century (Figure 4-1) 
marked by the enactment of company legislation which is based on the 
Companies Act of England (1862) (Watson 2017). This chapter provides an 
understanding of boards through the lens of regulatory bodies and evaluates contextual 
factors that influence the activities and composition of boards which are relevant to the 
construct of board capital. It is emphasised that regulatory bodies provide the foundation 
on which boards are instituted and assist in explaining how board member responsibilities 
are defined and developed. The broader factors that have shaped the regulatory system 
and the perception of board capital are surveyed in this chapter. 
Table 4-1: History of Australian Corporate Law 1800s–1929 
 
Data retrieved from: Centre for Corporate Law University of Melbourne  
T 
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The enactment of Australian company law (Table 4-1) has been influential in 
financing the development of the mining industry and played an important role in the 
economic success of colonial Australia (Lipton 2007). As the nature of business became 
more complex and organisations expanded their operations across borders, the early 20th 
century saw many debates about the need for federal power in respect to organisations 
(Watson 2017). These considerations caused regulatory changes which resulted in federal 
power being limited to foreign, trading and financial corporations created by state 
legislation (Lipton 2007; Watson 2017).  
The narrowing of federal laws has key implications for the duties of boards as 
organisations have become less regulated, giving boards more sovereignty over 
organisational affairs. It is argued that decisions made by organisations on whether or 
how to participate in governance are contingent on the domestic system of business and 
government from which organisational policies are developed (Detomasi 2015). 
Although not explicitly observed, the conceptualisation of board capital relies 
fundamentally on authority given to boards by regulatory bodies to be operational. 
Table 4-2: History of Australian Corporate Law 1950–1979 
 
Data retrieved from: Centre for Corporate Law University of Melbourne  
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During 1961 and 1962 each Australian state enacted uniform legislation (Table 4-2) 
in an attempt to resolve challenges associated with differences in legislation between 
states (Watson 2017). Consequently, there were a number of investor protection reforms 
which, although highly progressive, were largely based on English law proposals that 
were decades old (Lipton 2007). While these reforms simplified the regulatory 
framework governing corporations and organisations became more homogenised, board 
member duties became more obscure. There was, however, consensus among regulators 
in Australia that company directors should at all times in good conscience use reasonable 
care in the discharge of their duties but laws did not provide much clarity regarding what 
activities boards were expected to execute (Watson 2017).  
Table 4-3: History of Australian Corporate Law 1980–1989 
 
Data retrieved from: Centre for Corporate Law University of Melbourne  
After a period of homogenisation regulatory bodies shifted focus to deal with issues 
that were affecting organisations globally. Legislation passed in the 1980s (Table 4-3) 
was in direct response to the stock market crash and it was understood that a board’s role 
was to restore investor confidence in the securities market (Lee & Shailer 2008). At the 
time the explicit role of boards was to meet the fundamental criteria of a strong investor 
market by ensuring that timely, accurate and relevant information about organisations 
was available to investors (Lee & Shailer 2008). There was also the implicit expectation 
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that boards would create value for organisational stakeholders by making prudent 
decisions (Lee & Shailer 2008). This perspective reflects the agency view of boards 
which perceives boards as watchdogs of self-motivated managers who do not bear the 
risks of their decisions (Bendickson et al. 2016).  
As a result of high inflation during 1990 and 1991 when interest rates on mortgages 
increased to 17 per cent and the State Bank of South Australia collapsed in 1991, boards 
were recognised as playing a crucial role in governing large organisations (McCarthy 
1996). The events of the time necessitated appointing board members with the capacity 
for objective oversight of organisational activities (Lee & Shailer 2008). Accordingly, 
regulatory reforms focused on transparency and accountability which also involved 
promoting independence and board competence (Hamilton 2004). During the period 
1990–1999 (Table 4-4) Australia’s legislators made several amendments to the 
Corporations Act to address insider trading, benefits to directors of public companies, 
indemnification of directors and enhanced disclosure (Hamilton 2004; Watson 2017). 
Table 4-4: History of Australian Corporate Law 1990–1999 
 
Data retrieved from: Centre for Corporate Law University of Melbourne  
While the Corporations Act provides the foundation for governance systems such as 
boards, governance principles in Australia were greatly influenced by the Cadbury 
Report published in May 1992 (Jones & Pollitt 2004). The Cadbury Report was a 
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hallmark study that critically evaluated the governance structure of organisations in the 
United Kingdom and came at a time when corporate collapses were occurring in Anglo 
countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States (Jones & Pollitt 2004).  
The main event that instigated the ‘The Committee on the Financial Aspects of 
Corporate Governance’ that prepared the Cadbury Report was the collapse of the Bank 
of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) in 1990 which had over $4 billion US in 
assets (Herring 2005). Australian regulators recognised that there was merit in 
understanding issues confronting other countries that functioned as a free market 
economic system. The Cadbury report  recommended that an effective way of dealing 
with governance issues is to involve key organisational stakeholders, also referred to as 
‘influencers’ of the regulatory process (Jones, I & Pollitt 2004).   
During 1999 and 2000 the Australian national corporation scheme consisting of the 
Corporations Act (1989 Cth) and the Corporations Act of States and Northern Territory 
experienced serious setbacks to the power of Federal Courts to rule over organisational 
matters (Watson 2017). The ruling Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally on 17 June 1999 and 
later R v Hughes (2000) 202 CLR 535 meant that in most situations the Federal Court 
did not have the power to determine matters arising under corporations law (Watson 
2017).  
The uncertainty regarding Federal Court powers on corporation law meant that it was 
unclear whether matters could be transferred to the Supreme Court in the absence of a 
Federal Court ruling (Watson 2017). More importantly the ruling Re Wakim; Ex parte 
McNally (1999) created the possibility that every decision made by a Federal Court 
exercising state jurisdiction was invalid (Watson 2017). Subsequent decisions such as R 
v Hughes (2000) 202 CLR 535 caused the downfall of the national corporations’ law 
scheme and the enactment of its successor the Corporations Act 2001 (Watson 2017). 
Although states and the Commonwealth acted expediently to rectify anomalies in the 
legal system, decisions Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally and R v Hughes (2000) 202 CLR 
535 delivered serious blows to the regulatory system (Watson 2017). Special federal 
matters regarding trade practices and competition where matters also involve a state were 
now outside the Federal Court’s jurisdiction (Watson 2017). It became unclear whether 
federal and state matters needed to be separate proceedings in the Federal Court and 
Supreme Court respectively (Watson 2017). Accordingly, states moved swiftly to vest 
Beyond Board Capital: Probing Inside the Black Box of Australian Board Recruitment and Dynamics         Chapter 4 
90 | P a g e  
 
the Federal Court with state jurisdiction to allow the Commonwealth to have effective 
judicial control over corporation law (Watson 2017). 
Table 4-5: History of Australian Corporate Law 2000–2011 
 
Data retrieved from: Centre for Corporate Law University of Melbourne  
In the context of corporate governance this meant that all disputes relating to 
companies would now be heard in State Supreme Courts whereas previously they could 
be heard in the Federal Court (Watson 2017). Also, it became necessary to clarify 
directors’ duties through the introduction of a business judgement rule and expanding 
shareholders’ rights to take action on behalf of companies (Hamilton 2004; Lee & Shailer 
2008). There was a move towards providing more commercial and international focus in 
the accounting standard setting process and an emphasis on ensuring that accounting 
standards were responsive to the needs of both organisations and investors (Hamilton 
2004). Consequently, the period 2000–2011 (Table 4-5) saw many reforms and 
amendments to the Corporations Act, with regulators seeking to find the best balance 
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between state and market as the spread of economic liberalism secured a victory for 
capitalism.  
 
4.1 Governance Principles and the Role of Organisational Stakeholders  
Three main bodies in Australia have been instrumental in the development of 
corporate governance: Australian Council of Super Investors (ACSI), Austalian 
Securities Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Council and the Investment and 
Financial Services Association Ltd (IFSA). They have been responsible for the 
development of principles and practices on corporate governance and are focused on 
board structuring, board processes and the renumeration of board members detailed in 
Table 4-6 (p. 89).  
Based on the bodies’ individual focus areas, Australia has established principles 
regarding: board meetings, board roles, board evaluations, disclosure reports, 
remuneration reports and committees. These principles are written with the primary goal 
of institutionalising a ‘principles-based’ approach to governance to acquire balance and 
consensus in the information that is reported by organisations.  
Organisational stakeholders, primarily pension fund managers, are key players in 
influencing the development of corporate governance in Australia. In 2017 Australia 
became not only the world’s fourth largest pension (locally called ‘superannuation’) 
market valued at US$1.9 trillion but also experienced one of the highest growth rates of 
pension fund assets in the world, according to the Willis Towers Watson Global Pensions 
Asset Study (2018). This institutional influence began with the compulsory retirement 
income system implemented by the Keating Labor government in 1992, a tripartite 
agreement between employers, government and trade unions (Edey & Simon 1998; 
Olsberg 1997), which is documented as one of the key drivers of growth in the managed 
funds sector (Mees & Brigden 2017). According to Australia Trade Commission (2010), 
Australia has one of the largest and fastest growing fund management sectors in the 
world, which grows at a rate of 12 per cent annually and since 2003 the assets under 
management have almost doubled (Mees & Brigden 2017). 
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Table 4-6: Australia's Governance Codes and Principles 
 
Data retrieved and compiled from: ACSI, ASX and IFSA 
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The Australian government mandated retirement scheme referred to as superannuation 
is predicted to increase progressively from 9 per cent to 12 per cent of salaries in the 
period 2019–2020. Australia’s investment management industry is classified as the 
largest in the region with a value of AUD$1.7 trillion (Commission 2010). This echoes 
the importance of the need for a sound governance framework in Australia and highlights 
the importance of boards, as a collapse of the investment sector in Australia could cripple 
the economy. The role of organisational stakeholders has, however, not been evaluated 
in the context of board capital. From an international perspective, Australia has been one 
of the leading jurisdictions for corporate governance reform. Table 4-10 shows there has 
been a focus on board structure, board process and remuneration. 
Australia’s first corporate governance code predates the Cadbury Report and Australia 
is also one of the few countries internationally to have been only marginally affected by 
the recession that ensued after the Global Financial Crisis of 2008. Considerable 
governance reform has occurred since 2007-8 in Australia, however, much of it was due 
to pressure by organisational stakeholders as a reaction to both traditional governance 
failings but also social and environmental concerns such as a growing awareness of 
climate change.  
Table 4-6 shows there is notable shift to a results oriented framework motivated by 
policies that provide prescriptive guidance for boards. These current policies are focused 
on the distribution of power, transparency and accountability. This paradigm shift in 
Australia’s board governance has focused on creating value, managing value and 
measuring value. The shift from the structural model presented in the early 1990s which 
focused on reporting relationships between boards and organisational stakeholders is in 
direct response to the corporate governance issues discussed earlier and a reflection of 
the influence of organisational stakeholders. 
Anderson, Melanson and Maly (2007) conducted a comparative study to gain a better 
understanding of the developing viewpoints of institutional investors and their 
relationship to the behaviour of board members in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and 
the United States. The study found that ‘changes in board member views and practices 
across countries were significant and consistent with the defining characteristic of a 
fundamental shift in the positioning of the board towards becoming a strategic partner to 
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management’ (Anderson, Melanson & Maly 2007, p. 780). This emphasises that 
institutional investors influence how a board understands and defines its role.  
In addition, findings suggest that the role of institutional investors is influenced by 
this new strategic partnership role being undertaken by board members which works in 
in a complementary way towards increased monitoring (Anderson, Melanson & Maly 
2007). The researchers assert that boards are evolving into a more collaborative 
stewardship role and that the agency perspective becomes less applicable with the 
involvement of institutional investors in the governance process (Anderson, Melanson & 
Maly 2007). Their findings suggest that board members are ‘seeking a balance between 
collaboration and their role as monitors of management, rejecting the notion of the board 
as primarily a monitoring body’ (Anderson, Melanson & Maly 2007, p. 780).  
Although significant challenges have been highlighted in board governance, globally 
Australia is ranked number ten by the World Bank (Table 4-7) for good governance based 
on assessment of six major areas: voice and accountability, political stability, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. The World Bank 
uses a scale of +2.5 to -2.5 for each item, and these six factors are added together to one 
indicator representing the level of good governance which may range from +15 to -15.  
Table 4-7: Comparative Governance Ranking 2014 
 
Data retrieved from: World Bank 
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The OECD (2004) guidance on good governance highlights that it is important to 
understand how governance systems work and why they are motivated to work: 
Good corporate governance should provide proper incentives for the board and 
management to pursue objectives that are in the interests of the company and its 
shareholders and should facilitate effective monitoring.  
The data in Table 4-7 suggests that Australia has an effective institutional framework. 
However, there appear to be other contextual factors that are posing challenges in 
understanding issues confronting boards, highlighting there is a need for qualitative 
research discussed in the following section (Lama & Anderson 2015; Sheridan, Ross-
Smith & Lord 2014). 
 
4.2 Issues and Developments in Australia 
Governance issues in Australia have affected all forms of organisations with ASX 
listed companies HIH and James Hardie Industries, government funded Bacchus Marsh 
Hospital, the not-for-profit Shane Warne Foundation and private company Queensland 
Nickel all attracting Royal Commission investigations into their activities and raising 
serious questions about their boards. These cases have gained significant public attention 
and emphasise the need for all-inclusive research into Australian boards (Tarr & 
Nicholson 2017; Warren 2016; Willis, A 2005).  
HIH Insurance Group (2001) was one of the biggest collapses in Australia’s history 
with debts in excess of AUD$5 billion (Kehl 2001; Mirshekary, Yaftian & Cross 2005). 
Justice Owen concluded that the board at HIH seldom questioned or overruled 
recommendations from management causing board members to be greatly reliant on the 
advice of senior management and as a result board independence was compromised 
(Westfield 2003).  
The findings in the HIH case highlight there is an imprecise understanding of how 
board members go about the process of decision-making. While arguments about board 
effectiveness and board capital (Jermias & Gani 2014; Laoworapong, Supattarakul & 
Swierczek 2018) have focused on the human and social characteristics of board members, 
board member characteristics do not explain the process of decision-making in boards 
and how boards exercise power as a collective.  
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In the case of James Hardie the High Court of Australia in May 2012 found that seven 
board members labelled independent misled the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC) in believing that the company had funds to compensate asbestos 
victims (Hills 2005; Peacock 2011). While there is a perception that independent board 
members are more objective which facilitates better decision-making this was not evident 
at James Hardie, underscoring the need for a qualitative understanding of board capital. 
Issues with boards in Australia have continued to pose challenges for various sectors. 
The Victorian Health Minister Jill Hennessy sacked the entire board at Bacchus Marsh 
hospital in 2015 after investigations revealed there were seven avoidable baby deaths in 
two years (Preiss & Medew 2015). Investigations suggest there was no board oversight 
and risk assessment and board members were primarily dormant in the broader scheme 
(Preiss & Medew 2015). These events pose more questions than answers and highlight 
that board member characteristics do not explain the capacity and motivation of a board 
to execute its responsibilities. 
Another example is the Shane Warne Foundation, a large not-for-profit organisation 
generating millions of dollars of income, which was investigated by Consumer Affairs 
Victoria in 2015 (Vedelago & Houston 2016). It was found that the Foundation did not 
meet compliance requirements under the Fundraising Act and income could not be 
reconciled with expenses (Vedelago & Houston 2016). Although the board was cleared 
of any unlawful activity there was evidence of a breakdown in governance. An 
independent review by KPMG was inconclusive as auditors were unable to draw 
conclusions about the Foundation’s cash donations (Vedelago & Houston 2016). It was 
decided that the Foundation should distribute its final proceeds to stakeholders and cease 
from carrying out any further business (Vedelago & Houston 2016).  
It is important to reiterate that not-for-profit organisations in Australia have some key 
attributes of for-profit entities. Steane and Christie (2001) found that ‘not-for-profit 
boards in Australia mimic some aspects of a shareholder approach to governance’ (p. 
48). Although the priorities of not-for-profits are noted to be different because of the 
inherent stakeholder approach to governance there are isomorphic features because of 
the legal requirements imposed by regulators (Steane & Christie 2001, p. 48). (Steane & 
Christie 2001) noted that while not-for-profit boards are influenced by a particular agenda 
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and their motivation may not be profit maximisation, not-for-profit boards’ value 
knowledge and loyalty to the sector when considering board composition.  
The findings of Steane and Christie (2001) suggests that not-for-profit boards in 
Australia offset demands placed on them regarding their fiduciary duty by structuring 
their boards with diverse intellectual expertise (Steane & Christie 2001, p. 48). It is 
argued that not-for-profit boards possess greater diversity than boards in the corporate 
sector, having more women as board members than corporate boards, and include a 
greater proportion of board members from minority groups (Steane & Christie 2001, p. 
48). There are also some noted differences in board roles as not-for-profits are suggested 
to be more involved in operational affairs in addition to setting strategic direction (Steane 
& Christie 2001).  
Queensland Nickel, a private company, has been an ongoing case in the media since 
2016 and is still under investigation as more details about the company’s collapse unfold, 
involving billions of dollars in alleged fraudulent activities (Saunders 2016). Occurrences 
of poor board governance have been on the increase across organisations in various 
sectors of Australia. Sharma (2004) suggested that the high incidence of fraud in 
Australia is an indication there is an urgent need to strengthen the monitoring role of 
boards. Regulatory reports have recommended there is a need for greater independence 
and the elimination of duality on boards which means that a CEO should not also be the 
chair of a board (Sharma 2004).  
While curtailing fraud is suggested to be a matter for regulatory systems, the context 
presents many challenges. In the case of Queensland Nickel there is a concentrated 
ownership structure and as a result less regulatory red tape (Young et al. 2008). Sharma 
(2004) suggests that there is a relationship between fraudulent activity in Australia and 
ownership structures. By using a matched sample of fraudulent and non-fraudulent 
organisations for 1988–2000 in Australia, Sharma (2004) found that when the percentage 
of independent board members and independent institutional ownership increases, the 
possibility of fraud decreases (p. 105). The study findings reiterate that in cases where 
there is duality of CEO and chair roles the likelihood of fraud increases (Sharma 2004, 
p. 105).  
While Sharma (2004) has implied that the results support the call to strengthen the 
composition and structure of boards in Australia, the findings also highlight that there is 
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a need for a richer understanding of board recruitment and dynamics as board 
composition does not explain how these factors work in principle. Table 4-8 shows there 
is an emphasis on board diversity in recent Australian studies suggesting that diversity 
holds the key to overcoming challenges with board composition. The focus on board 
composition in Australia (the cart before the horse) has prevented a deeper understanding 
of board recruitment and dynamics. 
Table 4-8: Recent Empirical Studies on Board Diversity in Australia 
Study Focus Findings 
Groutsis, 
Cooper and 
Whitwell 
(2018) 
Cultural 
Diversity 
Australia’s culturally diverse landscape is not reflected 
in the corporate leadership of its institutions and 
businesses, most particularly at the board level. 
Kamalnath 
(2017) 
Gender 
Diversity 
Gender diversity on corporate boards might help 
overcome groupthink so long as female directors are 
also independent and bear ‘outsider’ status. However, 
other forms of diversity like race, education, tenure and 
professional background might offer the same benefits 
and thus should not be overlooked. 
Gray and 
Nowland 
(2017) 
Skill 
Diversity 
Diversity in expertise is primarily related to board size, 
industry and location. Shareholders benefit when boards 
diversify their expertise within a subset of specialist 
business expertise (lawyers, accountants, consultants, 
bankers and outside CEOs). Diversity beyond this 
subset of expertise is associated with lower firm value 
and performance. 
 
 Other Indicators of a Need for Further Research 
A study by Takes and Heemskerk (2016) evaluated interlocking directorships on a 
country level, providing key insights about the interconnected nature of Australian 
boards. Interlocking directorships is understood as ‘occurring when a person affiliated 
with one organisation sits on the board of directors of another organisation’ (Mizruchi 
1996, p. 271). Table 4-9 shows data compiled in 2013 on board interlocks globally and 
suggests that Australia has one of the most interlocking board networks of the 34 
countries examined. 
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Table 4-9: Global Board Interlock Network 
 
Data retrieved from: Takes and Heemskerk (2016, p. 97) 
While the findings from Takes and Heemskerk (2016) are not entirely surprising as 
studies (Alexander 2004; Nicholson, Alexander & Kiel 2004; Vidovich & Currie 2012) 
in the Australian context have suggested that Australian board members operate in tightly 
woven networks of familiarity and trust, the comparative data suggests that interlocking 
board directorships are a fundamental feature of Australian boards.  
Based on over a hundred years of research it is advanced that interlocking 
directorships have some negative influences on board effectiveness and organisational 
outcomes (Drago et al. 2015; Kaczmarek, Kimino & Pye 2014; Kramer 1950; Mizruchi 
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1996). Despite arguments that suggest that interlocking directorships are detrimental to 
small businesses (Table 4-10) because of collusion (Mizruchi 1996), Australia has not 
made any regulatory moves to prevent interlocking directorships. As at 2016 there were 
over 2 million small businesses in Australia (Table 4-10), representing a critical sector in 
the Australian economy.  
Table 4-10: Small Business Share of Economic Activity in Australia 2016 
Business Size Count % 
Small (0–19 employees) 2,066,523 97.4 
Medium (20–199 employees) 50,995 2.4 
Large (200+ employees) 3,717 0.2 
Total 2,121,235 100 
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics   
Although studies on boards in the Australian context have primarily focused on 
publicly listed companies because of the availability of secondary data and access issues 
to board members, concerns regarding interlocking directorships span across all forms of 
organisations. Vidovich and Currie (2012) suggest that during the last two decades 
reduced government funding in Western Australia has resulted in not-for-profit 
organisations being driven to apply market strategies to increase their revenues. 
(Vidovich & Currie 2012, p. 507) suggested this shift in the business model of not-for-
profit organisations in Western Australia caused greater interdependence between 
previously separate groups, blurring the lines that once separated private companies from 
not-for-profit organisations and increasing the interlocking nature of Australian not-for-
profit boards.  
 
4.3 Board Composition and Remuneration in Australia 
Based on empirical research board composition in Australia has been primarily 
influenced by cultural factors (Kiel & Nicholson 2003). Findings suggest that Australian 
boards are more likely to use ‘normative’ principles for structuring boards when 
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compared to boards in other Anglo-Saxon countries (Kiel & Nicholson 2003). Based on 
the ASX (2014) the process of recruiting a new board member should include an 
evaluation of a ‘balance of skills, knowledge, experience, independence and diversity on 
the board’ and this evaluation should facilitate the preparation of a description of the role 
and capabilities required for a particular appointment (p. 15). 
 Board Size 
Research in other contexts has shown that the size of a board is usually positively 
correlated to the size of its organisation (Dalton et al. 1999; Yermack 1996). However, 
Australian data suggests that board size has a positive relationship with firm value (assets, 
revenue and market capitalisation) when firm size is held constant (Kiel & Nicholson 
2003, p. 197), demonstrating that decisions about board size are influenced by normative 
practices. Table 4-11 shows board size in the top 100 organisations in Australia 
(ASX100) for the period 2008–2015. For the period 2008–2012 the most common board 
size among the ASX100 sample was 7, accounting for 23 of the 86 companies sampled 
(ACSI 2016). 
Table 4-11: Board Size (ASX100) 2008–2015 
 
Data retrieved and compiled from: ACSI 
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The largest board in the ASX100 in 2015 was Rio Tinto with 13 board members. Four 
companies had 12 board members: BHP Billiton, Commonwealth Bank, Crown Resorts 
and Westfield Corporation (ACSI 2016). At the bottom end of the scale was Investa 
Office Fund as the first company in the ASX100 since 2011 to function with a board 
consisting of only four people. Across the 93 companies in the ASX100 sample for 2012–
2014 board size ranged from 5 to 14 members, with the average board size remaining at 
8.5 members, consistent with findings in the prior two years (ACSI 2016).  
 Board Independence 
The Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Council (2014) 
recommends that boards of listed companies be comprised of a majority of independent 
board members. An independent board member is defined as a ‘non-executive director 
who is not a member of management and who is free of any business or other relationship 
that could materially interfere with or could reasonably be perceived to materially 
interfere with…the independent exercise of their judgement’ (ASX 2007). Figure 4-1 
shows ASX principle Box 2.3 that outlines the criteria for defining an independent board 
member (ASX 2014, p. 16). 
Figure 4-1: ASX Guidelines for Board Independence 2014 
 
Data retrieved and modified from: ASX (2014) 
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Research into the largest Australian organisations found that as the number of 
independent board members increases fraud decreases (Sharma 2004, p. 105). The rise 
in the proportion of board seats held by independent board members between 2004 and 
2005 (Table 4-12) was influenced by a change to the Australia Council of Superannuation 
Investors (ACSI) definition of director independence, which reiterates the influence of 
institutional investors in Australia (ACSI 2016). Prior to 2005, ACSI classified all 
directors with more than nine years’ service on a board as affiliated and from 2005 only 
those directors who had spent more than 20 years on a board were considered affiliated 
(ACSI 2016). The change in classification was effective from the second edition of the 
ACSI Guidelines released in 2005 (ACSI 2016). Table 4-12 shows the developments 
over the 14 years from 2002 to 2015. 
Table 4-12: Proportion of Board Seats Held By Independent Non-Executive Board 
Members (ASX100) 2002–2015 
 
Data retrieved and compiled from: ACSI 
The ACSI also assesses board structures against the independence criteria set out by 
the ASX in their biennially reports. While there are differences in the ACSI guidelines 
the benchmarks are largely in accordance with the ASX governance principles and 
recommendations, but tend to be more clear and rigid to reflect the input and 
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requirements of their investors. Institutional investor groups in Australia, including the 
Financial Services Council, are in complete agreement that boards should consist of a 
majority of independent members and where boards do not comply they are required to 
explain why (ACSI 2016). 
 Board Tenure 
Board member tenure in Australia is a key example of how normative practices have 
influenced board composition. Institutional investors represented by ACSI assert that the 
most important factor of board independence is an individual’s character and integrity 
and as a result the ACSI and ASX have not imposed a maximum term requirement for 
board members (ACSI 2016; ASX 2014). Board members’ tenure is assessed on a case-
by-case basis to ascertain whether the longevity of a board member’s service may be 
deemed an issue. Table 4-13 shows the average tenure for executive and non-executive 
directors (NEDs) in the top 100 companies in Australia (ASX100) for the period 2012–
2015. 
Table 4-13: Board Tenure in Years (ASX100) 2012–2015 
 
Data retrieved and compiled from: ACSI 
The average tenure of executive directors in the ASX100 sample decreased marginally 
from 6.9 years in 2014 to 6.7 years in 2015; much of which is associated with the higher 
number of new CEO appointments in 2015 compared to 2014. The tenure of female 
executive directors at 7.6 years appears to be a year longer than for males at 6.6 years 
(ACSI 2016). However, the findings are distorted by a small sample pool of only six 
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females, one of which is Harvey Norman Holdings CEO Katie (Kay) Page (partner of 
executive chair Gerry Harvey), who has been in the job for 28.4 years at 30 September 
2015. If Page were to be removed, then the average tenure for female executives in the 
cohort falls to 3.4 years (ACSI 2016).  
Additionally, only seven executives accumulated more than 20 years’ service in 2015, 
down from 11 in 2014 (ACSI 2016). Westfield Corporation’s co-CEO Peter Lowy served 
for 29.9 years, followed closely by the previously mentioned Harvey Norman duo, 
Harvey and Page (both on 28.4 years), Flight Centre founder Graham Turner (27.8 years) 
and Westfield’s other co-CEO Steven Lowy at 26.7 years. Sonic Healthcare’s 
Christopher Wilks (25.8 years) and Colin Goldschmidt (22.7 years) made up the rest of 
the 20+ Club (ACSI 2016). A further 14 executives had more than 10 years’ service 
(ACSI 2016). 
Average tenure for a non-executive director in 2015 was marginally lower at 5.9 years 
in 2014 and the average male non-executive director tenure was unchanged at 6.6 years 
(ACSI 2016). For female non-executive directors, the average dropped from 4.2 years in 
2014 to 3.9 years in 2015 reflecting the sharp increase in appointments of women to 
boards (ACSI 2016). Also, for the first time, two women made the list of non-executive 
directors who had served more than 20 years in the ASX100: ALS Limited’s chair 
Nerolie Withnall at 20.5 years and Computershare’s Penelope Maclagan at 20.3 years. 
Maclagan spent many years as an executive before shifting to non-executive director 
status in 2010 (ACSI 2016) and Withnall has now retired from ALS (ACSI 2016). 
Overall, there were 16 non-executive directors with 20+ years’ service in 2015 and 
the only departure from the previous year was BHP Billiton’s David Crawford who took 
up the role as chair of BHP spin-off company South32 Limited (ACSI 2016). Frank Lowy 
still tops the list with 56.2 years at Westfield Corporation which is the group he founded 
and he is also the only person to appear twice, with 37.2 years at Scentre Group, the 
successor entity to Westfield Trust. Lowy stepped down as chair of Scentre in 2016 
(ACSI 2016). Other long serving non-executive directors include Ramsay Health Care 
chair Michael Siddle (40.4 years), Computershare founder Chris Morris (37 years), and 
a third member of the Harvey family at Harvey Norman, Michael Harvey (28.4 years) 
(ACSI 2016). 
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In 2014 the average tenure of male non-executive directors was 6.6 years, up 
marginally from 6.5 years in 2013 (ACSI 2016). The average tenure of female non-
executive directors remained constant at 4.2 years with median non-executive director 
tenure falling slightly to 4.8 years compared to 4.9 years in the prior period (ACSI 2016). 
In 2014 there were 15 non-executive directors who had been in office for more than 20 
years which included two from each of Scentre Group, Harvey Norman and Ramsay 
Health Care (ACSI 2016). The average executive director tenure increased slightly from 
6.7 years in 2013 to 6.9 years in 2014 (ACSI 2016). Across the entire sample of 2014, 
the board with the highest average tenure was Ramsay Health Care at 19.5 years, closely 
followed by ARB Corporation with average tenure of 18.4 years and Harvey Norman 
with average tenure was 17.1 years which also had the longest serving executives and/or 
non-executive directors across the sample (ACSI 2016). On the other hand, the lowest 
tenure in the sample was 1.9 years at QBE (ACSI 2016). 
In 2013 the average non-executive director tenure increased marginally to 5.9 years, 
from 5.8 years in 2012 and 5.6 years in 2011 (ACSI 2016). The median tenure in 2013 
also increased by a similar amount, rising from 4.7 years in 2012 to 4.9 years in 2013 
(ACSI 2016). In 2013 the average tenure for female non-executive directors was lower 
than for male non-executive directors and reflects the ongoing rise in the number of 
women serving on ASX100 boards (ACSI 2016). Since 2011 the average tenure of 
female non-executive directors has increased from 3.8 years (with a median of 2.1) to 4.2 
years (with a median of 2.8) in 2013 (ACSI 2016). There was little change in average 
executive director tenure across the sample in 2013: average tenure fell from 6.8 years in 
2012 to 6.7 years in 2013 and median tenure increased slightly from 4.3 years in 2012 to 
4.4 years in 2013 (ACSI 2016). The longest serving executives were Harvey Norman 
founder Gerry Harvey and Westfield co-CEO Peter Lowy; they were among 10 
executives including one woman (Harvey Norman’s Kay Page) serving on boards for 
over 20 years which included two executives at Sonic Healthcare and another at Harvey 
Norman (ACSI 2016). 
In 2012 the average non-executive director tenure increased marginally from 5.6 years 
in 2011 to 5.8 years (ACSI 2016). Median tenure also increased from 4.3 years in 2011 
to 4.7 years in 2012 (ACSI 2016). Reflected in the increase is the number of women 
serving as non-executive directors although average tenure for female board members 
was lower than that for male non-executive directors at 3.9 years and 3.8 in 2011 when 
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compared to their male counterparts at 6.4 years and 6.1 years in 2011 (ACSI 2016). The 
average executive director tenure increased from 6.3 years in 2011 to 6.8 years in 2012, 
with a median of 4.3 years, up from 4.1 years in 2011 (ACSI 2016). The longest serving 
executive director was founder of Worley Parsons, John Grill, who served on the board 
for 42 years and retired at the company’s 2012 AGM (ACSI 2016). However Grill re-
joined the board after a break of four months in March 2013 as non-executive chair (ACSI 
2016). There was one female executive director, Kay Page, who was on Harvey 
Norman’s board for more than 20 years (ACSI 2016). 
 Board Remuneration 
Remuneration for non-executive directors in the ASX100 includes fees, travel 
allowances and non-monetary benefits such as spouse travel to and from board meetings 
as well as special exertion fees (ACSI 2016). In 2015 the average fees for a non-executive 
director increased by 2.5 per cent from $217,196 in 2014 to $222,692 (ACSI 2016). For 
female non-executive directors the average fees increased by 2.6 per cent from $214,070 
to $219,686.  
Table 4-14: Remuneration of Non-Executive Directors Holding Three ASX100 
Directorships 2001–2015 
 
Data retrieved and compiled from: ACSI 
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Average fees for male directors increased by 2.3 per cent from $218,298 to $223,988 
which resulted in the narrowing of the pay disparity between male and female directors 
with women earning 1.97 per cent less ($4,228) in 2015 compared to 1.95 per cent less 
($4,302) in 2014 (ACSI 2016). In 2015, the average pay for a portfolio of three or more 
non-executive directorships in the ASX100 was $853,518 representing a substantial 
increase from $808,965 in 2014 (ACSI 2016). Table 4-14 shows the average portfolio 
remuneration of non-executive directors holding three board roles. 
Table 4-15 shows the average remuneration per board role in the ASX100 (2015) 
emphasising the disparity in incomes between male and female directors. 
Table 4-15: Average Remuneration in ASX100 in 2015 
 
Data retrieved and compiled from: ACSI 
In 2015 the highest earning non-executive director in Australia was Lindsay Maxsted 
who amassed $1.69 million in fees from his three roles as chair of Westpac Bank and 
Transurban, and a BHP Billiton non-executive director (ACSI 2016). Table 4-16 shows 
the top ten earners  of 2015. 
Table 4-16: Highest Paid ASX100 Non-Executive Directors 2015 
 
Data retrieved and compiled from: ACSI 
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Five non-executive directors earned more than $1 million in 2015: Rio Tinto’s chair, 
Jan du Plessis, and BHP Billiton’s outgoing chair Jacques Nasser joined the elite club of 
millionaires with only one directorship earning $1.67 million and $1.44 million 
respectively (ACSI 2016). The only female in the million dollar club, and earning the 
least, was Paula Dwyer, chair of Tabcorp Holdings and Healthscope, and a director at 
ANZ Bank, with $1.34 million. Brian Schwartz was the fifth director in the million dollar 
club earning $1.42 million for his roles as chair at Insurance Australia Group, since 
renounced, and deputy chair at both Westfield Corporation and Scentre Group where he 
is now chair (ACSI 2016).  
 
 Skin in the Game 
In Australia there is the acceptance and practice in listed companies that all board 
members, not just senior executives and founders/owners, should have sufficient ‘skin in 
the game’ (ACSI 2016). The term skin in the game was made popular by Warren Buffet 
and is generally understood as the ‘stock owned by high ranking insiders in a company’ 
(Buffett & Cunningham 2013). The ACSI and other shareholder groups in Australia 
assert that skin in the game allows board decisions to be aligned to investor interests 
(ACSI 2016). Although there are variations in practice regarding the level of holdings, 
there is an emerging rule of thumb for non-executive directors which states that non-
executive directors should have invested an amount equivalent to at least one year’s 
director fees (ACSI 2016). In recent times some companies have implemented minimum 
director holdings measures (ACSI 2016). Table 4-17 shows the sample of 789 directors’ 
skin in the game for 2015. 
Table 4-17: ASX100 Skin in the Game (2015) 
 
Data retrieved and compiled from: ACSI 
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Table 4-18 shows the top ten director holdings in the ASX100 with the highest holding 
in excess of AUD $3 billion.  
Table 4-18: Top 10 Directors Skin in the Game 2015 
 
Data retrieved and compiled from: ACSI 
 
4.4 Board Member Characteristics 
Based on the data obtained the characteristics of Australian board members are 
defined by professional directorships in Section 4.4.1, age in Section 4.4.2 and gender in 
Section 4.4.3. 
 
 Professional Non-Executive Directors 
An increasing number of non-executive directors are holding multiple board seats in 
the ASX100, defining them as ‘professional’ non-executive directors. The ACSI explains 
that a professional non-executive director (NED) is an individual that holds more than 
one board seat within a sample group such as the ASX100 (ACSI 2016). Table 4-19 
shows the percentage of non-executive board members classified as professional 
directors for the period 2001–2015. 
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Table 4-19: Professional Non-Executive Directors 
 
Data retrieved and compiled from: ACSI 
 Age 
In 2015 the average age of an ASX100 director, male or female, executive and non-
executive, was 61.1 years (ACSI 2016). However, the most significant difference 
between the groups was that executive directors were on average significantly younger 
than non-executive directors and women, whether executive or non-executive, were on 
average noticeably younger than their male counterparts (ACSI 2016). The average male 
director was 62.3 years which is almost half a decade older than the average female 
director at 57.7 years. It is important to note that there were far fewer female executive 
directors (6) than male executive directors (114) (ACSI 2016). Female non-executive 
directors were on average four years older than female executives but for male directors 
the age gap was much wider at eight years (ACSI 2016). The age gap in 2012–2014 
between male executive and non-executive directors was almost 10 years, reflecting the 
number of retired executives in the non-executive cohort (ACSI 2016). The gap between 
female executive and non-executive directors was much less at three years, with female 
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directors holding far fewer leadership roles than their male counterparts. Table 4-20 
shows the average age of board members for the period 2001–2015. 
Table 4-20 Average Age of Board Members in ASX100 2001–2015 
 
Data retrieved and compiled from: ACSI 
 
 Gender Diversity  
In 2015 women accounted for 36 per cent of new board member appointments (31 
roles and 29 individuals) in the ASX100, reflecting the drive and focus on improving 
gender diversity (ACSI 2016). Table 4-21 shows developments during the period 2000–
2015. 
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Table 4-21: Gender Diversity in ASX100 2000–2015 
 
Data retrieved and compiled from: ACSI 
This chapter has provided key insights into factors that have bearing on the 
understanding of board capital in the Australian context. The data presented explains the 
contextual factors that shape the creation of board capital in the Australia and describes 
the human and social capital characteristics of board members serving on the top one 
hundred listed companies. The data suggests that institutional investors influence how 
board roles are defined, the composition of boards and the expectation of board members 
in contributing to organisational outcomes. It appears that regulators have placed much 
emphasis on independence and board composition, promoting gender diversity on 
boards. The findings show that while Australia has made advancements in implementing 
a good governance framework, discussions about board composition have not provided 
much insight about the board recruitment process. There is no clear understanding of how 
a person becomes a board member. The following chapter presents a qualitative 
perspective on board recruitment. 
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 BECOMING A BOARD MEMBER 
The men who now run the large corporations own no appreciable share of the 
enterprise. They are selected not by the stockholders but, in the common case, by a 
board of directors which, narcissistically, they selected themselves. 
 Galbraith (1968, p. 2) 
 
5.0 Research Findings  
 
he purpose of this study is to advance current knowledge and understanding of 
the concept of board capital through a qualitative study that explores how board 
capital is created and how board dynamics shapes board capital. This chapter 
presents the findings of the interview data analysis and offers an in depth comprehension 
of the recruitment and selection of board members. The chapter presents and 
contextualises an account of board members’ lived experiences engaging with 
‘recruiters’ and as ‘recruiters’. Meaningful insight into how boards are structured and the 
dynamics of board composition is presented which clarifies the formation and nature of 
board capital.  
The interview sample exhibits diverse characteristics including co-occurring 
experiences of being recruited onto different forms of organisational boards and as 
recruiters of other board members. The range of experiences and roles facilitated two 
levels of analysis with an opportunity to juxtapose narratives of being recruited with 
reflections of being a recruiter. An exploration of both viewpoints offers an intricate 
understanding of the motivations of organisations as enablers of the board recruitment 
system. The chapter provides an understanding of what boards are meant to achieve for 
particular organisations, giving insight into the purpose of boards. 
Based on the investigative approach a holistic perspective of the board recruitment 
system is provided concurrently, uncovering the idiosyncrasies and paradoxes associated 
with getting onto particular boards. Accounts give clarity to how recruitment decisions 
are made and why particular individuals come to be on boards. The interviews provide 
an awareness of the nuances associated with the selection process, disclosing human and 
socio-political factors that are an integral part of the board recruitment system. The 
T 
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findings present a comprehensive view of boards, shedding light on key factors that 
contribute to an understanding of how a person becomes a board member and by 
extension revealing the attributes of board members often referred to as board capital. 
5.1 The Board Recruitment Process 
Based on the interview data a composite of factors is considered when board members 
are recruited which also explains how people become board members. The analysis of 
participants’ narratives reveals three separate criteria groups: skills, qualifications and 
experience; gender and diversity; and reputation, background and closed social networks. 
Of particular note is the apparent difference in perception between how participants 
reflected on their own trajectory into board membership, the key attributes that led them 
there and in contrast what they look for when recruiting other board members. 
When participants reflected on how they became board members, a majority presented 
a narrative of skills, qualifications and experience as key considerations. However, when 
participants discussed what they aimed for in new board members, a sub-narrative 
emerges which seems to be dominated by attributes in two criteria groups: gender and 
diversity; and reputation, background and closed social networks.  
The three criteria groups are discussed in detail in the following subsections: Section 
5.1.1 skills, qualifications and experience; Section 5.1.2 gender and diversity; and 
Section 5.1.3 reputation, background and closed social networks. Section 5.2 on 
organisational philosophy, identity and belonging presents the various perspectives on 
board composition that explain the subtleties associated with the board recruitment 
system.  
 Skills, Qualifications and Experience 
Exploring the conceptualisation of the notion of board capital revealed that different 
organisations require access to particular resources which is somehow linked to their 
board members. Implicit in participant discussions is the idea that board member 
attributes are aligned with the nature of board roles which is not fixed across 
organisations. Participants suggested that different organisation types (ASX, 
government, and not-for-profit, for profit) may not value the ‘capital’ that resides with 
an individual in the same way. Specifically, human capital in the board context is viewed 
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in relation to attributes that may directly or indirectly provide value to the collective 
and/or an organisation at a specific period in time.  
Based on the various inclinations of organisations and/or boards, it is proposed that 
human capital in the board context is board specific and that boards are not homogenous. 
In particular, when participants were asked about acquiring their first board role, although 
there was some weight placed on skills, qualifications, employment and/or board 
experience in being selected, this varied across organisations (ASX, government, not-
for-profit, for profit). Furthermore, while the importance of human capital is confirmed, 
boards do not execute the same activities. There are diverse reasons provided for the need 
of particular board member expertise that are linked to the requisite activities of a 
particular board, redefining the ambit of governance: 
I was a marketing man and the first board that I went onto I was there as the 
marketing expert. (Male Participant 5: 40 years+ experience on various types 
of boards) 
In each of the previously illustrated scenarios human capital appears to be specific to 
the nature of the board role suggesting that different organisations may benefit from an 
individual’s amassed expertise, but not in the same way. Also, although the nature of 
board roles varied, there appears to be an emphasis on task specific skills, proposing that 
there are specific activities associated with particular board roles and that governance is 
an involved process. From the interview sample there are associations made between 
particular board roles and the expertise of the selected board member:  
I had a history of working for large profit entities and I brought accounting and 
finance expertise, I am a finance executive. (Female Participant 20: 25 years+ 
experience on government, for profit and not-for-profit boards) 
Implicit in participant accounts is the idea that selected individuals are knowledgeable 
in a specific area and that particular boards rely on their members’ expertise to be 
functional. Also, it is suggested that based on the activities of a board at the time of 
recruitment specialised skills may be needed. In particular, boards may be required to 
establish teams to focus on specific activities: 
I was an accountant and the board was setting up a risk and audit committee 
and my skillset matched what they were looking for at the time. (Male 
Participant 14: 23 years’ experience on for profit and not-for-profit boards) 
Although it appears that skills weigh meaningfully on being selected onto a board, 
there is also some revelation regarding the applicability of particular skills. While skills 
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may attract a particular recruiter and form the basis for being selected, job specific skills 
may not be directly applicable in executing board roles which are depicted as dynamic: 
In my first board role I brought my knowledge of my sector and my industry. I 
brought knowledge particularly from a private sector point of view as I was a 
CEO. Because the board role was a government role it was more advisory which 
was very different from my CEO role which was more about driving income, 
checking turnover and watching our bottom-line… the nature of the board role 
required very different skills which was based on advocacy, coordination and 
communication which was not exactly the skills that I was required to employ 
as a CEO. (Female Participant 15: 17 years’ experience on for profit, 
government and not-for-profit boards)  
Based on participant accounts it appears that in certain contexts board member skills 
such as networking and communication are required to be transferable to meet the needs 
of a particular board and/or organisation. In addition, according to the nature of the roles 
depicted by participants, transferable skills may be more important than job specific 
skills. However, it is also suggested that board member skills may be used indirectly to 
influence the perceptions of organisational stakeholders:  
From my experience boards will often recruit directors for strategic reasons to 
bolster the skillset of the board such as where the company may be weak in IT 
or social media they will recruit people with strong performance track records 
in those areas. (Male Participant 18: 25 years+ experience on various types of 
boards) 
The notion that skills are sometimes used by boards and organisations to influence 
perceptions suggests that job specific skills may not be as important as depicted for the 
functionality of boards. Although the importance of technical skills is slightly discounted 
participants disclosed that skills are also used as a tool to demarcate board roles: 
I believe that boards need that mix of skills, persons with the ability to play at 
the back, on the lines etcetera. (Male Participant 8: 25 years+ experience on 
various types of boards) 
Implicit in participant accounts is the idea that there is a dynamic process within 
boards that directs board members’ behaviour and defines the nature of relationships 
between members within the collective. It is suggested that defining roles based on skills 
may help to reduce conflict as each member is aware of their role within the collective: 
There is always a tension. You look on a board and you think what skills do you 
need, you try to put structure around it, but the most important thing is that you 
get people who will get along. (Male Participant 8: 25 years+ experience on 
various types of boards) 
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Furthermore, it is ascertained that boards do extensive planning to ensure that skill 
shortages are minimised within boards. Planning is undertaken to improve the 
availability of skilled board members and may be a comprehensive exercise depending 
on the focus of an organisation:  
When we are looking at succession planning for the board we look at what kind 
of skills we do have and what sort of skill gap do we have. So, on every board 
I’ve been on we’ve said here is who is on now. So, if I am leaving the board we 
need to find another accountant to replace me. On my current board for example 
we have discussed how can we get an artistic person on the board because that 
is not represented in our group of skills. (Female Participant 4: 9 years’ 
experience on for profit and not-for-profit boards) 
Another participant explained: 
In the boards that I have been on we have had the conversation about what skills 
we would need if someone is retiring or moving off the board and we do a little 
matrix and there are guidelines available through our committees or AICD 
[Australian Institute of Company Directors] to help you think about those 
things. (Female Participant 2: 8 years’ experience on for profit and not-for-
profit boards) 
In addition, there is a link made between organisational goals and the skill of a board. 
As organisational goals changed so should the skillset of a board:  
The nature of the organisation has changed and some of the long serving 
members retired from the board and that’s when we started to develop a board 
matrix that was a skills matrix. (Female Participant 3: 7 years’ experience on 
for profit board) 
Implied in participant reflections is the idea that board member skills should have 
some relationship to organisational activities. Participants disclosed that the retirement 
of board members is usually an initiated process which is evaluated against the overall 
responsibilities of an organisation. Interviewees suggest that particular board member 
skills may become redundant based on the changing nature of organisations and as a 
result boards require a skills matrix to facilitate the ongoing evaluation of skills. 
Based on participant accounts there appears to be a tendency towards selecting board 
members based on job specific skills sometimes referred to as ‘technical skills’. 
However, job specific skills may be less important when members come to work 
together: 
One of the people on the board she is a CPA and she is in a very senior role in 
a corporate as a strategy person and knows the content of strategy really well. 
She doesn’t work well with others, that’s not a skill she has, she drives everyone 
crazy… The things I see as a skill maybe because of my learning and 
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development background, I think working together collaborating is a skill and 
we [the board] don’t necessarily recruit for that. (Female Participant 1: 9 
years’ experience on government and not-for-profit boards) 
Another participant explained the emphasis placed on technical skills and not ‘soft 
skills’: 
So the last person we put on the board was from a major accounting firm who 
had run audits of very large companies, both those things were very important 
because they were skills that we didn’t really have. (Male Participant 18: 25 
years+ experience on various types of boards) 
The accounts reflect the general preference by boards and organisations for qualified 
individuals and show that qualifications are often used to substantiate selection choices. 
However, implicit in participant accounts is the notion that technical skills become less 
important when the collective worked together as board members relied more on 
communication and negotiating skills for the process of decision-making. There appears 
to be a need for transferable skills often referred to as ‘soft skills’ when board members 
come together as a group. Interviewees suggest that soft skills facilitate healthy 
interpersonal relationships within the collective.  
The apparent focus on qualifications and technical skills suggests that, depending on 
the focus of a particular board, there may be a lack of understanding of the importance 
of transferable skills. Participant 1 account above presented a contrast between the 
perception of the board member’s expertise and its associated value. On one hand the 
member is perceived to be knowledgeable and on the other hand is viewed as lacking the 
required attributes needed to function within the collective. Participant accounts suggest 
that ‘human capital’ may be narrowly defined in the board context as boards require 
members with soft skills, however these skills are not the focus of recruiters. 
The interview sample offers several proposals regarding skills: 1) people selected for 
board membership have command of particular skills; 2) marketing, accounting and/or 
finance skills are perceived as useful for particular boards; 3) soft skills are more 
important when transitioning into particular board roles; 4) board member skills may be 
tailored to influence the perception of organisational stakeholders; 5) board members are 
assigned roles based on their technical skills within the collective to facilitate healthy 
working relationships; 6) there is thoughtful consideration made by boards to minimise 
skill gaps; and 7) board skills should be, to a degree, linked to organisational activities.   
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 Industry Experience 
In addition to skills interviewees suggest it is important that boards and organisations 
identify members who are able to demonstrate a record of success:  
When I started [as a board member] I sort of worked for corporates for a long 
time, presented to boards in investment banking. I was in mergers and 
acquisitions so was at the top level in every organisation and often presented 
ideas about why companies should merge to the board of directors, so you know 
I had a lot of experience about what they [boards] need to think about. (Female 
Participant 19: 20 years+ experience on various types of boards)  
Understood from participant accounts is the idea that people with significant corporate 
experience are perceived as valuable to particular boards. Furthermore, work experience 
relating to key operational activities is perceived to add value and expertise in dealing 
with matters that may be of concern for boards: 
I got involved in working a lot of privatisations for the state government and at 
that time they were interested in corporatising a lot of the state-run 
organisations in order to sort of improve the governance and the rigour around 
some of their businesses. So, I came to the attention of the state government and 
so then they wanted me to work on a couple of boards for that purpose. (Female 
Participant 19: 20 years+ experience on various types of boards) 
Based on participant accounts, having experience working on pertinent matters within 
a particular context provides useful information for boards. Also noted in the illustrated 
account is the idea that having certain work experience uniquely prepares a board 
member to undertake board roles. Work experience is enhanced by past interactions with 
boards and candidates who have had previous interactions with boards whether directly 
or indirectly are better prepared for board roles. Having a range of experience is 
perceived as important for boards: 
People selecting for boards like a good track record of experience, they want to 
feel that the people that they are bringing on have been around, have seen a lot 
of things and made a lot of mistakes and got some experience. (Male Participant 
5: 40 years+ experience on various types of boards) 
Another participant explained: 
Boards need directors with experience and that can be different sorts of 
experience but I think the role of a director in a large organisation in order to 
do the job well needs some experience of commercial life. (Female Participant 
16: 7 years’ experience on for profit and not-for-profit boards) 
Interviewees suggest that boards require members with diverse experience and 
depending on an organisation it may be ideal to have board members with context 
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specific exposure. Although business-related experience appears to weigh meaningfully 
on being selected, it is suggested that board experience is equally important and boards 
desire members who are at different stages in their board tenure: 
An ideal board is like a football team. You need persons that have played for 
150 games, 50-150. You need to manage the group that you have a mix of 
freshness and experience. (Male Participant 8: 25 years+ experience on various 
types of boards) 
Even though boards welcome candidates with various levels of board experience there 
may be a challenge associated with having a board of varied experience, particularly 
members who have spent less time than others on a board:   
I have seen that boards of mixed experience can be dominated by more 
experienced members who discount the less experienced or newer members. 
(Male Participant 18: 25 years+ experience on various types of boards) 
Another participant explained: 
Based on the boards that I’ve been on newer members of a board are often times 
stifled from offering opinions with fresh thinking. (Female Participant 6: 15 
years’ experience on for profit and government boards) 
Based on the interviewee accounts it is suggested that boards somehow benefitted 
from task specific experience but people with less board experience are at a disadvantage 
in influencing the decisions of a board. Furthermore, it appears that people attract the 
attention of boards based on their involvement in business. There is also the notion that 
some professional experiences are perceived as not useful for boards:  
In the ASX200, I don’t think anyone gets put on a board because of HR 
experience. I never saw that, so I don’t think it might be so… I can understand 
that a reasonable large not-for-profit may want HR people…It depends on how 
people come up through the world, academics I don’t think so, there are a 
sprinkling of professors on boards, and you might see that in the drug 
companies. You’ll see public servants, senior public servants is very similar to 
executive success, working for the government. I have sat on boards with 
successful public servants, they can be very very good indeed and that’s another 
self-selecting thing. Someone rises up the public service you know other people 
have made judgements about them, you’ll know that they’re honest, 
hardworking, competent and competitive you know all of those are good things. 
(Male Participant 5: 40 years+ experience on various types of boards) 
Another participant explained: 
When I was looking around for board roles most of the advertisements for 
directors were looking for legal or finance expertise. So I was a bit nervous 
because I haven’t done that and I haven’t interacted with boards in my day job 
either, but I knew people that were on boards who encouraged me to apply in 
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the not-for-profit sphere as there are not a lot of boards that advertise for the 
experience I’ve got in HR, it’s more technical skills they wanted. So, the first 
two roles I applied for and got were in the not-for-profit sector. (Female 
Participant 1: 9 years’ experience on government and not-for-profit boards) 
The interview sample, where more than half the study’s participants had legal, 
accounting and finance expertise, showed it is conceivable that boards are dominated by 
people with particular expertise. An analysis of the backgrounds of the interview sample 
corroborated the above accounts and suggests based on the wide cross-section of 
participants serving on various types of boards that it may be possible to make 
generalisations about the board recruitment system. Particular organisations, depending 
on their goals or involvement of their board members, may require particular types of 
expertise. 
It is important to highlight that the illustrated accounts are from board members who 
perceive themselves as marketing and human resource specialists, and these perspectives 
from participants who are not stereotypical board members help to clarify the focus of 
boards. The interview sample had only one person with an academic background but who 
also had extensive corporate board experience and an unfavourable view of academics: 
Based on the company’s constitution people who held senior executive positions 
at the university were required to be on the hospital board which was a company 
of the university, so that was the scenario that I inherited which I eventually got 
changed. It was an interesting issue for me because I realised that I had to do 
really thorough director inductions because the problem you’ve got with senior 
executives in universities was that a lot of them don’t have commercial board 
experience, so they would tend to approach the board role like a university 
committee and there was the problem with them understanding effectively 
conflict of interest and so on. We realised straight away that those appointments 
didn’t have the financial acumen and that there were skill gaps. (Male 
Participant 6: 15 years’ experience on for profit and government boards)  
The previous account sheds further light on the perception that academics may not be 
as useful for boards and proposes that ‘pure’ academics do not have the requisite 
experience needed to adequately undertake board roles which contradicts some of the 
arguments made in Chapter 2  
The interview sample makes several suggestions: 1) human resource experience may 
be useful for large not-for-profit boards but not so much for other types of boards; 2) 
there are few academics on boards and these are mainly in the healthcare industry; 3) the 
perception of the usefulness of board members is shaped by their career paths; 4) public 
servants are perceived in equal standing as successful corporate executives; 5) board 
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members who have ascended the corporate ladder are perceived favourably and are 
assumed to have the qualities desired by boards; and 6) there may be some bias in the 
recruitment and selection of board members based on the perception of their social 
capital. 
The suggestion that the selection of board members may be biased towards people 
with social capital suggests that it may be difficult to determine the human capital 
characteristics that are most useful for boards although there appears to be consensus that 
financial intelligence is important.  
Furthermore, the noted exclusion of certain professions or skills makes it challenging 
to accurately identify expertise or human capital characteristics that may be useful for 
boards. In particular, it is noted from participant accounts that roles are not clearly 
defined and that at times board members may rely more on particular types of skills. 
Also, due to selection biases there may be differences between people who get onto 
boards and those who do not which is not explained by occupation or expertise.  
Moreover, it appears that having boards with pertinent human capital does not explain 
the inner workings of boards as participant accounts suggest that board roles are generic 
and tailored to meet organisational needs. There appears to be a fuzzy line between 
operational and governance expertise; aspiring board members influence the perception 
of recruiters and organisational stakeholders about usefulness through a careful planning 
of career paths. In the board context there is ‘self-selection’ which suggests that board 
members are inclined to select people like themselves into the group which undermines 
the perception of regulators that diversity is important for boards which is discussed in 
more detail in the following section on gender and diversity.  
 Gender and Diversity 
Although it appears that boards and/or organisations are primarily in control of the 
recruitment and selection process, there are other parties shaping the board recruitment 
system. There are organisational stakeholders that impose certain selection criteria on 
boards and to an extent influence recruitment decisions. Chiefly, the board recruitment 
system is suggested to be controlled by influential stakeholders and/or governing bodies 
who have mandated that there be a focus on gender equality and diversity. There is strong 
evidence there is a longstanding issue of gender imbalance on boards and there are some 
normative perceptions about having women on boards: 
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On the board that I am building now they’re all women, so I am trying to find 
men and again because I do think it’s important to have both in the room. I am 
not sure about this whole belief that women add a different perspective and that 
they make men behave better and all of these trite, you know that’s what you 
hear, they add a little civility and that’s actually quite the opposite sometimes 
or they bring different skill bases and that’s a nice way of putting it and it’s not 
a boys club anymore right and maybe there is some merit in some of that. 
(Female Participant 6: 15 years’ experience on for profit and government 
boards) 
It is suggested and perceived by some participants that having more women on boards 
may assist in preventing some of the current issues associated with boards. Many of the 
problems confronting boards and organisations are perceived to be either directly or 
indirectly associated with male dominance and as a result there appears to be a focus on 
recruiting more women onto boards to have a gender balance in the process of decision-
making:  
After the 1980s the old boy system has broken down to a reasonable extent with 
greater exposure of corporate misdemeanours and more active follow up by the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), Australian 
Securities Exchange and the Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC). Also, as more women came onto boards the old boy 
system was exposed. (Male Participant 18: 25 years +experience on various 
types of boards) 
Another participant with 10 years experience on ASX listed company boards 
explained: 
In the past, particularly in Melbourne, directors were part of old boy networks 
and were often on many boards together. Companies like Pacific Dunlop, BHP, 
ANZ would have interlocking boards where there were mutual advantages 
across businesses that is banks lending to companies with reputations of board 
members driving the due diligence procedures. Often board members were 
members of the same clubs such as the Melbourne Club, Australian Club and 
Athenaeum Club. (Male Participant 11) 
Interviewees’ accounts suggest that in recent times, board composition has been 
purposefully controlled. It is suggested there is an institutional requirement that 
recommends that there be a specified percentage of women on boards and that there is a 
perception that having women on boards improves the productivity of boards. Although 
interviewees serve on various types of organisational boards, there appears to be a general 
acceptance of the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) principles even in not-for-profit 
boards: 
I think there is really not much of a difference in the approach of a large not-
for-profit board. We are guided by what the ASX says and we try to meet the 
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needs of our stakeholders, so paying attention to social issues like gender 
imbalance is important. (Female Participant 7: 9 years’ experience on not-for-
profit boards) 
Another participant explained: 
I do not approach my role at the foundation any differently from how I approach 
my corporate board roles, any large or serious not-for-profit is aware of the 
ASX governance principles. (Female Participant 20: 25 years+ experience on 
government, for profit and not-for-profit boards) 
Another participant explained: 
Government boards are heavily regulated, we wouldn’t dream of not 
maintaining industry standards. (Female Participant 6: 15 years’ experience on 
for profit and government boards) 
However, the investigation uncovered that the movement towards having more 
women on boards is not without challenges. Participants revealed that society has had 
significant influence on recommended practices which has created issues. There was 
some cynicism and disapproval communicated by interviewees:  
Well there’s a great deal of social pressure these days to find women to put on 
boards, so if I was young and trying to get on boards I would choose to be a 
woman but it wasn’t like that until 10 years ago, that’s social engineering, it’s 
new I don’t know whether it will last. (Male Participant 5: 40 years+ experience 
on various types of boards) 
Another participant communicated some frustration with the practice: 
I believe in meritocracy, if you’re good you’re good, I don’t care if you’re 
bloody female or male, I don’t care. It annoys me and I’ve seen boards every 
single AGM some female would get up and say where are the women…this was 
a big corporate ASX top 20 company, there was an enormous expectation to 
appoint females and I don’t like any prescriptive thing. I don’t believe in it, I 
don’t think it should be. (Female Participant 19: 20 years+ experience on 
various types of boards)  
The illustrated views suggest that recruiting board members based on gender may 
create a system that discounts the value and importance of human capital and may 
promote a system based on entitlement. Interviewees suggest that the regulatory process 
may create a recruitment system that ignores ability and endorses ‘kakistocracy’, 
governing by the least qualified. However, there is some agreement on the importance of 
appointing women onto boards:  
I believe that gender is important. It’s important that all the people who work 
in the place and our customers and our partners have a sense that we are 
nurturing talent without regard to stereotypes. (Male Participant 8: 25 years’ 
experience on various types of boards) 
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Interviewees suggest that controlling the perception of organisational stakeholders is 
important for boards and that perception influences how boards are being structured. 
Additionally, participants revealed that there is a challenge with getting women onto 
boards. There appears to be a limited number of women who meet the selection criteria:   
The reality of it is that women don’t have the same access in a corporate sense 
because they leave to have children or they have other things in their lives and 
so there just aren’t the same numbers coming through and so you need talented 
senior executives as a pool in order to find those directors and there aren’t the 
women out there, so therefore you get a lesser quality because you have to 
qualify with some arbitrary ruling. (Female Participant 16: 7 years’ experience 
on for profit boards and not-for-profit boards) 
Another participant said: 
So this big board that I have just been put on, to me it means a lot to be put on 
this board but the chair approached me last June and said ‘would you, you know 
come on to this board’. She is a woman and I said not if you are asking me 
because I am a woman, and she was sort of. I totally disagree with that sort of 
thing and she said ‘well we do need more women’ and I said ‘well I am not 
interested, if that’s the reason, not interested’. (Female Participant 20: 25 
years+ experience on government, for profit and not-for-profit boards) 
Issues relating to the structuring of boards are an integral part of participant 
discussions and there is the suggestion that having a limited number of female candidates 
compromises the quality of female board members appointed to boards. There appears 
to be a tension associated with meeting general expectations and adding value to a board. 
As a result, there is much discussion about having people who contribute a range of 
different things: 
You’re doing a lot of things at the same time when you are trying to pull together 
a board and you want diversity. Diversity encompasses gender, age, ethnicity, 
geography, culture, education, socioeconomic background and sexual 
orientation…So to some degree you’re reflecting but to some degree you’re 
leading, you need people outside to be confident you’re doing both things. (Male 
Participant 17: 15 years’ experience on various types of boards) 
Another participant explained: 
From my experience it’s important that boards ensure that the cultural and 
social system surrounding the way they operate celebrate differences and 
diversity. (Male Participant 12: 14 years’ experience on for profit and not-for-
profit boards) 
Echoed in the interview discussions and illustrated in the accounts is the importance 
of shaping the perception of organisational stakeholders. It appears that powerful 
stakeholders are able to influence the leadership style within organisations by imposing 
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that boards actively seek to have a diversity of members. Organisational stakeholders 
control and dictate the characteristics that a board is required to exhibit. Diversity is a 
quality of leadership and boards structure themselves in such a way to gain the approval 
of their key stakeholders such as regulatory bodies. Board diversity appears to be a 
maxim for an ideal organisation.  
Also, it is suggested and illustrated in the participant reflections that it is essential that 
boards observe certain practices that will attract diverse individuals. There appears to be 
an emphasis on meeting the expectations of organisation stakeholders: 
I think you need diversity. I think it is somehow helpful for the board to be 
somehow representative of the stakeholders of the organisation. So, I think 
diversity of thought, diversity of gender, diversity of background, the more 
brains you have around the table the better for the organisation. (Female 
Participant 4: 6 years’ experience on for profit and not-for-profit boards) 
Interviewees generally did not consider an organisation distinct from organisational 
stakeholders and as a result diversity is considered as a factor that aids organisations in 
fulfilling stakeholder needs. From the information provided by the interview sample it is 
proposed that, although diversity is a priority for boards and the understanding of 
diversity may be broad, in many instances a prescriptive approach is applied to obtaining 
diversity:  
All the boards I know when people are put on boards, there’s always skillset, 
always you want a lawyer, you want a banker, you want a this you want a that, 
and then there’s the male female [mix] and then if there’s any geographic 
spread then they will want somebody who may be connected in that field 
globally, so that’s the general trend., I think there’s a wide interest in diversity 
but not just gender diversity. (Female Participant 19: 20 years+ experience on 
various types of boards) 
Although there appear to be many perspectives on diversity, there is some consistency 
in discussions. There is primarily a focus on skill diversity and as a result other elements 
or dimensions of diversity are understated and appear to be underrated. While skill is 
understood to be a factor associated with human capital which was introduced in previous 
discussions (Section 5.1.2), it is also a factor used to create diversity within boards. The 
focus on skill diversity establishes an uncharacteristic rationale and unique understanding 
of diversity in the board context: 
There is some focus on curtailing the group think mentality. ASX has been keen 
on promoting diversity of skills. There is also increased focus on gender too. 
(Male Participant 10: 10 years’ experience on for profit and not-for-profit 
boards) 
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Another participant explained: 
From my involvement in various board roles, there is a specific look for a 
diversity of skillsets, and we certainly wanted to have legal representation on 
the board. Ultimately the dynamics of skillsets came across two or three other 
sectors one of which was from a financial point of view. But most importantly 
on one particular board we recruited someone for logistics servicing offering 
advice based on the core business. That was very important as it gave us a 
different perspective on consideration of board papers that we did consider. 
(Male Participant 13: 25 years’ experience on for profit and not-for-profit 
boards)  
The accounts illustrated that diversity is a mandate instigated by a governing body but 
with limited focus on skills and gender. Boards appear to be motivated to meet 
recommended practices of having a diversity of skillsets and not much more. Also, it is 
proposed that diversity of skills assisted in the decision-making process of boards as 
narrated in both exemplars. While there is much emphasis on diversity in participant 
discussions and all participants demonstrated an awareness that there is a move towards 
diversity on boards, it became apparent that the focus of diversity is demonstrably 
narrow: 
I think diversity is simply good for business. The wider the range of skills and 
experience around the table, the greater the potential for boards to generate 
creative solutions that are vital to success in today’s challenging economic 
environment. (Male Participant 11: 10 years’ experience on ASX listed 
company boards) 
Another participant explained: 
As innovation becomes key to competitive advantage, I have observed that a 
board consisting of white men of a similar older age and class is unlikely to 
have the expertise, behave with flexibility and depth to guide organisations 
successfully into complex and technologically sophisticated marketplaces. For 
example, from my experience board members over sixty typically don’t know 
much about crowd-funding and digital technology. (Male Participant 18: 25 
years +experience on various types of boards) 
Implicit in the illustrated accounts is the notion that age influenced the type of 
expertise available to boards and that older board members are perceived as not having 
the capability to overcome challenges presented by globalisation. It is important to note 
that the above participant accounts support the ‘neoclassical’ view that organisational 
decisions regarding labour are dictated primarily by market forces (demand and supply). 
In general the interview sample proposed that the idea of board diversity is defined on 
the basis of the perceived benefit to an organisation. While having a diverse board is a 
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planned process it is inherently confined to specific factors due to a number of reasons 
largely focused on human capital:  
Well in not-for-profits diversity is very useful because you don’t have a lot of 
money. So if you can get a lawyer to do something for free, then that’s why right 
and if you can get a banker, if you can get somebody like I just put on yesterday, 
a finance guy on my board and I said the first thing I want you to do is to come 
sit with the CFO because they need some help. (Female Participant 3: 7 years’ 
experience on for profit and not-for-profit boards) 
Another participant explained: 
Boards need to ensure that there is a diverse range of skills and experience on 
the board, which ensures a broad array of mindsets and beliefs. (Male 
Participant 18: 25 years +experience on various types of boards) 
It becomes apparent from the previous seven accounts that there is no clear distinction 
between diversity and human capital because boards are largely focused on skills and not 
the other factors associated with diversity. Both concepts appear to be analogous in the 
board context. Contrary to the previous accounts, there are a number of noted challenges 
associated with having a diverse group of individuals on a board. In particular, 
interviewees suggested that diversity may impact the cohesiveness of a board and may 
pose a challenge in achieving healthy working relationships. Two interviewees 
representative of the sample elaborated:  
It is my experience that part of the challenge with getting diversity is getting 
those people to work collectively as a team. When they [board members] are 
very diverse in their background and values it can be a strength and a weakness 
when you’re not sitting on a board with like-minded people. (Male Participant 
14: 23 years’ experience on for profit and not-for-profit boards)  
Another participant explained: 
I’ve seen that with diversity conflict is inevitable and so greater diversity 
requires greater motivation and skill for the chair to manage the group 
particularly as board dynamics are already complex. (Female Participant 9: 15 
years’ experience on for profit, not-for-profit and government boards) 
Participant reflections suggest that it is important for board members to get along with 
each other and that this occurs when persons have similar habit of thought. Also, the chair 
of a board has greater responsibility in effectively managing a more diverse group. There 
is compelling evidence suggesting that boards are tailor-made for a number of reasons 
that are not previously emphasised in the literature on board capital, such as the influence 
of diversity on board cohesion. 
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Based on the information derived from the interview sample the structuring of boards 
is depicted as a process with fundamental preconceptions, making the process biased and 
non-transparent, contrary to recommended recruitment best practices. A participant 
disclosed factors that were being considered in the selection of a board member for an 
ASX listed company board:  
The ideal person for our board would be someone with very good management 
experience, in an innovative company that involves a lot of technology and she, 
we would prefer to have another woman who is probably in her late forties, so 
she would have had twenty years of work experience, probably won’t have 
another board role and would be someone who would probably be really 
interested in working in this organisation for the next fifteen to twenty years, 
who is very grounded and involved in their community in some way, who has 
lots of interest outside work, who is a very balanced person, is not ego driven, 
and who would be fun…an Indian background or something other but you know 
you don’t want to get too hung up on any of them but equally you don’t want to 
compromise. (Male Participant 8: 25 years’ experience as a board member on 
various types of boards) 
While known factors such as skills are often included in generic board vacancy 
advertisements and participant discussions, it becomes apparent from the account that 
factors such as age, gender, personality traits, ethnicity and expected tenure are likewise 
important. Also evident in the interviewee’s reflection is the implication of selecting a 
board member with an expected tenure of 15 years.  
The participant also disclosed that the particular company was looking to grow its 
markets and wanted a perceived influential person of Indian descent to help break into 
that market segment. This helped to clarify the focus on the particular ethnicity as the 
emphasis on gender was already understood based on previous narratives. Interviewees 
suggest that board members’ perceived social capital is being used to gain access to 
additional resources for the benefit of an organisation. Although it appears that board 
diversity influences the accessibility of particular resources, it is noted that diversity is 
characteristically restricted by board recruitment practices which are discussed in depth 
in the following section. 
 
 Reputation and Background  
In Section 5.1.1 it is suggested that human capital is a factor that influences board 
recruitment and selection decisions. Specifically, participants spent some time reflecting 
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on their perceived contribution to particular boards. Although there is compelling 
evidence that particular skills, qualifications and experience may be useful for boards, 
there appear to be some imperceptible factors that influence the process of getting onto 
boards. In particular, narratives in Section 5.1.3 illustrated that gender and some factors 
associated with diversity such as age and ethnicity influence consideration of who gets 
onto boards, however further discussions with participants suggest that social capital may 
be more important. 
During the investigation discussions shifted focus to gain a better understanding of 
the various motivations of organisations and to determine how board members actually 
come to the attention of boards and organisations. When interviewees spoke about 
gaining their first board appointments or subsequent appointments they mentioned being 
referred by someone who was already on a board and/or an influential person in the 
business community.  
Reputation, background and closed social networks influence the recruitment and 
selection process often referred to as social capital. Depending on the goals of an 
organisation, having the ability to influence public perception is considered valuable to 
organisations and boards:  
I spent nine years on the board of [ABC company] and my contribution there 
was essentially first of all reputation…I got a reputation of being a fierce 
policeman and so on in the corporate world and so I was like a Mr Clean…there 
was a lot of political opposition and they needed a clean face. (Male Participant 
5: 40 years+ experience on various types of boards) 
Another participant explained an appointment to an ASX listed company board: 
I have been to Harvard and they thought that I would add a more ambitious 
profile to the organisation. (Male Participant 8: 25 years+ experience on 
various types of boards)  
Interviewees suggest that perceived standing varies widely and is dependent on the 
focus and goal of an organisation. The illustrated reflections show that the value of 
reputation is dynamic and includes the status of an educational institution attended. While 
the factors depicted have no direct relationship to a particular board role, it appears that 
board members are valued because of their ability to influence the perception of 
outsiders. Moreover, disclosures suggest that boards are being used for reasons outside 
of the defined ambit of governance. Once a board member has established some 
credibility, getting onto other boards becomes much easier:   
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You know you get on to one board and if you do a good job people hear about 
you and they ask you to go on to another and another and another and it can 
kind of a mushroom a little bit so, it’s generally reputation. (Female Participant 
15: 17 years’ experience on for profit, government and not-for-profit boards) 
Based on reflections from interviewees it appears that having prominence is a good 
way of achieving a seat at a board table. There is also the suggestion that boards may be 
comprised of recognised individuals who are operating within tightly woven circles:   
So, of the board members that we have most people have been known by people 
or known of by people, not friends of people but known of by people. (Male 
Participant 10: 10 years’ experience on for profit and not-for-profit boards) 
Another participant explained: 
I really needed people who knew how to negotiate contracts and so on, so I 
again talked to my network and approached someone that had extensive, 
international, commercial and government connections. (Female Participant 6: 
15 years’ experience on for profit and government boards) 
It becomes apparent from the accounts there are subjective factors that influence the 
board selection process. While the literature discussed in Chapter 2 suggests that boards 
selected from among the most qualified, there is compelling evidence provided by 
interviewees to suggest otherwise and it appears that human capital is broadly defined in 
the board context. Interviewees suggest that there is an emphasis placed on having 
background knowledge of people recruited onto boards. Based on the diverse types of 
board memberships held by the study’s participants it appears that recruiting board 
members through closed networks is a normative and accepted practice.  
Interviewees’ reflections suggest that the candidate pool may be tacitly restricted 
because of factors such as the ability to network to forge contracts or beneficial business 
relations also known as ‘resource-based networks’. It appears that board members are 
used as a tool to create favourable conditions for organisations. Interviewees suggest that 
board members’ perceived image and connections are used to influence the capability of 
a board. Narratives suggest that board composition is a thoughtful process geared at 
acquiring scarce or pertinent resources for an organisation. 
The environment in which a board member has operated plays a role when recruiters 
are making decisions on the potential of a board member. Complementing previous 
narratives it is suggested that having a background in an organisation’s primary area of 
business is perceived as useful for boards: 
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My first directorship role was linked primarily to my transport and logistics 
background in a company that their core business was transport. (Male 
Participant 13: 25 years’ experience on for profit and not-for-profit boards)  
Another participant explained: 
They [board] were really looking for a generalist with a business sort of bent to 
it and a strategy background as well and what I came with is a deep strategy 
and business development background and so I was a good fit for they [the 
board] were in the evolution of their organisation as they were just about to do 
a big restructuring, just about to refresh their strategy so someone like me was 
a good fit. (Female Participant 4: 6 years’ experience on for profit and not-for-
profit boards) 
Interviewees suggest that an organisation’s stage of development may influence 
recruiting decisions regarding board members. As in the previous account organisational 
development is a factor that influences the need for particular board members. The notion 
that board members are directly linked to organisational activities suggests that board 
members may be a primary source used to coordinate business undertakings, which is in 
line with the ‘resource dependency’ view of boards. Boards, by their dynamic nature 
which is caused by planned turnovers every three years, are able to adapt to 
organisational needs.  
 
 Closed Social Networks 
Although the literature highlights the importance of networks referred to as social 
capital and research suggests that boards may use their networks to minimise 
‘asymmetric information’, the converse may also be true. Based on participant accounts 
it appears that information may be restricted within a particular social network. 
Interviewees suggest that board members and organisations operate within, and do not 
venture outside, trusted networks: 
Usually boards look for candidates within their networks, so when someone who 
had for quite a long time, a serious financial person said they were going to 
resign from the board the first thing everyone looks around the table and says 
whose got someone. (Female Participant 2: 8 years’ experience on for profit 
and not-for-profit boards) 
The account depicts an instance when a member left a not-for-profit board and 
established that a replacement would be identified through the existing board members’ 
networks. Existing board members are expected to have the capacity to evaluate the 
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suitability of a potential candidate, having firsthand knowledge of both the needs of an 
organisation and/or board and an understanding of the potential member: 
The background of the candidate is very important so you feel comfortable, or 
you feel there’s less chance of making a mistake if you choose this person. (Male 
Participant 5: 40 years+ experience on various boards)  
Based on the information provided by the interviewees and illustrated by the previous 
reflection it is suggested that having information about the ‘social background’ of 
potential board members could safeguard against choosing the wrong board member. 
However, it is noted that interviewees downplayed the idea that the practice of recruiting 
known individuals may encourage discrimination: 
What was decided was that those of us who were at the board could look at who 
we knew. I was not comfortable with that process and I fought that process and 
didn’t win. My preference was that we advertise for appointed members but the 
feeling around the table was we would rather have people we know rather than 
people who come from an ad and I didn’t get far pushing that change. I felt it 
was a boys club and I wasn’t happy with it. Being honest it wasn’t casting the 
net wide enough. (Female Participant 9: 15 years’ experience on for profit, not-
for-profit and government boards) 
Interviewees suggest that outsiders (members of other social groups) are undesirable 
and the account shows that while there may be some opposition to a closed network 
selection process, there is an agreement not to look outside trusted networks. It is 
suggested that ‘best fit’ is decided based on esteem and the perception of belonging to a 
group.  
Participant discussions appear to be somewhat contrary to human resource best 
practices due to an emphasis on closed networks, reputation and social background. 
While there is no blatant discussion of discrimination by interviewees, there appears to 
be a preference for people belonging to particular social groups and of certain 
background:  
I was an alumni of the university and I was contacted through my networks at 
the school and I was appointed, this was how I got my first board role. (Female 
Participant 15: 17 years’ experience on for profit, not-for-profit and 
government boards) 
Another participant explained: 
We often don’t look outside trusted networks, old boy networks when recruiting 
new talents and planning for succession. This can mean allowing people to stay 
longer than is beneficial to shareholders, the organisation or our fellow board 
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members. (Male Participant 13: 25 years’ experience on for profit and not-for-
profit boards) 
Another participant explained: 
Starting from scratch you would need to be pretty well networked and you would 
need to have some big names that could reference you. (Female Participant 20: 
25 years+ experience on government, for profit and not-for-profit boards) 
Based on the disclosures made by participants there appears to be an established 
practice of identifying candidates that are known to existing board members. The 
accounts contradict the notion that board members are primarily selected because of their 
human capital. Participant accounts suggest that the view that recruitment decisions are 
made from an open market ensuring the best candidate is selected may not be valid in the 
board context.  
Although the literature (Chapter 4) suggests that board tenure is being controlled by 
governing bodies it appears from interviewee accounts that there are variations in 
practice. It seems that board membership turnover times vary because of the board 
recruitment process which is designed to recruit from within a particular closed network. 
More importantly, operating within a closed network may negatively influence the 
usefulness of boards. 
Additionally, it is emphasised that closed social networks, reputation and background 
are crucial in gaining the attention of boards and are influenced by an organisation’s 
internal environment. ‘Candidate short-listing’ inadvertently occurs by narrowing the 
pool of contenders through closed networks:  
You certainly need to be recommended and it does become a bit of a network 
and once you are proven and known. I know the reason I would have gotten on 
that board and would have been accepted by government was there were a lot 
of powerful people in industry and the not-for-profit sector that would have 
recommended me…there is a lot of status and pay, so people like to be 
networked. (Female Participant 19: 20 years+ experience on various types of 
boards) 
Although interviewees suggest there are external pressures (Section 5.1.3), accounts 
depict that the board recruitment process is primarily regulated by influential actors who 
may be internally or externally linked to an organisation that shape and control the 
recruitment process. In particular, the tone of Participant 19 in the previous account 
conveys a sense of pride and belonging to the particular social group that is described in 
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the reflection. The participant felt some degree of accomplishment by being associated 
with powerful actors.  
Figure 5-1 below illustrates the posited interrelationship between closed networks and 
other recruitment and selection criteria. Figure 5-1 shows there are recruitment factors 
that are influenced by both the internal and external environment. Closed social networks 
are placed in both the internal and external environment of an organisation because based 
on participant accounts board recruitment is controlled primarily by existing board 
members but there are also influential persons in society that can dictate who gets onto 
particular boards such as government boards. New recruits may belong to a social circle 
of an existing board member and/or may also have connections with an influential party 
in society. There are both internal and external social networks that are linked to 
particular organisations that influence who gets onto boards.  
Figure 5-1: Factors that Influence the Board Recruitment Process 
 
 
Figure 5-1 shows that gender and diversity stipulations are influenced by actors in an 
organisation’s internal and external environment. Reputation and background are other 
factors that are associated with social capital based on participant accounts and the 
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literature and are influenced by socially constructed meanings individuals assign to 
members of particular social groups. Skills, qualifications and experience are associated 
with human capital and are influenced by factors that are in both the internal and external 
environment. 
The human resource literature emphasises that ‘candidate matching’ occurs based on 
factors illustrated on the left of Figure 5-1 (skills, qualifications and experience). The 
aforementioned factors facilitate the shortlisting of candidates, which is in tandem with 
recommended practices and equal opportunity laws. Skills, qualifications and experience 
represent the foundation on which traditional recruitment systems are built. These factors 
are considerably influenced by the external environment due to laws and normative 
principles but are also based on the internal needs of an organisation. For that reason, 
skills, qualifications and experience are depicted both in the internal and external 
environment of the board recruitment system (Figure 5-1). 
While the input of boards regarding organisational activities is not clearly defined, 
participant discussions suggest that there is a cyclical relationship between boards and 
organisations based on the perceived value at a specific period in time. Board members 
are being used to leverage business connections and facilitate contracts in line with social 
capital theory: 
When I’m selecting members it tended to be about what do I actually need. So 
you need to control people so you get actually what you need. So for example if 
people haven’t worked internationally they don’t understand the issues, how 
hard it is, you know, they think it’s about getting on business class planes rather 
than understanding the importance of how you have to negotiate contracts. 
(Female Participant 6: 15 years’ experience on for profit and government 
boards) 
From the account and statements from interviewees it appears that boards are linked 
to an organisation’s internal and external environment. There is an apparent 
interrelationship between board recruitment criteria which makes it difficult to determine 
order of primacy. There is a tension between the various selection criteria creating a 
complex selection process. Factors influenced by only the external environment (gender 
and diversity) are used to shape the perception of organisational stakeholders about a 
board and its organisation.  
Some factors illustrated in both the external environment (skills, qualifications, 
expertise, gender and diversity) are easily discernible to people looking in and, based on 
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participant discussions, are often used to validate board recruitment decisions supported 
by narratives in Section 5.1.1, Section 5.1.2 and Section 5.1.3. Board recruitment 
practices are more assumed than practised, the process of identifying new board members 
is a networked process executed by existing board members in order to meet the 
perceived needs of an organisation.  
Interviewees suggest that existing board members are intimately involved in 
organisational affairs and as a result advertising for new board members as a first resort 
is atypical in the board recruitment process:  
From my experience, most often most boards will start looking internally first 
before they go to advertising and trying to then find someone and interview them 
and you have no history or understanding of them and hope they’re not just 
telling you a story. Like all jobs, you know, it’s the same, someone you know is 
much less risk than someone you don’t know. (Male Participant 14: 23 years’ 
experience on for profit and not-for-profit boards) 
Implicit in the account is an understanding that board vacancies are filled through 
networking. Interviewees did not give much thought to the associated effect of narrowing 
the pool of candidates before an evaluation of skillset, suggesting that while human 
capital is perceived as important it is not the only factor at play in recruitment decisions. 
It is suggested that boards rely on their particular understanding of various social 
institutions within society in order to identify the most appropriate board member. It is 
understood and accepted that individuals who belong to a social network outside of a 
board’s network would be excluded: 
I think in Australia it’s messier than in America or in Britain… clubs are 
relevant, I’m a member of the Australian Club. I know that the people that are 
members there go through a very elaborate screening process and so if I were 
choosing a director and one of the candidates was a member of the Australian 
Club I would say almost certainly honest, cooperative, easy to mix with and so 
on. There are lots and lots of different circles, there’s not a single tight network 
in Australia. There are scores, hundreds perhaps of little networks, things that 
will provide people that know about those networks with confidence in other 
people. (Male Participant 5: 40 years+ experience on various types of boards) 
Interviewees did not exhibit an overall concern regarding the practised restrictions 
related to recruiting new board members, as membership in social institutions is being 
used as a means of predicting behaviour. It is suggested and depicted that board members 
are comfortable with people known to them and are merely keen to constrain the 
aforementioned ‘boys club’ (Section 5.1.3) practice due to external pressures. As a result, 
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board member values and contribution are perceived based on the norms of the social 
institution(s) to which an individual belongs: 
I didn’t actually seek to become a director. I was asked so when I became a 
director of what was then [X Company], it was a very small country based 
Building Society and it was based in [XYZ], where I was born so I knew some 
people. So, I became a director of what was then a little country Building Society 
because I was from there and I knew some people. I think the people who were 
on the board and particularly the chairman at the time, the directors were all 
people from [XYZ] or had connections in [XYZ]. (Male Participant 8: 25 years’ 
experience on various types of boards) 
Also, the idea that there are a vast number of networks in society suggests there may 
be overlapping networks or that people may be otherwise linked by gender (boys clubs), 
ethnicity or class. Section 5.1.3 on gender and diversity shows there is now much focus 
on board diversity due to external pressures. However, based on the narratives presented 
in this section there appear to be many contradictions. The process of board member 
identification is depicted as inherently restricting certain individuals although it is 
suggested that it is based on the available pool of candidates: 
So, if I was picking a board of people in their twenties, ethnically it would look 
different to a board in its fifties or sixties. And so if you look at the representative 
sample of Melbourne of people in their fifties and sixties, it’s different to the one 
in their twenties so when you look at the face of the board, what the board looks 
like it’s more like an Anglo-Saxon type of look. (Female Participant 15: 17 
years’ experience on for profit, government and not-for-profit boards) 
The above account suggests that the focus on certain age groups by boards may also 
restrict the diversity within boards. Implicit in participant discussions is the idea that 
society has changed over time which shapes the composition of boards. The notable 
emphasis on diversity implies there is an existing problem of lack of diversity on boards 
due to board recruitment and selection practices. This prompted an investigation into 
other conditions that have influenced and shaped the existing recruitment system which 
are discussed in the following section. 
 
5.2 Organisational Philosophy, Identity and Belonging 
There are distinctive factors that are revealed by participants that influence an 
organisation’s approach to board recruitment, selection and composition. Interviewees 
suggest that organisations are guided by certain values and/or philosophies when 
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considering board member attributes. The desired characteristics are motivated by an 
organisation’s view of the purpose of its board: 
There are enormous differences on boards and what they do and the people that 
go onto them…they have different priorities, preferences and so on. (Male 
Participant 5: 40 years+ experience on various boards) 
Another participant explained: 
A person doesn’t bring the same value to a different board, it would be a case 
by case basis. You have to think about the interest of the organisation and the 
fit to the organisation, you make decisions as to which is more valuable. You’re 
conscious of the qualities but you just have to be careful about the fit. (Female 
Participant 19: 20 years+ experience on various boards)  
Accordingly, board members are recruited based on certain criteria aimed at bringing 
together a collection of individuals with the attributes and attitudes that are perceived 
necessary to fulfil an organisation’s or board’s objectives: 
I think it is important when customers or partners look at the organisation, the 
board needs to reflect, so you don’t want to be carbon copies but you’ve got to 
be of a group that you know they’ll be comfortable with and that they will feel 
represented. (Male Participant 13: 25 years on for profit and not-for-profit 
boards)  
Another participant explained: 
So you can have institutional structures in place but it is very hard to generalise 
across experience and across circumstance. So a structure that might work at 
[X Company] where it appears it has been dominated by one brilliant but 
unpleasant bully as opposed to another company that might work in an entirely 
different way. Each of them can be successful in their own way but you couldn’t 
have a strong board at [X Company] with certain expectations of being involved 
in management because it is obviously dictated by a culture that requires a 
passive board. (Male Participant 18: 25 years+ experience on various types of 
boards) 
Insights obtained from interviewees suggest that particular organisations have specific 
belief systems that influence the kind of candidate they desire to attract. While these 
factors are subjective they are used to reflect and influence a desired ‘culture’. Candidates 
with compatible values to those of an organisation and its members are viewed 
favourably. A participant who was appointed to the board of an educational institution 
explained: 
The good thing about selecting me was that I was already familiar with some of 
their [the organisation’s] philosophies and I am Catholic by background and 
so I was attractive based on shared philosophies and so it was a good fit. 
(Female Participant 2: 8 years’ experience on for profit and not-for-profit 
boards) 
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Another participant spoke about an experience on a not-for-profit board: 
We’ve had a situation where we’ve had a transgender person who wanted to 
become a member [of the board] and we are a female only organisation and so 
what do you do with that. You’ve got to have a policy, you’ve got to make a 
decision and that was a board and organisational decision what we do there 
and assessing the risk around that [having a transgender person on the board]. 
(Female Participant 1: 9 years’ experience government and not-for-profit 
boards) 
The accounts suggest that a board and by extension an organisation may agonise over 
selecting members who exhibit standards that are in conflict with established 
organisational principles. While it is not clear the principal risk associated with having a 
transgender person on a board or the benefit of being Catholic, the statements highlight 
that board composition also has to do with perception and values. It appears that 
governance is more broadly defined or idiosyncratic than explained in the literature. For 
instance, it is implied that there are perceived risks associated with both appointing a 
transgender person and not appointing such a person. There appears to be some level of 
tension between the expectations of organisational stakeholders and organisational 
standards and practices. There is an acceptance that individuals are naturally predisposed 
to having certain prejudices: 
It is understood that every person brings bias to the board. This can be historical 
bias, new technological bias, customers versus staff bias, gender bias, cultural 
bias, age bias etcetera. The idea in constructing our board is to neutralise non-
useful bias and utilise relevant bias. (Male Participant 11: 10 years’ experience 
on ASX listed company boards) 
Although considerations regarding board composition appear for the most part 
subjective, this did not discount the significance of the views shared. Participants 
explained the importance of organisational philosophy: 
It depends on the calibre of people; the cultural fit to me both in an organisation 
and a board is absolutely paramount. (Male Participant 17: 15 years’ 
experience on various types of boards)  
Another participant explained: 
So, businesses run well when you have distinctive qualities. So, for example, 
what are the things that you need from a Chief Executive? You need someone 
who has absolute clarity in vision, who is underpinned by a really strong sense 
of values and boards need to have that too. Not in the same way but the most 
important thing is the values of the person [board member], all the other things 
are kind of manageable but if they [board members] haven’t got the right values, 
you haven’t got hope. (Male Participant 8: 25 years +experience on various 
types of boards) 
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Interviewees placed some emphasis on values in discussions, although not clearly 
defined. However, it is suggested that group identification provided insights regarding a 
person’s character and particularly a sense of an individual’s ideals and beliefs. 
Discussions suggest that there is a focus on creating boards from groups of people that 
are connected by values. It seems that in cases where there is a lack of understanding of 
an individual’s group identification this may result in that person not gaining the attention 
of a particular board. A person’s values appear to be assessed through an understanding 
of their group identity: 
You look for signals, you look on what that person has done, how they conduct 
themselves or how they live, find out about what they want to talk about, and 
being a Rotarian might very well be one of those. My father was a Rotarian. 
(Male Participant 12: 14 years’ experience on for profit boards and not-for-
profit boards) 
Another participant explained how identity and belonging influenced selecting a 
member:  
I nominated in someone. I wasn’t the only person nominating in someone but I 
had a really good strong candidate as he also fit the bill on a whole lot of the 
other criteria around fit for organisation mission and values. I know he would 
because I’ve known him for most of my life and they ended up choosing him out 
of the pool of people. (Female Participant 3: 7 years’ experience on for profit 
and not-for-profit boards)  
Illustrated in interviewees’ accounts is the notion that selected board members are 
chosen after an evaluation of values. It is suggested that selected members are judged on 
the basis of their identification in a group to which an existing board member or recruiter 
belongs. Organisational philosophy and/or values are implied to be a principal factor in 
the composition of boards, conditioning the emphasis that is placed on certain selection 
criteria.  
Accordingly, a person who identifies with an organisation’s values is poised for 
consideration as a board member. It is important to note that while particular principles 
or values appears to be embedded in the board recruitment system, it is unlikely that these 
factors are easily detected or known by outsiders, making discrimination an inherent part 
of the board recruitment process. This is not entirely negative as making judgements is a 
characteristic part of governance as defined by law, although having fixed ideas about 
groups of people is not the outcome hoped for or to be established as standard practice.  
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5.3 Summary of Research Findings 
In the previous sections participant reflections provided an awareness of a range of 
factors that influence board composition. Figure 5-2 shows the range of factors associated 
with board composition including the different subsets of criteria that are included in the 
recruitment process after candidates have been identified through closed social networks. 
There is an intersection of factors, primarily gender and diversity that all participants 
stressed as being important to organisations.  
Figure 5-2: Factors Influencing Board Recruitment and Selection 
 
 
The board recruitment system appears to be built on distinctive factors such as 
organisational philosophy and values and board members’ identity and belonging to 
particular social groups. The interview sample suggested that board structuring is a 
controlled process, influenced by key actors, and that boards are socially constructed 
based on normative beliefs and practices.  
In exploring the individual experiences of the study’s participants there seem to be 
two narratives on how a person becomes a board member. One narrative suggests that 
the recruitment process is autonomous based on a clear assessment of skills, training and 
relevant experience, creating a structured and equitable process. On the other hand, the 
second underlying narrative suggests a much more complex pathway with criteria which 
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are more abstract and subjective, informed by the ethos of an organisation, its board, 
governing bodies or professed stakeholders.   
When the sample of interviewees were probed on how they achieved membership on 
boards, many reflected on skills, qualifications and experience which is chiefly referred 
to in the literature as human capital. Conversely, when the sample of interviewees 
reflected on how they recruited board members, the process was depicted as subjective 
based on personal preferences and normative influences. Factors such as closed 
networks, reputation and background which influenced the recruitment process are 
referred to as social capital in the literature. Furthermore, there is a focus on gender and 
diversity due to stakeholder activism and external pressures.  
While there was some consistency on known recruitment and selection criteria such 
as the perceived importance of human capital, there are many subjective factors that 
inherently exclude ‘outsiders’. Specifically, criteria relating to human capital were found 
to be incorporated superficially in order to substantiate recruitment decisions. Based on 
the interview narratives, it is posited that human capital is not the only factor that weighed 
meaningfully on recruitment decisions. 
It appears that social identity and values influence the composition of boards and are 
used as an important criteria in candidate matching. As a result, closed social networks 
are used as the primary means of identifying board members, excluding normal 
recruitment channels such as job boards. There is also some emphasis on board member 
social capital, such as reputation and industry connections that are primarily used to either 
influence external perception regarding the usefulness of a board or link an organisation 
to its needed resources. 
While there appears to be some emphasis on diversity it is narrowly focused on 
reducing the existing ‘group think’ mentality by having a diversity of skills on boards 
and eliminating the ‘boys club’ practice by having more women on boards. Both 
problems are postulated to be created by the use of closed networks in the recruitment 
and selection of board members. As a result, it appears that boards by design have created 
the problems that they are trying to solve with an inherently paradoxical recruitment 
system. Findings suggest that a focus on gender and skill diversity may not lead to actual 
board diversity. 
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On the surface the board recruitment system appears to be designed similarly to other 
recruitment systems seeking the most qualified candidate. However, from the narratives 
presented, the structuring of boards is multifarious creating contradictions. For instance, 
human capital, although depicted as task specific, is suggested to be non-transferable 
challenging the notion there is a quantifiable resource within boards.   
Findings suggest that board member attributes are uniquely linked to particular 
organisations and as a result it is difficult to forecast the value of human capital in the 
board context. This revelation has key implications for board dynamics which are 
analysed in the following chapter. Additionally, the data suggests that recruitment based 
on closed social networks will facilitate group and social cohesion by being committed 
to a common goal, having shared views, and interpersonal attraction minimising conflict. 
The following chapter presents findings that provide deeper insights into how board 
member attributes play out in the boardroom and reveal other factors that influence the 
productivity of boards. These discussions have further implications for the 
conceptualisation of board capital which is evaluated in Chapter 7: A Sociological 
Understanding of Board Capital.  
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 BOARD DYNAMICS 
The directors of such companies, however, being the managers rather of other 
people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected that they should watch 
over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery 
frequently watch over their own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to 
consider attention to small matters as not for their master’s honour, and very easily 
give themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence and profusion, therefore, 
must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a company. 
 Smith (1776, p. V.I.606) 
 
 
6.0 Research Findings 
he previous chapter provided an understanding of how a person becomes a 
board member and explained factors that are perceived as important for the 
creation of board capital. This chapter presents additional findings from the 
interview analysis and begins with an examination of the relationship 
between individual board members and then considers how board dynamics is 
conditioned by the internal and broader organisational environment. 
This chapter presents and contextualises an account of board members’ actual 
involvements in different forms of organisations, executing a range of board roles. The 
chapter presents themes to emerge from participants’ reflections on their roles and 
interactions as board members. Participant accounts provide insights into how board 
members come to understand their role and how boards are used. Their reflections offer 
an understanding of the inner workings of different types of organisational boards.  
The range of experiences and disclosures provides an opportunity to probe inside the 
‘black box’ of organisations shedding light on how boards operate. In so doing the 
chapter reveals how boards balance the interests of organisations and their many 
stakeholders. Empirically, the accounts enable an evaluation of the concept of board 
capital, uncovering factors that shape unitary board systems other than board members’ 
human and social capital. 
The chapter advances discussions of board capital beyond board member attributes to 
survey the collective, providing insights about groups and aspects that have bearing on 
T 
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the concept of board capital. The findings reveal behavioural factors that influence 
decision-making systems that operate as a group and contribute to an understanding of 
how board practices, processes and systems of rules are interpreted, shaped and 
controlled by board members which advances an understanding of the nature of board 
capital.  
Based on the interview data, there appear to be various relationships and complex 
interactions within and outside of a boardroom that are integral to boards which helps to 
explain nuances associated with the concept of board capital. The analysis of 
participants’ experiences reveals four subsets of factors that shed light on board 
dynamics: 1) group interaction process, 2) power plays, 3) chair authority and 4) 
organisational stakeholders.  
The four factors are intertwined in three groups of inter-dependent relationships: 
interactions among board members, interactions between board members and managers 
of an organisation, and interactions between board members and external stakeholders. 
These relationships are an inherent part of ‘one-tier’ governance systems; narratives 
disclose manifold interactions between boards and associates within their internal and 
external environment that weigh heavily on the ability of board members to have healthy 
working relationships that contribute meaningfully to an organisation. These 
relationships are discussed as follows: Section 6.1 life in the boardroom; Section 6.2 
boards and management; and Section 6.3 boards and other organisational stakeholders.  
 
6.1 Life in the Boardroom 
Discussions with participants revealed there are intricacies involved in executing 
board activities and human capital on its own does not explain how boards function 
collectively. Although there has been much emphasis on the individual characteristics of 
board members, interviewees highlight that boards operate as a collective and that the 
dynamics of a group is crucial. Accounts from interviewees suggest that, besides the 
chair’s role, there are no distinct roles when board members come to work together. 
 Based on participant reflections it appears that a board’s process of interaction is 
conditioned by a chair’s authority and the power distribution among board members. 
While these factors are context specific, varying across boards, interviewees reflect on 
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instances and factors that may contribute to or disrupt the productivity of boards. 
Interviewees suggest that embedded in boards are different elements of power which 
create the implicit rules that control group interactions. These factors are discussed in the 
following subsections: group interaction process, power plays and chair authority. 
 Group Interaction Process 
Based on participant accounts there appear to be different patterns of relationships and 
complex systems that exist within boards that primarily function as a group. Participants 
suggest that the principal attribute of a board is the interaction of its members. Based on 
participant reflections it seems that dynamics within boards are shaped by different 
individual characteristics associated with personality traits, habits and beliefs and 
conditioned by the ethos of an organisation. The cultivation of healthy relationships 
within a board is influenced by a number of factors:  
I’ve been on boards almost all of my professional life and the problem with 
boards is that you cannot generalise and you can’t even take the same board 
and put it into a different company, a different industry at a different time, with 
different executives. They are all variables and it all depends on people getting 
on and working together. (Male Participant 8: 25 years+ experience on various 
types of boards) 
Another participant explained: 
I believe that in order to be productive boards need to ensure that the cultural 
and social system surrounding the way they operate listen to constructive 
mavericks or dissenters and ensure directors are encouraged to participate and 
speak up. (Male Participant 12: 14 years’ experience on for profit and not-for-
profit boards) 
Although there is some ambiguity depicted in the processes of boards, participant 
accounts show that the quality of group interactions is related to the functionality of 
boards. Interviewees suggest that boards are both heterogeneous and dynamic which 
makes it difficult to simplify relationships. It appears that conditions surrounding board 
activities are shaped by context and influenced by three levels of factors: organisational, 
group and individual. 
While it appears that boards are normative systems that are driven by subjective 
factors such as the quality of interpersonal relationships, interviewees suggest that board 
processes should facilitate and be receptive to the views of all board members, including 
those who do not readily conform to the status quo of the group. Interviewees suggest 
that verbal communication is key to executing board roles and it appears that decision-
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making is unstructured. Additionally, interviewees suggest that conflict is unavoidable 
as there are certain personality types that gravitate towards boards:  
I have seen that frequently boards by their nature consist of ‘Type A’ 
personalities, driving, ambitious, opinionated and successful. They [directors] 
can be responsible for making huge expensive and far ranging decisions. So, 
ego, reputation, future earning capacity etcetera are all underlying drivers of 
behaviours in boards. (Male Participant 11: 10 years on ASX listed company 
boards) 
Another participant explained: 
On boards conflict is inevitable as it is human nature to bring bias, opinions, 
past experience broad or narrow emotions to a meeting. So, it goes without 
saying that some people dominate, some remain neutral and some submissive. 
(Male Participant 12: 14 years’ experience on for profit and not-for-profit 
boards) 
Based on participant discussions it appears that board member attributes are principal 
drivers of board decisions. Interviewees suggest that personality traits influence the 
behaviour of the group and that boards are often dominated by competitive and ambitious 
individuals. Also, participants suggest that conflict is created due to character differences 
and board member dispositions which is influenced by individual dispositions and 
temperament at the particular time the group comes together.  
Also, participants suggest that there is a relationship between group synergy and board 
productivity. Interviewees emphasised it is essential that all board members are actively 
involved in the proceedings of a board and form good working relationships:  
It is important in the sense of contributing to what’s going on and making sure 
that from your sense of ethics or what’s right or where the business should be 
going that you speak up and you actually take an interest in all of that and that 
also doesn’t always happen. A lot of people sit around and don’t say much at 
all. (Female Participant 6: 15 years’ experience on for profit and government 
boards)   
Another participant explained: 
So, all the time with a board you’re trying to develop, trying to have groups of 
people, all of who bring distinctive skills, distinctive backgrounds, but who as a 
team will work and complement each other, who will get on. (Male Participant 
18: 25 years+ experience on various boards) 
Based on participant accounts there is an apparent paradox created when board 
members come together. On one hand there are the individual attributes that influence 
how board members interact with each other but on the other hand there are situational 
factors that may or may not benefit the group. These situational factors are not fixed and 
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as a result the nature of the group is constantly changing. Interviewees suggest that the 
collective is distinct from its individual members and it is key that members work 
cohesively together: 
A board of directors can be disastrous, that is to say if it doesn’t work well 
together. (Male Participant 14: 23 years’ experience on for profit and not-for-
profit boards) 
Additionally, participants suggest that the relationship between board members prior 
to joining a board may undermine the productivity of a board. Interviewees suggest that 
boards that are comprised of members who are established friends may not be productive:  
The worst boards are often those who are social friends. So, we are friendly and 
socially we have done things together but none of us were social friends before 
we became board members. I am always very suspicious of boards that are 
accumulations of very good friends. (Male Participant 11: 10 years’ experience 
on ASX listed company boards) 
Another participant explained: 
I sort of say be careful who you’re friends with and don’t try and be too familiar. 
I am not going to be associated unless I am invited through reputation, because 
I am not going to go there [on a board] and just be a name or a friend of a 
friend. (Female Participant 19: 20 years+ experience on various types of 
boards) 
On the surface these statements appear to contradict narratives in the previous chapter 
that suggest that boards recruit from within a ‘closed social network’. However, it 
appears that participants are making a blurred distinction between being ‘social friends’ 
and belonging to the same ‘social networks’. ‘Social friends’ appears to have a negative 
connotation while ‘social networks’ are positively associated with ‘social capital’. It is 
not entirely clear how these demarcations are managed in principle. However, there 
appears to a delineation between being ‘friendly’ and being social ‘friends’.  
 
 Power Plays 
Although it appears that the success of a board is founded on the interaction of its 
members, there are other factors that influence the group processes and decision-making 
mechanisms of boards. Interviewees suggest that board members use different methods 
or tactics in order to be poised to exert power and control. There appear to be behavioural 
factors that are characteristic of boards that influence ‘board dynamics’:  
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It’s very interesting the power dynamics in boards. It’s interesting that people 
will always sit in the same place, the chairman will usually sit at the end and 
the person who thinks they have or wants to have almost as much power often 
sits at the other end. It’s all about power where they are sitting, how I can stare 
down this person if they are now sitting adjacent to me as opposed to opposite 
to me, the clearest thing is everyone sits in the same place. (Female Participant 
19: 20 years+ experience on various types of boards) 
Another participant explained: 
Some boards have a culture where the closer to the chair one sits the more 
powerful one feels or is seen to be. Most people gravitate to the same seat each 
meeting. Changing places can be very disruptive to some people. Experienced 
chairs will change venues and seating positions from time to time to see how 
this affects people and opinions. (Male Participant 17: 15 years’ experience on 
various types of boards)  
Participant accounts revealed that seating arrangements are symbolic of the power 
relationships embedded within boards. The apparent emphasis on seating suggests that 
group interactions are conditioned by situational placements and that seating is used as a 
tool to exercise authority and control. There are a multiplicity of factors that influence 
the power dynamics within boards and there are gender related conflicts:  
I was in a board meeting recently and when I sat down he [the chairman] pulled 
my chair out for me and I really didn’t want that because you have to be equal, 
you can’t have any of that. And he likes to kiss hello, another big issue. You 
can’t do that because that immediately changes the power and immediately puts 
you in as a female that he has kissed hello. So the whole kissing thing is a big 
thing but anyway and the pulling out of my chair right, because again I am not 
an equal right, because unless I pull your chair out why are you doing this. Is 
that some subtle form of power to say that we are still back in the 19th century 
and that is appropriate behaviour. (Female Participant 20: 25 years+ 
government, for profit and not-for-profit boards) 
Another participant explained: 
I was in a board meeting last night and the chairman is a man and ah there was 
a fella sitting next me who is all about pomp and ceremony and regimentation 
because that’s a form of power, ‘through you chair’. I have never heard a 
woman say that, men say that, men who like the structure. So instead of being 
able to ask another board member a question, they would say ‘through you 
chair’ whereas I don’t really ascribe to all of that. I think that’s a little bit old 
world. (Female Participant 9: 15 years’ experience on for profit, not-for-profit 
and government boards) 
Reflections from female interviewees suggest that chivalry is not welcomed by female 
board members as this may shift the balance of power which is perceived to be not in 
favour of female board members. It appears from participant accounts that issues created 
as a result of members tacitly competing for power may positively or negatively influence 
Beyond Board Capital: Probing Inside the Black Box of Australian Board Recruitment and Dynamics     Chapter 6 
152 | P a g e  
 
the functionality of boards. Interviewees suggest that some board members may be in a 
better position to influence board processes than others, as it appears there is not an equal 
distribution of power inside boards. Gender appears to be a factor that influences the 
power dynamics within boards. It is difficult to predict how members will behave when 
they are required to work together: 
There are dominating individuals who try to have their opinions override others 
through loud voices, talking over others, talking excessively, rambling off the 
subject, interrupting, having side conversation to put the speaker off and there 
are submissive directors who demonstrate excessive tugging of forelocks or 
agreeing with the chair or other directors in order to curry favour etcetera. 
(Male Participant 12: 14 years’ experience on for profit and not-for-profit 
boards) 
Another participant explained: 
I’ve seen in the context of a board the power dynamics can be very damaging 
or very constructive depending on how they are managed by the chair. (Male 
Participant 10: 10 years’ experience on for profit and not-for-profit boards) 
Participant accounts suggest that the chair of a board is perceived to have the most 
power and as a result board members will try to align themselves with the chair of a board 
in order to influence board processes and decisions. Interviewees suggest that the chair 
of a board is in charge of managing the power dynamics within the group. It appears that 
the functionality of a board is conditioned by the chair’s skill and ability to equitably 
distribute power. 
Participant accounts suggest that it is difficult to predict the behaviour of the group 
and that boards may not benefit from all members because of the differences in 
personalities where some people will dominate and others will be submissive. Based on 
participant reflections it seems that the shifting of power among members makes it hard 
to forecast the value of particular board members. Interviewees suggest that some 
members are subservient to others for various reasons or disruptive based on ulterior 
motives. There are a number of factors that define power relationships within boards:  
So there are different forms of power right and that’s part of it. But in terms of 
actually hard power, real power, obviously the chair has it and I don’t know 
whether the more vocal you are, the more power you have for instance. I’m not 
sure that’s right, sometimes again it gets back to the networks. Like there might 
be a guy who is very connected who doesn’t say much at all, but in fact in one 
of them I’m there and he drives me mad because he just sits there and rolls his 
eyes and doesn’t say anything and I want to say, in fact I did have a thing with 
him. (Female Participant 19: 20 years+ experience on various types of boards) 
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The above account provides some insights about the nature of power in the board 
context. There are different factors that explain how power is distributed in the 
boardroom such as ‘legitimate power’ based on an assigned role such as chair, ‘coercive 
power’ based on the display of body language, and ‘referent power’ based on social 
status. The participant explained further about referent and coercive power: 
But you know so people assume he’s powerful because of his networks so 
actually in the board meeting he may not say anything at all, he may just roll 
his eyes and huff and puff or throw his chair back as though he’s exasperated, 
‘this is oh so meaningless’ or ‘we’re all saying the wrong thing’. All that stuff 
goes on, there’s the whole body language stuff that goes on but he has power 
just because of who he is. (Female Participant 19: 20 years+ experience on 
various types of boards) 
Another participant explained: 
There is power of personality on a board where either the chair or a board 
member can dominate by influence, money or simple bullying behaviour. (Male 
Participant 11: 10 years’ experience on ASX listed company boards) 
Participants’ accounts revealed that board members may be assigned power based on 
their membership in social groups that are perceived to be influential. Interviewees 
suggest that board members who have membership in particular social groups may 
intimidate other board members who are perceived to have less standing. It appears that 
the decision-making processes within boards is designed to favour socially connected 
board members.  
While previous discussions by interviewees suggest that all board members are equal 
and that the board operated as a collective, there is some contradiction when participants 
reflected on their personal experiences as board members. Participant reflections suggest 
that board members are not necessarily equal and that board processes are complex and 
conditioned by the competing interests of board members:  
Directors can be angling to be the next chair [of the board] or be selected for a 
committee et cetera and so will have a hidden agenda in responding to issues. 
Additionally, directors can be planning a coup d’état to oust the chair or other 
directors. (Male Participant 14: 23 years’ experience on for profit and not-for-
profit boards) 
Another participant explained: 
I know that when I have ranted in the boardroom and lost my temper, I made an 
enemy of this key guy and everyone knows he’s powerful so you work against 
yourself if you wanted this person to do something for you. I thought he’s even 
less likely to do something for me now isn’t he, it would have been better to have 
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a side conversation. I know that’s a very common way of actually doing things 
so when you actually walk into a boardroom all the decisions have really been 
made. And I have seen that happen and it’s so annoying because as a woman 
you are often not in those side conversations. But it’s all been predetermined so 
you can get in there and rant and rave all you like and want to revisit the issue, 
to revisit strategy or some really important stuff but you get the distinct 
impression that has been determined, that this is where we’re heading. (Female 
Participant 6: 15 years’ experience on for profit and government boards)   
Based on participant discussions it appears that board members may require favours 
from other board members and as a result are sometimes fearful of being disadvantaged 
by disagreements. Also, accounts from female participants suggest that female board 
members may be at a disadvantage as there remain practices that are adopted from the 
‘old boys’ system discussed in Chapter 4. Although statistically female directors are 
generally outnumbered by their male counterparts (Chapter 1) and as a group are less 
influential, the study has equal male and female representation and illustrated accounts 
emphasise issues experienced by the sample of female participants. 
 
 Chair Authority 
Based on previous narratives it is suggested that subgroups exist within boards and 
that within these subgroups are differences in power determined by gender or social 
standing. Interviewees suggest that while boards operate as a collective there are 
members in the collective who have more authority than others. It is understood that the 
chair has overall responsibility for a board and plays a role in determining how power is 
distributed among its members. The role of chair appears to be desirable for ambitious 
board members and accounts show that chair authority influences the overall dynamics 
of a board.  
It is essential to highlight that all participants in the interview sample agree that the 
chair of a board has primary responsibility for directing board activities. Accounts 
provided a range of subtleties associated with a chair’s role. Interviewees suggest that 
the chair leads the group:  
In some ways, a chairman is the boss of the board. In a lot of respects the board 
follows the chairman’s lead and the chairman’s got to give the lead and so on. 
(Male Participant 5: 40 years+ experience on various types of boards) 
Another participant explained: 
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Chairs need to ensure adequate time is available to discuss and review board 
decisions. (Male Participant 17: 15 years’ experience on various types of 
boards) 
It appears from participant reflections that chairs are required to organise the activities 
of boards. Interviewees suggest that the leadership style of a chair is of crucial importance 
and is a factor that influences the value to be derived from a board. The chair is integral 
in shaping the culture of a board: 
Board climate needs to be recognised and agreed at the onset and the chair 
needs to guide this amongst options such as positive emotional climate by 
encouraging trusting relationships, good communication and a shared sense of 
purpose. (Female Participant 9: 15 years’ experience on for profit, not-for-
profit boards and government boards) 
Another participant explained: 
The chairman should be alert to those who demand unquestioned obedience. 
(Male Participant 12: 14 years’ experience on for profit and not-for-profit 
boards) 
Based on participant discussions it is suggested that the culture of a board is shaped 
by its chair and that board culture should facilitate a range of views from all members of 
a board. Interviewees suggest that a chair should not be too quick to accept suggestions 
without doubt or disagreement. Participants explained that it is important that a chair has 
an awareness of signs such as ‘unquestioned obedience’ that indicate there may be a 
secret agreement (collusion) among certain board members to use their influence to 
achieve particular outcomes that may not be beneficial for an organisation and/or its 
stakeholders but serve the interest of a select few.  
While the role of the chair is depicted as all-encompassing, interviewees suggest that 
organisational activities such as facilitating creativity and innovation may be obstructed 
or enabled through board culture which is led by a board’s chair: 
It is also important for boards to have a technological climate focusing on 
cutting edge solutions or a creative climate encouraging left field ideas which 
should be geared at seeking the best from a diverse group of talented people. 
The chair has to figure it all out. (Female Participant 9: 15 years’ experience 
on for profit, not-for-profit and government boards) 
Additionally, participants made key distinctions between leadership styles proposing 
that different attributes of a chair may influence the functionality of boards. Interviewees 
suggest that decision-making may be influenced by a chair’s leadership style. Although 
it is not entirely clear whether there is a preferred leadership style, participants made 
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characteristic illustrations about different chairs and the influence on board processes and 
decision-making: 
At [Board 1: Government Board] it was much more formal around papers and 
things like that was mainly driven by the chair who was trying to establish that 
level of formality within the group while at [Board 2: Private for Profit] it was 
much looser and also driven by the chair. The chair has a lot of influence over 
how things work on boards I’ve decided. The style of the person and the chair 
[Board 2] at the time were very loose around process, so we didn’t do papers 
to make decisions. We pretty much had a discussion and made decisions. 
(Female Participant 1: 9 years’ experience on government and not-for-profit 
boards) 
Another participant explained: 
Good chairs allow an amount of robust discussion as this ensures opinions are 
well canvassed. (Male Participant 18: 25 years+ on various types of boards) 
Participants also suggest that the experience of a chair influences the dynamics of a 
board: 
The experience of the chair is critical in managing dynamics and drawing out 
discussions to solicit all perspectives. (Female Participant 2: 8 years’ 
experience on for profit and not-for-profit boards) 
It appears from participant accounts that board chairs control and establish the 
standards for the relationships between board members. Participants operating in the for-
profit sphere suggest that it is not a preferred option for boards to make decisions by 
voting which is in contrast to government and not-for-profit boards. In the for-profit 
environment whenever there is a disagreement the chair should facilitate the discussion 
of issues ensuring that adequate information is provided so that the board may reach 
consensus. A participant speaking about a for-profit board explained: 
It is very unusual for matters to come to a vote. If there is a disagreement it 
generally means that the board does not have sufficient information to reach 
agreement. It is the chair’s responsibility to identify the source of disagreements 
and get all board members on the same page. This process may be time 
consuming but I have found that this is the best way to make decisions, you don’t 
want to get into the habit of voting. (Female Participant 15: 17 years’ 
experience on for profit, government and not-for-profit boards) 
Another participant explained from an ASX board perspective: 
Consensus is important but this doesn’t necessarily mean a vote. Voting is often 
viewed negatively as this is remnant of archaic systems. Voting is usually a sign 
of a weak chair. (Male Participant 8: 25 years+ experience on various types of 
boards) 
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On the other hand having opposition to voting is not necessarily the case for 
government and not-for-profit boards which appear to operate with more bureaucracy: 
The chairman should drive the decision making process in a board. It’s a unique 
set of skills, because on the one hand you do not want to have a board meeting 
that goes on for 5 hours. On the other hand you need to let conversation that is 
important run and you need to let people speak and at the same time the chair 
should also be able to elicit a response from everybody in the room and whether 
that is requiring votes maybe that’s one way of doing it. Or I have seen other 
people go around the room and say ‘well every director has to say something’, 
has to have a point of view about this, but that’s the more serious boards but I 
don’t think anything is wrong with that either. (Female Participant 1: 9 years’ 
experience on government and not-for-profit boards) 
Another participant explained: 
Voting is standard practice, it saves time and unnecessary debates. I would be 
surprised and have something to say if the chair doesn’t allow important matters 
to come to a vote. (Female Participant 20: 25 years+ experience on government, 
for profit and not-for-profit boards) 
The accounts provide insights about context relating to particular types of boards, such 
as not-for-profits versus government boards, showing subtleties in ‘democratic’ 
participation and control differences in different forms of organisational boards. 
Also, there has been much discussion and research on the implications of dual roles 
of having the chief executive officer or managing director as chair of the board. 
Interviewees suggest that dual roles are not beneficial for boards:  
I think it’s very dangerous to put it, at its crudest, to have the chairman and 
CEO as the same person. The board is not going to be very effective if the 
chairman and the CEO is the same person. A director who feels that something 
is going wrong is in a quite different position if what he has to do is to say 
‘Chairman I should like to ask why the CEO didn’t do that’. That’s on one hand 
and on the other hand I would like to ask why you didn’t do that, in not wanting 
to pick a fight and so on it’s going to be really mirth. (Male Participant 5: 40 
years+ experience on various types of boards) 
Another participant explained: 
Unless you want a board for show then a CEO should not chair a board and 
unfortunately I’ve seen it happen. Very unproductive and ultimately detrimental 
to the organisation as there was no system for due diligence, after all the CEO 
was supervising himself. (Female Participant 6: 15 years’ experience on for 
profit and government boards) 
Participants suggest that in recent times, and especially in listed companies, it is 
atypical that a chair and a CEO is one and the same person but there are still a few 
occurrences of this practice: 
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It is very unusual these days to see a CEO as a chairman of a board especially 
in listed companies but this is not uncommon for other types of company boards. 
Often times this is when the CEO is also a founding member of the company or 
has substantial shares in the business. (Male Participant 17: 15 years’ 
experience on various types of boards) 
Another participant explained: 
Nowadays you don’t see that [CEO as chair] even in not-for-profit boards as 
they tend to follow the ASX principles to the letter and not to be crude but it 
would defeat the purpose of having a board, as the chair is in charge of the 
board and the board oversees management. (Male Participant 10: 10 years’ 
experience on for profit and not-for-profit boards) 
Participant accounts highlight the importance of a chair of a board which is not clearly 
articulated or considered in quantitative examinations of boards. Participant accounts 
suggest that power influences board dynamics and having dual roles may shift the 
balance of power within boards causing a board to be dysfunctional. Additionally, 
Chapter 2 shows there has been much focus in governance investigations on quantifying 
the value of boards, however studies were not able to explain governance failures in 
boards with perceived ‘human and social capital’. Reflections from interviewees suggest 
that the distribution of power and paying proper attention to management is important 
for the functionality of boards.  
 
6.2 Boards, Managers and an Organisation 
Exploring the individual experiences of the study’s participants revealed there are grey 
areas relating to understanding the duty of boards which creates some complexity in the 
relationship between boards and managers acting as ‘agents’ of an organisation. 
Participant accounts suggest there is a subtle distinction between the authority of a board 
and managers that are appointed to act on behalf of an organisation in its day to day 
operations.  
Participants emphasised that understanding the idiosyncrasies associated with board 
roles are critical to the functionality of boards and organisations. Interviewees suggest 
there are subtleties associated with board roles and that having an understanding of the 
nature of board duties can make the difference between functional and dysfunctional 
organisations. Factors conditioning how boards operate are discussed in the following 
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subsections: Section 6.2.1 role clarity and expectation; Section 6.2.2 role confusion; and 
Section 6.2.3 role conflict. 
 Role Clarity and Expectation 
While it is not entirely clear what activities boards execute in order to contribute to 
organisational goals, there appears to be some agreement that board activities involve 
overseeing management: 
It’s providing the guidance, the clarity of values and vision, guidance to 
management when it’s needed, the value of outside perspectives and outside 
experience, the ability to keep out of it but know when to get involved when it’s 
needed without being intrusive. (Male Participant 10: 10 years’ experience on 
for profit and not-for-profit boards) 
Another participant explained: 
So, what can it [a board] do? It can hire management, it can delegate authority 
to management, it can see to it that that authority is being carried out properly, 
it can help management to manage better and it can reserve a few things to 
itself, which it can do in the time that it’s prepared to make available and 
whatever is delegated to management is not reserved for the board and vice 
versa. So, there are critical decisions about what you delegate and what you 
reserve and how you’re going to satisfy yourself that management is managing 
properly. (Male Participant 5: 40 years+ experience on various types of boards) 
Interviewees emphasise that there should be a clear demarcation between board and 
management activities but it appears that this distinction is a matter of judgement. 
Participants suggest that boards operate with much flexibility and defining management 
versus board activities is not set in stone. Although board activities vary across 
organisations there is some degree of structure established:  
With a board where you have a number of elected representatives of 
stakeholders the idea and understanding is that all are aligned to the strategic 
plan. (Male Participant 14: 23 years’ experience on for profit and not-for-profit 
boards) 
Another participant explained: 
It’s hard for the board to be the source. So, the board has to own the 
organisation’s strategy, has to be totally committed to it, but the board’s job is 
not to do the work to develop it. (Male Participant 10: 10 years’ experience on 
for profit and not-for-profit boards) 
Interviewees suggest that boards operate on the basis of an organisational plan that is 
influenced by organisational stakeholders. However, it appears that board activities 
should not have direct involvement in the development of organisational goals but instead 
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board activities should facilitate the achievement of those goals. Interviewees suggest 
that there is an intricacy in the development of organisational plans and it appears that 
having an understanding of the strategic process is integral to understanding and 
executing board roles:  
The business strategy typically would come from management. Senior 
management would present something to the board, say this is where we want 
to go, this is what we see as important, these are the reasons. And often you will 
have a half day strategy session once a year, once every couple of years you 
should do, where you actually go off site and you have a moderator and/or a 
facilitator and you have management there and that’s like the top, that’s the 
CFO, the CEO and maybe one or two others and you have the board and there 
is an interaction. (Female Participant 19: 20 years+ experience on various 
types of boards) 
Another participant explained: 
It’s quite a big family of things that a board has to learn and there is a lot of 
subtlety about how you set a strategy… management comes up with a plan, the 
board looks at it, spends a couple of hours reviewing it and makes perhaps some 
suggestions for change. (Male Participant 5: 40 years+ experience on boards) 
There appears to be an inter-dependent relationship between boards and management 
which suggests that it may be difficult to evaluate boards on their own. Interviewees 
suggest there are implied rules that guide the interaction between boards and management 
and create a delineation of responsibilities between both parties. Boards watch over 
managers and managers provide boards with assurances that they are executing 
appropriate strategies to benefit organisational stakeholders: 
Management will say this is what we want to be, this is where we see ourselves 
going, these are the trends in the industry, this is where we see ourselves fitting, 
this is our niche, this is whatever the rationale is they present that to the board. 
And they have to basically convince the board that they think that’s right but, 
by and large, it should be driven by management, because the board isn’t there 
all the time right, the board is just, should be an overseeing body. So typically 
the board will agree with whatever the management wants to do, typically. 
(Male Participant 13: 25 years’ experience on for profit and not-for-profit 
boards)  
Based on the disclosures made by participants it appears that board roles are primarily 
supervisory in nature but board members are required to have a technical understanding 
of the activities of an organisation in order to adequately execute roles. While it appears 
that boards are key to achieving organisational goals, participants suggest that it is the 
relationship between managers and boards that defines functional and dysfunctional 
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organisations. Participant reflections raise concerns regarding the importance of 
particular types of human capital in the board context.  
While strategy appears to be important for the survival of an organisation, it is 
depicted as a complex process that forms a part of board activities. Interviewees suggest 
that strategy does not reside solely with boards and that it is an involved process with 
managers of an organisation. Participants suggest that doing strategy encompasses 
having clarity about decision-making roles and it appears that strategy as practised by 
boards is distinct from strategy itself: 
Well strategy is about building sustainable businesses that in the long term have 
a distinctive role to play and return value to the stakeholders appropriately. So 
being number one is not a strategy, but being the best community, the most 
customer-connected bank is a strategy. (Male Participant 8: 25 years+ 
experience on boards) 
Interviewees suggest that strategy is an actionable plan that is context specific but the 
plan itself is perceived to be influenced by an understanding and execution of 
organisational activities. It appears that although strategy is guided by a plan, practising 
strategy is more of a social process involving a distinctive relationship between a board 
and its managers. Although there is consensus among participants that the plan of an 
organisation should be beneficial to organisational stakeholders, it is not entirely clear 
how this is accomplished: 
On good boards directors’ oversight management, that is good governance, 
balance risk and performance, set strategic direction. They work through the 
CEO appointed by the board but also keep in touch with management on an 
informal basis so there are checks and balances. (Male Participant 18: 25 
years+ experience on various types of boards) 
Another participant explained:  
In good boards, you would have a risk management committee which might be 
the same as the audit committee. (Male Participant 5: 40 years+ experience on 
various types of boards) 
Participants commonly suggest that managing risk and navigating organisational 
direction are key elements of governance. Interviewees repeatedly emphasised that the 
scope of board duties should not extend into the perceived management sphere and that 
boards should be indirectly involved in overseeing organisational affairs:  
Good boards of directors are generally apparent but not intrusive and they’re 
not prominent. It’s the management who needs to be the public face of the 
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organisation. (Male Participant 8: 25 years+ experience on various types of 
boards) 
Another participant explained: 
You have the accounting and reporting requirements, you don’t have a public 
face. (Male Participant 11: 10 years’ experience on ASX listed company boards) 
While there is accord among participants regarding the indirect nature of boards, there 
is some indication that expectations varied widely. Some organisations require more 
board involvement in organisational affairs than others: 
Good directors, in their own time, will research areas that interest or influence 
their business and network for ideas that can benefit their business, looking for 
mergers and acquisitions, new markets or simply new ways of doing business. 
(Male Participant 12: 14 years’ experience on for profit and not-for-profit 
boards) 
Another participant explained: 
Well it depends on what type of board you’re talking about. In a not-for-profit 
its core role is to raise money so then it becomes a very different level of 
involvement than on a corporate board where you want people who understand 
key business areas like marketing, finance or logistics and you want the sort of 
expertise in the boardroom that will allow an evaluation of how we are doing 
and where we are going, or what we need to be doing and provide feedback to 
management. In not-for-profits it’s more about networks, energy levels, being 
prepared to actually get in and organise a gala for example. It’s sort of a more 
working, more of a closer working relationship, totally different. (Female 
Participant 20: 25 years+ government, for profit and not-for-profit boards) 
Interviewees suggest that board member involvement is based on organisational needs 
which vary based on the type of organisation. Based on the varied nature of board roles 
interviewees suggest that board members require some ‘on-the-job’ training in order to 
understand and adequately execute their role. Board orientation is a standard practice 
which helps to prepare new board members for their role: 
All the boards that I join now give quite extensive induction packs, hard copy 
material and usually a half a day to a day briefing, after which we visit different 
facilities or properties of the company. (Female Participant 15: 17 years’ 
experience on for profit, government and not-for-profit boards) 
Another participant explained: 
It’s unquestionable the importance of training and induction. The role is usually 
complex and each board is different and if we didn’t get those briefings we just 
wouldn’t know where to start. (Female Participant 7: 9 years’ experience on 
not-for-profit boards) 
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Participants also provided some insight into how boards evaluated their usefulness, 
and it is suggested that a board assesses itself. Based on participant accounts it appears 
that boards have sovereignty over themselves:  
Every year we [board] have a full questionnaire, which hopefully just prompts 
people to raise issues and then every couple of years, every 3 years or so, we 
get someone from outside to come in and just review the process. I don’t believe 
that you can outsource this evaluation process. I believe it’s got to be done by 
the board itself. Outsourcing it is usually an excuse for chairs not to have hard 
conversations. But sometimes I know boards have needed to do that because 
people have refused to listen. (Male Participant 8: 25 years+ experience on 
various types of boards) 
Another participant explained: 
You look around and you listen and you set up your yardsticks from the 
beginning. I’ve been through that and every director has a responsibility to 
watch what’s going on and make sure it’s all going right and the chairman can 
be removed at any time, usually as politely as possible, and the board can 
remove a chairman at any time without notice and without reason. Usually 
directors lobby amongst themselves. (Male Participant 5: 40 years+ experience 
on various types of boards)  
While board activities are demonstrated to be fairly broad and exercised with some 
degree of flexibility, there is some accord in the combined perspectives provided. All 
interviewees suggest that: boards hire managers and provide the required support; boards 
supervise and control managers; boards assist organisations in achieving goals; boards 
practise strategy; board members require training and induction; and boards are self-
managed but may involve an external party to assist in the evaluation process.   
 Role Conflict 
While interviewees suggest that there is a clear distinction between managers and 
boards, making this distinction is not without challenges. Participants’ reflections 
emphasise that there is some difficulty in transitioning from a manager to a board 
member. Interviewees suggest that this problem is characteristic of boards as it appears 
that board members typically juggle senior management and board roles in their everyday 
life. There appears to be a degree of conflict created when board members have to 
determine which role they should assume:  
There is a tremendous temptation when you are sitting on a board to tell 
management how to do it because you had some sort of expertise to begin with. 
It’s a very very unwise thing to do because you aren’t going to be there. (Male 
Participant 5: 40 years+ experience on various types of boards) 
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Another participant explained: 
For profit boards, it’s a bit of a hard line to go between board work and 
operational work given that some people have operational experience. (Female 
Participant 2: 8 years’ experience on for profit and not-for-profit boards) 
Based on participant reflections, overcoming conflict created as a result of 
transitioning between roles appears to be crucial to the functionality of boards. While 
boards are inherently involved in the management process there appears to be an 
important distinction: 
Boards select, support and nurture really good management but their job is to 
act as governors, supervisors, not as managers, and its managers that do the 
work. (Male Participant 17: 15 years’ experience on various types of boards) 
The suggestion that board members are not involved in task-related activities raises 
questions on the importance of technical skills for board members. An emphasis on 
technical skills in the recruitment process (Chapter 5) has also contributed to the tension 
being experienced by board members. Although technical skills are considered in the 
recruitment process and used to rationalise selection choices, interviewees suggest that 
board members should not actively use their skills as this may undermine the efforts of 
managers which is counterproductive. There appears to be some degree of 
incompatibility between technical skills and board roles.  
Making the distinction between board and management roles is not without 
challenges; boards lacking governance exposure may lose sight of their core 
responsibilities: 
An inexperienced board can struggle with governance roles and wander off into 
tactical managerial issues versus board level strategic issues. (Female 
Participant 15: 17 years’ experience on for profit, government and not-for-
profit boards)  
Another participant explained: 
I have seen board members who have become enthusiastic barrackers of 
management and who haven’t maintained the appropriate distance in their jobs. 
(Male Participant 11: 10 years’ experience on ASX listed company boards) 
Participant accounts suggest that understanding and navigating board roles is a key 
factor that shapes board and organisational dynamics. While it was previously suggested 
(Chapter 5) that it is important for board members to have operational expertise, this may 
not be productive for boards and organisations. The emphasis placed on task-related 
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skills in the recruitment process contradicts the argument that boards should not be 
actively involved in organisational activities and creates a paradox: 
The most important thing that you would have learnt is not to meddle in 
management matters…there is an important behavioural difference that makes 
a big difference to the performance of the organisation. Meddling directors 
usually muck things up. (Male Participant 5: 40 years+ experience on various 
types of boards) 
Another participant explained: 
The board is a bridge between the management of the organisation and the 
external stakeholders…they [board members] do not manage the business or 
they [board members] should not manage the business because they [board 
members] are only part-timers. (Male Participant 8: 25 years+ experience on 
various types of boards) 
Interviewees suggest that board roles are highly complex with management and board 
roles somewhat intertwined and, as a result, are inherently prone to conflict and 
subjectivity. Board members experience tensions as they transition or alternate between 
roles (manager to board member). Participants suggest that crossing over management 
lines or into management affairs is viewed negatively.  
 Role Confusion 
Based on participant accounts there appears to be no prescriptive approach associated 
with executing board activities which appears to be problematic where there is no clear 
demarcation between boards and management. Interviewees suggest that board roles 
involve obscure activities that create misunderstandings about responsibilities: 
You are a part of a group and you try to contribute to the prosperity of the 
organisation and the growth of the organisation, the capacity of the 
organisation to serve all its stakeholders well and to leave it in a better shape 
than you found it. I am sounding vague but I think you have to be pretty tough 
minded about what you do on a day to day basis, but you need to have clear 
principled views about what your job is and why you’re trying to do it. (Male 
Participant 8: 25 years+ experience on various types of boards) 
Another participant explained: 
You’ve got to be able to think clearly, to exercise independent judgement, to be 
courageous, to be able to challenge without being disagreeable…being 
persuasive would be another one and so on. Then apart from the personal 
qualities, there are the experiential ones, you’ve seen things work in the past, 
you know what’s likely to work well. (Male Participant 5: 40 years+ experience 
on various types of boards)  
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The idea that boards are required to conform to meet the needs of an organisation 
challenges the notion that board and management roles can be clearly demarcated. On 
one hand participants suggest that clear roles between management and boards are crucial 
and on the other hand reflections suggest that there is a need for adaptability and 
flexibility. There appears to be much subjectivity regarding what boards are required to 
do to contribute to the success of organisations. Participant views ranged from peripheral 
to central, suggesting that boards are either an accessory to or a key unit in the scheme 
of organisations:   
A board is merely a leadership tool for a company or business or institution. 
(Male Participant 18: 25 years+ experience on various types of boards)  
Another participant explained: 
Different organisations require different board dynamics. Large organisations 
may require boards to keep a tight rein with close monitoring and risk 
assessment, smaller and non-profit boards may need to be more dynamic. Their 
directors need to focus on driving revenue, leveraging networks, scanning the 
environment and thinking ahead. (Female Participant 16: 7 years’ experience 
on for profit and not-for-profit boards) 
Based on participant accounts boards profess to execute a number of tasks that are 
tailored to meet the needs of an organisation such as leading, monitoring, evaluating risk 
and influencing profitability. Although boards are key to the survival of an organisation, 
there is no clear understanding of what leads to success or failure but there is consensus 
that the dynamics and boundary between managers and board members are crucial: 
Boards are really the reason why companies succeed. They can be the reason 
companies fail. They can impose processes and structures that make it 
impossible for management or at least very difficult. You see you’ve got to be 
able to work together, but if boards start thinking they are the most important 
people then you’ve got a problem. (Male Participant 17: 15 years’ experience 
on various types of boards) 
Another participant explained: 
So in appointing a board the board has a fair degree of autonomy and that can 
facilitate progress or inhibit change when needed. (Female Participant 6: 15 
years’ experience on for profit and government boards) 
Implicit in participant reflections is the notion that board activities are somehow 
associated with an organisation’s success or failure. There appears to be a unique balance 
between overseeing and managing; interviewees suggest that tipping the scale either way 
makes the difference between functional and dysfunctional organisations. Based on 
participant accounts, maintaining stability is challenging as it may be difficult for board 
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members to determine what role they should assume because board members typically 
have management expertise and some type of technical skill. Also, it appears that 
different organisations vary the level of engagement required by their board members. 
Board roles appear to be broad and extend beyond supervisory to all-encompassing 
involving mentoring and development of board members and managers: 
The board oversees management and has to be the sounding board but it [the 
board] also has to reinforce, nurture and develop. (Male Participant 14: 23 
years’ experience on for profit and not-for-profit boards). 
Based on participant accounts, the process of development is twofold; on one hand it 
pertains to the development of a board and on the other hand to development of an 
organisation. Board activities are depicted with some degree of complexity creating some 
ambiguity:  
Boards have to encourage change, be enthusiastic about failure, embrace the 
possibilities of failure, be prepared to take risks on things, encourage people to 
have a go at stuff. Pretty woolly, but in processes that are so regulated it can be 
difficult, in a board, it doesn’t feel like a vacuum it feels like a pressure cooker. 
I think it’s a froth, a hard issue how you nurture change and innovation, but 
you’ve got to do it. (Male Participant 8: 25 years+ experience on various types 
of boards) 
Interviewees depict their board responsibilities with some amount of obscurity and as 
a result it becomes difficult to determine to what extent board members contribute to 
organisational goals. It appears that board and organisational dynamics are defined by 
the quality of relationships established between managers and board members. 
Interviewees suggest that board members rely critically on their judgement and ability to 
apply common sense in executing their duties. There is a subtle distinction between a 
board member and manager which creates some complexity and grey area in roles. Based 
on participant accounts, there is some variation in expectations which creates inconsistent 
demands on board members.  
6.3 Boards and Organisational Stakeholders 
In Section 6.2 participants communicated that board roles are comprehensive and that 
boards are focused on meeting stakeholder needs. Based on accounts by interviewees, 
there appears to be an understanding and acceptance that organisations and boards are 
linked to their external environment through inputs from organisational stakeholders. 
Interviewees suggest there are diverse power/interest relationships between boards and 
organisational stakeholders (an individual or group that has a direct or indirect interest in 
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organisational decisions that may have a favourable or unfavourable implication for the 
interest holder). It appears that boards are predisposed to focus on organisational 
stakeholders which influence the way boards define their role: 
A board’s job is to act as a person ultimately responsible to shareholders and 
in a sense the bridge between the management of the organisation and the 
external stakeholders, at least the providers of capital and the regulatory 
authorities. (Male Participant 8: 25 years’ experience on various types of 
boards) 
Another participant explained: 
The Corporations Act states that the business of the company should be 
managed by and under the direction of the directors, I think Section 2.03 or 
something like that, so the board is responsible for the management of the 
company but it physically can’t manage because directors do not get their power 
individually from the shareholders, they get it collectively. (Male Participant 5: 
40 years’ experience on various types of organisational boards) 
Although organisational stakeholders varied among participants based on form of 
organisation, interviewees emphasised that board members operate as a collective and 
that board authority is defined by powerful stakeholders. While previous narratives 
suggest that boards operate autonomously, there appears to be some input and influence 
from organisational stakeholders. Even though stakeholders varied across organisations 
there is consistent influence and comparability across discussions.  
 Role Strain 
Due to the involvement of organisational stakeholders, board roles seem to have 
multiple statuses. Interviewees communicated difficulty in fulfilling role obligations as 
there are competing objectives among organisational stakeholders which creates a 
tension within boards that are seeking to meet the different needs of their stakeholders:  
If you take the one [board] I am on at the moment, the last remaining one, from 
which I have resigned twice and they just keep on putting my fee up, there I am 
the only one on the board who is not a shareholder and my contribution to that 
board is independence… they are often in disagreement because some of them 
want to pay high dividends now and others want to reinvest in expanding the 
business and so on and I hold the ring you know that’s my first contribution. 
(Male Participant 5: 40 years+ experience on various types of boards) 
Another participant explained: 
You just have to be careful, especially in executing your responsibility. We have 
a board member and that person is also the CEO of a major gift giving 
organisation, so there’s a conflict, because we can’t then go to that organisation 
and ask for money but other members thought this is appropriate as in the long 
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run this would benefit the stakeholders of the business. I was more concerned 
with the potential backlash that may impact the organisation while others were 
concerned with the bottom-line because they’re all still businesses whether not-
for-profit or publicly listed and you need an independent view about how you 
go about meeting those objectives. (Female Participant 19: 20 years+ 
experience on various types of boards) 
Another participant explained: 
Government or policymakers will have a certain mandate that the board is 
expected to achieve and this may or may not be aligned with the organisation’s 
core objectives but the board holds the reins and makes the tough choices. 
(Female Participant 20: 25 years+ experience on government, for profit and 
not-for-profit boards) 
Competing interests as a result of limited resources or focus has created a quandary 
between self and organisational interest. On one hand board members are acting on behalf 
of all organisational stakeholders and on the other hand on behalf of themselves being 
also a stakeholder of an organisation. Interviewees suggest that board members may have 
a direct or indirect interest in the affairs of an organisation. Although independence is 
emphasised as being important in making decisions, the notion seems impractical given 
that board members have various motivations and economic interests in the organisations 
they govern.  
Participants suggest that board members who do not own shares in an organisation are 
independent and those who own shares are dependent. While this simplifies board roles 
in some contexts, it does not help to explain how boards make decisions as a collective. 
Narratives in Section 6.1 (life in the boardroom) suggest that board decisions are made 
by exerting power and control. Interviewees suggest that debating differing views 
collectively is a common way of evaluating the best way forward. However, it is 
understood that not all stakeholder needs will be satisfied and it appears that stakeholders 
with a monetary interest in an organisation are given priority. These stakeholders are 
usually treated as ‘owners’ because of capital invested. 
While interviewees suggest that impartiality is important for the execution of board 
roles, it is understood that boards have a mix of objective and biased members. Although 
it appears that board members have conflicting views, participants emphasised that 
boards are required to exercise objectivity in evaluating the competing needs of 
organisational stakeholders. Based on participant reflections, objectivity is a fluid 
concept. Even though board members are defined as independent based on their past 
relationship or interaction with an organisation, the state of being independent is not 
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permanent. Interviewees suggest that board members have different incentives to 
participate in decision-making and, as a result, may have a specific agenda in responding 
to issues.  
Based on participant accounts, board members experience pressure when it becomes 
apparent that it is difficult to meet the demands of all stakeholders. Interviewees suggest 
that some board members may interpret their role differently from others which also 
creates a tension as boards make decisions as a collective. It seems that board roles 
involve a number of conflicting activities: 
Its making sure things are done correctly and making sure there are no conflicts 
of interest that we are behaving ethically, that we are trading solvent, and that 
shareholders are happy, it’s all of those sorts of things. (Female Participant 15: 
17 years’ experience on for profit, government and not-for-profit boards)  
Another participant explained: 
There are many factors to consider. While not-for-profits are dominated by part-
timers we have to ensure that we create value for our stakeholders and use our 
limited resources wisely to benefit the organisation. How we do that often times 
depends on the demand and pressures imposed by outsiders. (Female 
Participant 1: 9 years’ experience on government and not-for-profit boards) 
The collective nature of boards appears to contribute to the challenges experienced by 
board members. Unlike managers, boards are required to make decisions as a group. 
Although some boards are more democratic than others, there is still the need for a 
process of soliciting input about matters from all board members. Boards can only make 
decisions in the time that is allocated to evaluate matters as a collective: 
Directors discharge their responsibilities when the board meeting comes, so 
when you have your board meeting you have to actually be vocal and actually 
discharge your responsibility. (Female Participant 6: 15 years’ experience on 
for profit and government boards) 
Another participant explained: 
So, they [board members] can only act when they meet. (Male Participant 5: 40 
years’ experience on various types of organisational boards)   
Another participant explained: 
We meet formally monthly or eleven times a year. One of the times is for a couple 
of days, but generally it’s for a day or day and a half. We have a lot of committee 
meetings; many of the committees run technically. (Male Participant 12: 14 
years’ experience on for profit and not-for-profit boards)  
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Interviewees suggest that boards meet on average once per month and as a result 
critical decisions need to be made about how the board will be satisfied that it is 
adequately discharging its duty. Based on the wideranging responsibility of boards and 
the various statuses implicit in board roles, there may not be sufficient time available to 
review all matters objectively. However, interviewees report that special interest 
committees within boards are set up to focus on crucial matters: 
One of the boards I am on there is a very dominant chairman and he doesn’t 
always let the views around the table be heard, that happens and you don’t feel 
as though you can speak. But it’s a fine balance between trying to keep things 
on track and not take an enormous amount of time, so he might say ‘[XXX] well 
go and have that conversation with the CFO offline’ or so and so ‘if you have a 
concern about that please go and talk to so and so’. Or ‘let’s form a sub-
committee’ where they will report on that issue that is of concern and then come 
back to the board, so you need to be able to do all of those sorts of things but 
keep things on track. (Female Participant 19: 20 years+ experience on various 
types of boards) 
Implicit in participant accounts is the notion that the power of a board resides with the 
collective and not any one board member. However, this creates a paradox as narratives 
in Section 6.1.2 suggest that power is not necessarily equally distributed within boards. 
Based on the noted tension created as a result of being a board member with priorities 
which may be different from those of the group, interviewees suggest that board members 
network to gain pertinent information to validate their claims: 
It’s a very unstructured access that any director has to anybody in the 
organisation. They can go to whomever, they need to be respectful of that, but 
we don’t restrain people to develop their own networks within our organisation. 
They can’t cut across or be in competition with management networks, but 
everyone needs their own sources of intelligence as it were, because these jobs 
are broad, difficult and complicated. (Male Participant 8: 25 years’ experience 
on various types of boards) 
Another participant explained: 
So people like to network and think that they are on the board of this company 
and that company and it is usually white Anglo-Saxon males that care about 
that but it works for some boards because in not-for-profits their charge is to 
raise funds to support the business. Whatever the rationale is, board members 
use different means to get the job done and the job and technique varies 
depending on the interest of the company and its stakeholders. (Female 
Participant 7: 9 years’ experience on not-for-profit boards) 
Based on participant reflections it appears that both internal and external networking 
is important for the functionality of boards which suggests that some aspects of board 
processes are unstructured. While participants suggest that boards are working towards a 
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common goal, there is evidence of multiple statuses within roles such as overseer, 
networker, organiser and decision-maker. Interviewees suggest that these varying roles 
cause strain for board members. However, there is some amount of structure put in place 
to mitigate against possible shortcomings in the process of executing duties: 
All the important issues are covered in the meeting and we have a very ordered 
structure of how things should operate at every board meeting and if there are 
any concerns that somebody should be aware of we set up sub-committees, 
particularly finance, that’s the big risk one, and risk committees so that all those 
issues are identified and if something goes terribly wrong and the board is held 
accountable we have a set of board papers that says that we did look at that 
risk, we did do a risk analysis on this, we did drill down the financials on that. 
So you would also need a real effective paper flow that shows you’ve considered 
those sorts of things and that’s a little bit of covering backside but that’s 
knowing you have done a good reasonable job. (Female Participant 4: 9 years’ 
experience on for profit and not-for-profit boards) 
Another participant explained: 
All boards have their own stresses and strains and are under pressure. Boards 
are really under pressure for all sorts of reasons, so we find ways to maintain 
structure and satisfy ourselves that we are doing our jobs. So we use technology 
a lot and not everyone attends every meeting physically but most meetings 
everyone attends physically, but we use technology a lot, there is emails, papers 
and documents. (Male Participant 13: 25 years on for profit and not-for-profit 
boards)  
Although board roles are comprehensive and the expectations associated with a 
particular role may cause board members to experience pressure, boards try to put some 
structure around their activities. Interviewees suggest that structure and systems are used 
to cope with the conflicting obligations of a particular board role. While participants note 
that systems are not foolproof, written documentation provides a means to confirm and 
justify board member actions. In cases where the desired outcome is not achieved, board 
papers are used to protect individual board members from hostile responses. The 
following section explains how stakeholders directly and indirectly influence the 
functioning of boards.  
 External Influences on Board Dynamics 
Discussions with interviewees revealed that, in recent times, there has been a 
deliberate attempt by organisational stakeholders to impose limits on how long board 
members are allowed to serve on boards. Based on insights about the Australian context 
(Chapter 4), board tenure is one of the amendments that is permitted to a company’s 
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constitution and is influenced by regulatory bodies. Interviewees suggest that 
organisational stakeholders are instrumental in decisions regarding board member 
appointments which creates some perplexity about who governs a board: 
Under the Corporations Act shareholders appoint a board to act for a term of 3 
years but I do also think that where people leave because of an automatic rule 
that everyone leaves after three terms, you can waste a lot of talent. (Female 
Participant 15: 17 years’ experience on for profit, government and not-for-
profit boards) 
Another participant explained: 
Members are appointed under the Trust’s Constitution for a period of two terms 
after which board membership may be considered for one additional term. 
(Female Participant 1: 9 years’ experience on government and not-for-profit 
boards) 
The changing nature of boards due to imposed turnover appears to cause a challenge 
in retaining talent and has implications for board dynamics. Although boards have much 
control over organisational affairs, governance systems are not unilateral but operate 
multilaterally with inputs from various stakeholders. On one hand boards are overseeing 
organisational activities being the highest internal authority of an organisation and on the 
other hand there are various stakeholders creating the structural parameters within which 
boards operate. While stakeholders have no direct authority over boards in executing 
their duties they create the conditions in which boards are required to function such as 
terms of appointment. 
Additionally, participants suggest that special interest groups engaging with boards 
through governing bodies are keen to identify material or pecuniary relationships 
between organisations and their board members. Interviewees suggest that having a 
predetermined understanding of board members’ personal connections to an organisation 
is perceived as crucial to the execution of board duties. Interviewees suggest that 
organisational stakeholders are not receptive to long or extended board member tenures 
as this is perceived to impair judgement: 
I know that shareholder activist groups are now coming down hard on deviant 
companies; board tenure is used as a yardstick to judge director independence. 
(Male Participant 12: 14 years’ experience on for profit and not-for-profit 
boards) 
Another participant explained: 
Board tenure has been a controversial subject and I know ISS [Institutional 
Shareholder Services] and other influential bodies have been trying to impose 
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a maximum term of between nine and twelve years but there is some allowance 
based on the comply and explain principle. That is if a company does not adhere 
to the recommended practices they must explain in their company reports. (Male 
Participant 17: 15 years’ experience on various types of boards) 
Another participant explained: 
Special interest groups have been keen to oversee the activities of large not-for-
profits as there are many of these that net in the millions. Given that not-for-
profits are often times littered with part-timers these special interest groups 
want to be assured that these entities are being controlled and managed 
professionally. There is now much focus on getting persons with executive 
experience and many of these foundations pay their directors well to attract the 
best talent. The ASX principles are often times adopted for these bigger not-for-
profit organisations and there is a focus on limiting board tenure. (Female 
Participant 2: 8 years’ experience on for profit and not-for-profit boards) 
Based on participant accounts it appears that large not-for-profit organisations are 
corporatised and controlled in a similar fashion to for-profit entities. However, it seems 
that there is particular stakeholder focus on paid board roles, suggesting that unpaid roles 
are not as important: 
Well the Australian Shareholders Association (ASA) tries to impose that [limit 
on number of board roles] and it says that it will vote against boards if directors 
have, I think they say three paid roles. They’re not interested in not-for-profit 
roles…the general practice is that people give priority to the things for which 
they are paid over the things for which they’re not paid... I have been on up to 
six paid boards concurrently not recently but I would not try that these days as 
the standards have risen. (Male Participant 5: 40 years+ experience on various 
types of boards)  
Implicit in participant accounts about the ASA view is the assumption that the 
activities being carried out in not-for-profit organisations are of less importance than 
profit focused organisations. There appears to be not much concern from regulators 
regarding board members with multiple board roles in not-for-profit organisations. Based 
on participant accounts, stakeholders lobbying through institutional bodies are an 
influential group. Interviewees suggest that governing bodies are very much involved in 
the affairs of an organisation. However there appear to be loopholes in the system that 
boards may use to their advantage. All participants agreed that boards should have 
systematic turnover although there are noted variations in practices: 
Rejuvenation is important on a board and that’s true as I have done nine years 
on my previous board, 3 year-appointments renewed, maybe that was a little bit 
too long, six years these days is often what you see. I have just been appointed 
only for three years. I am not quite sure three years is quite long enough 
especially when you are only meeting every quarter, because there is a little bit 
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of value in corporate memory, there is certainly value in knowing what’s gone 
on before, but at a certain time that then becomes an entrenched view, so it’s 
balancing that off, so something like three and three is probably a good idea. 
(Female Participant 19: 20 years+ experience on various types of boards) 
Another participant explained: 
If you have a lot of people who are there a very long time then you get worried 
because that’s an indicator that the thing isn’t being refreshed. (Male 
Participant 8: 25 years+ experience on various types of boards) 
Based on participant accounts it appears that board member tenure has a relationship 
with the productivity of boards and that tenures that exceed three terms or nine years are 
discouraged. Interviewees suggest that the practice of initiating board member turnover 
safeguards against stagnation and lack of growth in organisations. Interviewees suggest 
that boards welcome input from their stakeholders: 
I’ve seen that is beneficial when boards invite presentations from outsiders or 
stakeholders with different ideas, perspectives and information. (Male 
Participant 18: 25 years+ experience on various boards) 
Another participant explained: 
It’s never safe to leave people to their own devices. If boards didn’t have 
governing bodies looking over their shoulders, no telling what they would do. 
Stakeholder activism brings about order and structure which is good for all 
businesses. (Female Participant 4: 9 years’ experience on for profit and not-
for-profit boards) 
Although stakeholder input is recommended, it is not clarified how this is managed. 
As previous narratives highlighted, stakeholders create role strain for board members as 
there are usually conflicting views or competing interests and there is no prescriptive way 
to decide how each stakeholder’s needs should be addressed. Additionally, some 
stakeholders are more involved in the affairs of an organisation than others:  
Institutional investors, particularly when large and influential or owning many 
shares, can strongly influence boards. Behind the scenes discussions with the 
chair on sensitive issues can bring changes in board strategies. Increasingly 
these investors can influence remuneration policies, director recruitment...they 
can influence who goes onto boards, even placing their own people to oversight 
board performance. Voting directions at AGMs are often influenced by the 
larger institutional shareholders voting in blocks and outvoting smaller active 
investors, having the chairman removed if performance is clearly lacking. (Male 
Participant 11: 10 years on ASX listed company boards) 
Another participant explained: 
The big institutional investors will go and talk to the chairman, talk to the CEO 
frequently…if there is an occasion in which institutional shareholders felt that 
Beyond Board Capital: Probing Inside the Black Box of Australian Board Recruitment and Dynamics     Chapter 6 
176 | P a g e  
 
a company wasn’t complying sensibly or behaving sensibly they would certainly 
raise it and they might very well be going to the chairman and say we are not 
happy with your CEO. (Male Participant 5: 40 years’ experience on various 
types of boards) 
Participant accounts suggest that institutional investors are very powerful and work 
behind the scenes controlling boards and organisations. During the investigation an 
analogy used to describe institutional investors was learnt and resonated: 
institutional investors are often times viewed as ducks floating calmly across a 
body of water, to the observer the duck is peacefully and gradually making 
progress, while underneath water the duck is paddling purposefully as if its life 
depended on it’ (Participant 18). 
 
6.4 Summary of Research Findings 
Interviewees suggest that, while boards operate as a collective, power is not 
necessarily evenly distributed within boards and a chair has the responsibility of ensuring 
the equitable distribution of authority. Board members use different stratagems to exert 
control and network both internally and externally to obtain pertinent information to 
rationalise decisions. While there is some clarity about roles, board members experience 
role conflict, confusion and strain based on pressures from organisational stakeholders 
and conflict with self based on personal motivations. 
Based on the reflections provided by the interview sample it appears that organisations 
and boards have diverse relationships with members of their internal and external 
environment. Relationships have key implications for both the activities of an 
organisation and its board. It is crucial to note that these relationships are difficult to 
consider in examinations of board capital because power is an inherent part of these 
interactions. The findings have key implications for examinations of board capital, 
suggesting there will be inconsistencies in quantitative examinations of these 
relationships due to the nature of power and its influence on how board members interact 
with others. Figure 6-1 below shows the interconnectedness of boards comprising 
relationships with members of their internal and external environment. A chair is shown 
at the head of the boardroom table and is responsible for managing the dynamics of the 
group. However, group interaction is shaped by factors such as gender, seat placement 
and board members’ perception of their colleagues which is influenced by their assumed 
social capital. 
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Figure 6-1: Board Dynamics 
 
 
Additionally, board member activities seem to be interrelated with the activities being 
executed by managers of an organisation. The level of engagement between managers 
and boards varies widely and board members have different perceptions about their duties 
and responsibilities. Clarity around roles appears to be a critical factor in demarcating 
the activities of boards which has implications for group dynamics and the concept of 
board capital which are evaluated in the following chapter. 
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 A SOCIOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDING OF BOARD 
CAPITAL 
Board research in this area tends to rely on either survey data or historical databases. 
While both may help to raise awareness of (universal) issues, neither can get close to 
more essential, qualitative appreciation of board culture and impact of relationships. 
Pye (2004, p. 74) 
7.0 Chapter Overview 
his thesis was designed to investigate the nature of board capital in the 
Australian context and how board recruitment and dynamics influence the 
formation and utilisation of board capital. The chapter begins with a 
summary of the state of existing literature on boards and then explains the benefits of a 
sociological approach. The chapter then examines the first research question: What are 
the contextual factors that shape the creation of board capital? To answer this question 
the study evaluated the key considerations in the recruitment of board members and the 
human and social capital characteristics of board members (Chapter 5).  
The findings to the first research question to emerge from the analysis are that skills, 
qualifications and experience (human capital) influence the recruitment of board 
members. More importantly, the study found that reputation, background and closed 
social networks (social capital) meaningfully influence the types of individuals who are 
recruited onto boards. Also, human and social factors are influenced by contemporary 
issues pertaining to gender and diversity and an organisation’s philosophy on the kinds 
of board members it wants to attract. 
Secondly, this chapter then considers the final research question: What are the factors 
that influence board dynamics and how do they shape board capital? This question has 
implications for how board capital is used. The data shows (Chapter 6) that board 
dynamics are influenced by group interaction processes, power plays and chair authority. 
Additionally, clarity around roles is an important factor that influences how boards 
execute their activities and interact with organisational stakeholders. The findings 
suggest that board members experience role conflict, role confusion and role strain which 
are influenced by members in an organisation’s internal and external environment. This 
T 
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chapter brings together the findings of this investigation explaining how answers are 
situated relative to the existing body of knowledge about board capital and the wider 
literature, enabling suggestions for future research. 
 
7.1 Assumptions about Boards and Board Capital  
Within the governance literature about unitary board structures, the relationship 
between boards and organisations has been traditionally conceptualised in terms of a 
relationship between independent outsiders and dependent insiders, with the underlying 
rationale being that board members have different motivations to engage with 
organisations and managers to achieve organisational goals. In this conceptualisation 
boards are treated as homogenous structures defined by a dyadic relationship which is an 
understood interaction of independent and dependent board members. Although studies 
(Baysinger & Hoskisson 1990; Bhagat & Black 1999; Chhaochharia & Grinstein 2009; 
de Villiers, Naiker & van Staden 2011; Jensen 2000; Kesner 1987; Setia-Atmaja, Haman 
& Tanewski 2011; Wagner Iii, Stimpert & Fubara 1998) have provided key insights about 
the relationship between boards and organisations, findings in the literature are 
inconsistent, with no convincing evidence that organisations with greater board 
independence are more productive. 
In contemporary times governance studies have shifted focus to evaluate the 
heterogeneous characteristics of board members using the construct coined board capital, 
theorising that board members’ human and social capital captures the ability of a board 
to monitor managers and provide resources to an organisation. Studies (Brown, Hillman 
& Okun 2012; Haynes & Hillman 2010; Hillman & Dalziel 2003; Pei, Hu & Hillman 
2016; Soo-Hoon, Poh-Kam & Chee-Leong 2005; Sørheim et al. 2017) suggest that 
boards can be structured through careful recruitment based on organisational objectives 
and are key to acquiring the scarce resources needed to attain organisational goals.   
The concept of board capital primarily has its roots in the resource dependency theory 
of boards that boards aid organisations in managing environmental uncertainty but is also 
a fusion of the agency perspective focused on a board’s ability and motivation to oversee 
managers (Bendickson et al. 2016; Berle & Means 1932; Haynes & Hillman 2010; 
Hillman & Dalziel 2003; Hillman, Withers & Collins 2009; Jensen & Meckling 1976; 
Pfeffer, Jeffrey  & Salancik 2003). 
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It is assumed that an organisation’s approach to board composition facilitates the 
selection of board members from a pool of best candidates in relation to organisational 
objectives (Chen 2014a; Khanna, Jones & Boivie 2014; Kim, N & Kim 2015; Line, 
Louise & Eduardo 2013). However, studies (Chen 2014b; Jermias & Gani 2014; 
Muttakin, Khan & Mihret 2016) have reported various human and social capital factors 
that are linked to organisational outcomes with equivocal results making it challenging 
to explain the inputs associated with board capital and considerations of organisations 
when structuring boards. There is a nebulous understanding of the board recruitment 
process and how it influences the creation of board capital. 
 
7.2 The Benefits of a Sociological Approach 
This sociologically informed analysis advances an understanding of board research in 
four key areas: board recruitment practices, board dynamics, and human and social 
capital in the board context, and addresses assumptions about board capital. A qualitative 
sociological approach that involved semi-structured interviews with board members and 
documentary analysis of the Australian context provided rich data that offers a basis for 
reconsidering and challenging some of the assumptions about boards.  
Through this approach the social and organisational context is considered instrumental 
in shaping board recruitment practices and dynamics. This study is done in the context 
of Australia where neoliberal political approaches by government have led to federal 
power being limited to foreign, trading and financial corporations. The limited scope of 
federal law has key implications for boards who have been given legitimate and 
substantial power over organisational affairs. The following section revisits the research 
questions, how they are commonly answered in the board capital literature and what the 
research findings suggest.  
 
7.3 The Creation of Board Capital 
Empirically, this study found that board capital is directly linked to board recruitment 
practices which create and define the criteria for board membership. Findings suggest 
that board capital is created through recruitment processes which are aimed at bringing 
together a certain pool of individuals who are socially connected. While the 
Beyond Board Capital: Probing Inside the Black Box of Australian Board Recruitment and Dynamics     Chapter 7 
181 | P a g e  
 
organisational context has some bearing on what factors are considered important for the 
creation of board capital, the study found that existing board members are integrally 
involved in the recruitment process. The involvement of existing board members in the 
recruitment process causes selection biases and personal preferences to dictate the type 
of human and social capital that becomes available to boards and organisations. There 
are also external parties that shape the creation of board capital. The research questions 
are revisited in the following section. 
 
7.4 Research Question 1: Key Considerations in the Recruitment of Board Members 
The empirical evidence suggests that existing board members involved in the 
recruitment of board members assign some value to skills, qualifications and experience 
which are linked to human capital (Becker 1964; Carpenter, Sanders & Gregersen 2001; 
Dalziel, Gentry & Bowerman 2011; Hillman & Dalziel 2003). However, the 
investigation uncovered that the reputation, background and social identity of aspiring 
board members weighed meaningfully on being selected which is associated with social 
capital (Adler & Kwon 2002; Bourdieu 1985; Coleman 1988; Johnson et al. 2011).  
Additionally, the study found that gender and diversity, which have socio-political 
implications for society and by extension boards, influence recruitment decisions. 
Organisational stakeholders are keen to curtail the problem of male dominated boards 
and are ‘influencers’ in the board recruitment process (Christopher 2010; Connolly, 
Farrell & James 2017). Lastly, the findings revealed that organisational philosophy 
influenced board member selection criteria. Findings suggest that organisations impose 
certain values on their board members.  
The board recruitment factors are discussed in greater depth in the following 
subsections: human capital characteristics of board members; social capital 
characteristics of board members; the role of gender and diversity in the creation of board 
capital; and the role of organisational philosophy in the creation of board capital. 
 
 Human Capital Characteristics of Board Members  
Empirically, this study found limited evidence to suggest that Australian organisations 
are recruiting board members from among the most qualified candidates as the board 
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recruitment system operates within closed social networks restricting the pool of 
candidates. Although the study documented variations in organisational goals and 
recorded that board members’ human capital is being tailored to meet organisational 
needs, this study reveals that board members are well-networked within the board 
recruitment system and the recruitment of new board members is internally managed by 
existing board members who are focused on recruiting people known to them or their 
associates. It appears that Australian board members are a part of a dense network of 
relationships which was also suggested by Nicholson, Alexander and Kiel (2004), 
however board recruitment practices were not the focus of their investigation. 
While a closed network board recruitment practice has some undesirable implications, 
an offshoot consisting of ‘interlocking’ (Alexander 2004) board memberships may be 
justified by agency theorists’ arguments that ‘board network interlock centrality’ is a 
form of validation by the market, which rewards high performing board members with 
multiple board seats across organisations (Brickley, Coles & Terry 1994; Davis & 
Robbins 2005; Shivdasani 1993). Studies (Brickley, Coles & Terry 1994; Tian, Haleblian 
& Rajagopalan 2011) suggest that sharing board members across organisations is an 
indirect means of evaluating the quality of governance and that ‘organisational 
stakeholders’ (Freeman 2010) respond differently to the same board decisions depending 
on who is on a board. However, Davis and Robbins (2005) assert that while board 
‘centrality’ has implications for organisational decision-making it does not have a 
positive relationship with organisational performance. 
Although the study findings are consistent with the literature on board interlocks 
which are associated with social capital (Alexander 2004; Boyd 1990; Chen & Chang 
2016; Hillman, Nicholson & Shropshire 2008; Nicholson, Alexander & Kiel 2004; 
Robins & Alexander 2004; Wang & Oliver 2009; Zajac & Westphal 1996; Zona, Gomez-
Mejia & Withers 2015), the implications of this investigation are that human capital is 
less of a priority for Australian boards. Findings in this study highlight the inability to 
purely isolate the influence of human capital from social capital which other researchers 
have also noted (Coleman 1988; Haynes & Hillman 2010; Nahapiet & Ghoshal 1998). 
The findings of this study support the view that despite theoretical ideals emphasising 
the importance of human capital (Becker 2002; Carpenter, Sanders & Gregersen 2001; 
Carter & Lorsch 2004; Vandenbroucke, Knockaert & Ucbasaran 2016), the behaviour of 
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actors within the board recruitment system is more assumed than demonstrated. Although 
this investigation found evidence to substantiate human capital claims and research 
participants emphasised their skills, qualifications and experience providing validation 
for their board appointments, this investigation found that the board recruitment system 
is designed to potentially exclude qualified outsiders as closed social networks are the 
primary means of identifying board members.  
This study reveals that task-related expertise such as marketing, legal, accounting and 
finance are perceived to be useful for boards and are often used to justify recruitment 
choices, but findings also suggest that technical skills are less important when the 
collective worked together. Boards are not directly involved in operational activities and 
board members rely more on their interpersonal skills to gain pertinent information, 
identify resources and forge contracts. This finding suggests that examinations (Chen, 
2014b; Khanna, Jones & Boivie 2014; McDonald, Westphal & Graebner 2008; Peng, 
Sun & Markóczy 2015; Pfeffer, Jeffrey  & Salancik 2003; Vandenbroucke, Knockaert & 
Ucbasaran 2016) of board members’ human capital in isolation from social capital may 
not be particularly useful .  
For that reason, there is some merit in the conceptualisation of board capital (Hillman 
& Dalziel 2003) and developments in the model proposed by Haynes and Hillman (2010) 
that try to overcome the challenge of isolating human and social capital with an archetype 
linking both task-related and interpersonal skills to human and social capital. However, 
the model is fairly rudimentary only capturing occupational and industry related factors. 
The study findings suggest that board members’ linkages to particular social institutions 
influence board capital and the board recruitment system favours individuals with 
membership in particular social institutions and types of human capital linked to those 
individuals. 
While this study emphasises the importance of context, the data suggests that if the 
use of closed social networks to fill board vacancies is widespread then it may be difficult 
to explain human capital factors that are important for the utility of boards. This study 
postulates that human capital factors examined in quantitative investigations of board 
capital (Boesso, Cerbioni & Kumar 2014; Chuluun, Prevost & Puthenpurackal 2014; 
Sundaramurthy, Pukthuanthong & Kor 2013; Tian, Haleblian & Rajagopalan 2011) may 
not be directly related to a thoughtful evaluation of board member expertise during the 
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recruitment process but instead is a by-product or derivative of recruitment practices. If 
evaluating board capital on the premise that a board’s human capital is an offshoot of 
recruitment practices, then a board’s human capital may or may not suit the particular 
needs of an organisation at a specific period in time.   
Based on the research findings it appears that board capital has an inherent opportunity 
cost as particular types of human capital are lost once certain board members are chosen. 
Examinations of board capital without knowing the motivations of recruiters are 
representative of a board’s ex post facto capability to provide particular resources to an 
organisation. Examinations without contextual information are calculated assumptions 
about the board recruitment process which may not hold true (Brown 2007; Haynes & 
Hillman 2010; Tian, Haleblian & Rajagopalan 2011; Walters, Kroll & Wright 2008). For 
these reasons the qualitative findings in this study provide an avenue to incorporate 
contextual information in examinations of board capital. Otherwise, board capital may 
be explained as an unplanned or unintended resource linked to board members (Kor & 
Sundaramurthy 2009; Sundaramurthy, Pukthuanthong & Kor 2013).  
Based on the qualitative findings of this study it appears that proxies of human capital 
in the board context are justifiable when a post-examination reveals a positive 
relationship to a specific performance indicator or indefensible when a post-examination 
reveals a negative relationship to a particular performance indicator. This study noted 
that organisations have various performance indicators based on different priorities. 
Therefore, examinations of board capital would need to consider organisational goals in 
relation to board member appointments to be able to meaningfully evaluate board 
effectiveness. Not knowing the organisational context will lead to inconsistent findings 
as one performance indicator may be positively associated with proxies of human capital 
and be negatively associated with another performance indictor in the same study as seen 
in Sundaramurthy, Pukthuanthong and Kor (2013). 
The qualitative findings in this study suggest that the board capital construct is not 
particularly useful in explaining recruitment choices as, although certain factors 
associated with board members’ human capital may be positively associated with an 
organisation’s performance indicators in quantitative examinations of board capital 
(Chen 2014b; Tian, Haleblian & Rajagopalan 2011), it should not be assumed that human 
capital is the key motivator for choosing particular board members. The findings of this 
Beyond Board Capital: Probing Inside the Black Box of Australian Board Recruitment and Dynamics     Chapter 7 
185 | P a g e  
 
study suggest that understanding contextual factors is important in explaining 
recruitment choices. 
Additionally, the qualitative findings of this study suggest that board tenure may not 
be a suitable proxy for human capital without contextual information. In the literature 
(De Maere, Jorissen & Uhlaner 2014) board tenure is used as a proxy for human capital 
with the assumption that this reflects knowledge of the business. However, findings 
suggest that organisational stakeholders control board tenure and consider that longer 
tenures may not be beneficial for organisations which contradicts a principal assumption 
of board capital. Also, the findings suggest that board members may be kept on a 
particular board longer than beneficial for an organisation because existing board 
members are unable to find a suitable replacement within their social circle.  
The findings of this study provide some justification for instigating board member 
turnover as the data suggests that the human capital of board members may not, at certain 
points in organisational cycles, be directly aligned with particular organisational goals 
and performance indicators. This is consistent with the findings of Barroso, Villegas and 
Perez-Calero (2011) that the human capital of board members with long tenure is less of 
a valuable resource in organisations studied and board members with industry expertise, 
a specific type of human capital, and impeded organisations from investing overseas.   
The findings of this study suggest that board tenure varies based on an organisation’s 
stage of development and human capital needs but more importantly is influenced by an 
organisation’s ability to identify a suitable candidate within the existing board social 
circle. Given that existing board members may be allowed to stay longer than beneficial 
for an organisation because of the inability to identify a suitable replacement within a 
board’s network, a board’s human capital may become counterproductive.  
On the other hand De Maere, Jorissen and Uhlaner (2014) found that organisations 
with longer tenured board members are less likely to become bankrupt, which contradicts 
the argument that board member tenure should be controlled (Barroso, Villegas & Perez-
Calero 2011), suggesting that the benefits of human capital associated with 
organisational knowledge and experience mitigate the risks associated with 
entrenchment. These inconsistent findings (Barroso, Villegas & Perez-Calero 2011; De 
Maere, Jorissen & Uhlaner 2014) support this study’s assertion that proxies of human 
capital are appropriate in a particular organisational context and associations made with 
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certain performance indicators are ex post facto explanations for recruitment decisions 
having some unknown opportunity costs.  
Based on the key features identified about the Australian board recruitment process 
this study posits that if similar practices are observed in other contexts then quantitative 
examinations of board capital (Chen 2014b; De Maere, Jorissen & Uhlaner 2014; Haynes 
& Hillman 2010; Jermias & Gani 2014; Khanna, Jones & Boivie 2014; Line, Louise & 
Eduardo 2013; Soo-Hoon, Poh-Kam & Chee-Leong 2005) are merely reporting a 
favourable or unfavourable by-product of recruitment decisions or a board’s ex post facto 
capacity to provide resources to an organisation with a preconceived opportunity cost 
defined by the performance indicator used.  
Although the findings of this study suggest that board members’ human capital may 
be at times linked to an organisation’s stage of development, which suggests some degree 
of control, there is also the suggestion that recruitment choices may favour particular 
organisational conditions at specific periods in time and may thwart others. This is 
consistent with findings from Sundaramurthy, Pukthuanthong and Kor (2013) which 
show both positive and negative effects of board member human capital on different 
performance indicators in the same longitudinal study; their inconsistent findings were 
not explained. This study found that a board’s human capital may prove both favourable 
and unfavourable depending on the proxy used to examine the relationship, as while there 
is some element of control in the board recruitment process the opportunity costs of 
recruitment choices can only be examined ex post facto.  
Based on the qualitative findings of this study it is suggested that quantitative 
examinations of board capital without contextual basis are merely trying to validate 
proxies of human capital in an attempt to explain recruitment decisions. However, 
without an understanding of the board recruitment process and the motivation of its 
actors, it is remiss to make certain assumptions about board capital. Without 
understanding what board recruiters set out to accomplish when boards are being 
structured it then becomes difficult to determine the appropriate proxy that should be 
used in explaining board behaviour as there is an inherent opportunity cost associated 
with board recruitment decisions. Otherwise, quantitative analysis of board capital would 
be based on assumptions that may not hold true as seen in the inconsistencies reported in 
Sundaramurthy, Pukthuanthong and Kor (2013).   
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Additionally, the findings of this study suggest that existing board members may be 
constrained to focus on particular human capital factors and neglect others that have 
bearing on an organisation by being restricted by the offerings available in the closed 
social networks in which board recruiters operate. Findings of this study suggest that 
having a human capital rationale for making board member appointments is important as 
organisations use board members’ human capital attributes to both justify recruitment 
decisions and influence the perception of organisational stakeholders in a favourable 
way. Consistent with the arguments of Liu, McConnell and Xu (2017), this study reveals 
that subjective factors such as reputation can influence the perception about the value of 
board members’ human capital. 
The findings of Liu, McConnell and Xu (2017) suggest that CEOs receiving high 
media coverage just prior to their departure experienced a net increase in their board seats 
post-retirement when compared to other CEOs with low media coverage. Liu, McConnell 
and Xu (2017) assert that media plays a role in corporate governance and influences the 
perceived value of human capital. Similarly, this study uncovers that for board members 
who have a favourable reputation in the business community or a professional profile 
that is linked to particular social institutions, their human capital is viewed favourably 
and those individuals have the ability to gain appointments on multiple boards.  
The findings of this study suggest that reputation is being used to influence outside 
perception which is not directly related to organisational outcomes. Instead, based on the 
findings of this study, it appears that organisational stakeholders and existing board 
members are more receptive to board member appointments when they are either known 
publicly or linked to a prestigious institution. This is in line with Davis and Robbins 
(2005) that board members are mere metaphoric ‘ornaments on the organisational 
Christmas tree’ and are used as embellishments to ‘burnish’ an organisation’s image to 
satisfy organisational stakeholders or outsiders looking in (p. 290). Based on the study 
findings, it appears that references made to human capital are ex post facto 
rationalisations. Findings reveal that the board recruitment system is crucial to 
understanding the nature of board capital and uncovering assumptions about human 
capital. 
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 Social Capital Characteristics of Board Members 
Empirically, this study found that having membership in particular social institutions 
is important in order to gain the attention of board recruiters. Findings of this study 
suggest that memberships in social institutions such as private clubs are used as a means 
to determine a candidate’s social status and capacity to attain scarce resources which is 
in line with discussions about social capital (Casciaro & Piskorski 2005; Dalziel, Gentry 
& Bowerman 2011; Hillman, Withers & Collins 2009; Nienhüser 2008; Pfeffer, Jeffrey  
& Salancik 2003). Based on the resource dependency arguments the survival of an 
organisation centres on the ability of organisational actors to acquire critical resources 
from the environment (Pfeffer, Jeffrey  & Salancik 2003). Findings of this study suggest 
that board recruiters are predisposed to focus on candidates who are perceived as having 
like minds by working with colleagues. These preferences have no direct relationship 
with the achievement of organisational goals but it is assumed this approach will result 
in less conflict and therefore lead to a productive board. 
This study found evidence to support the view that Australian board recruiters are 
more focused on board members’ social capital than human capital for three reasons: 1) 
there appears to be an inherent need in particular organisations for board members who 
are able to network externally to facilitate business partnerships, acquire timely 
information and influence policies; 2) social capital complements and compensates for 
gaps in human capital; and 3) social capital provides some reassurance that board 
members will be perceived auspiciously by organisational stakeholders. This finding is 
consistent with the investigation by Tian, Haleblian and Rajagopalan (2011) that found 
the stock market responded more favourably to board decisions about the appointment 
of a CEO when a board has higher levels of social capital. However, by limiting the pool 
of candidates to closed social networks it remains unknown whether organisations are 
getting the best or most out of board members’ social capital. 
The findings of this study resonate with studies of ‘managerial elites’ (Huse 2009; 
McNulty & Pettigrew 1996; Nicholson & Newton 2010; Pettigrew & McNulty 1995) 
who are understood to be ‘members of the inner circle that constitute a distinct, semi-
autonomous network, one that transcends company, regional, sectoral and other 
politically divisive fault lines within the corporate community’ (Useem 1986, p. 3). 
Based on the findings of this study it appears that there are a vast number of networks in 
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Australia that control the board recruitment process and select board members based on 
the interests of a particular organisation or social group. 
While the focus on social capital inherently narrows the pool of candidates and the 
availability of particular human capital, findings in this study suggest that, depending on 
the organisation, social capital may allow board members to have more control over 
organisational affairs, as board members who are more socially connected are perceived 
as being better able to acquire pertinent information both internally and externally. This 
finding is consistent with social capital theorists that identify three forms of social capital 
related to human capital: obligations and expectations, information channels, and social 
norms (Adler & Kwon 2002; Bourdieu 1985; Coleman 1988; Nicholson, Alexander & 
Kiel 2004). Based on the findings of this study it appears that the board recruitment 
process is largely influenced by organisational stakeholders such as pension fund 
managers who have expectations that board members are socially connected. 
The findings of this study suggest that having the ability to influence public perception 
about the capability of a board is important for board recruiters. High profile candidates 
appear more likely to get onto multiple boards and influence recruitment decisions by 
virtue of being on multiple boards. This finding is consistent with the findings of 
Stevenson and Radin (2009) that board members with a network of strong social ties are 
more socially influential than those with human capital and Lins, Servaes and Tamayo 
(2017) that social capital is helpful in repairing trust in unstable markets which facilitated 
growth in the organisations studied.  
However, contrary to the literature (Coleman 1988; Ferragina 2012; Jacobs 1965; 
Putnam 2000) and optimistic claims about social capital (Lins, Servaes & Tamayo 2017; 
Tian, Haleblian & Rajagopalan 2011), this study found that social capital may inhibit 
cooperation at the board level and encourage opportunism. It appears that in order for 
boards to influence organisational outcomes each board member is required to obtain 
their own sources of intelligence resulting in power plays and an unequitable distribution 
of power among board members. This is discussed in more detail in Section 7.5.1 ‘the 
role of power in shaping board capital’. 
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 The Role of Gender and Diversity in the Creation of Board Capital 
Empirically, this study found there are organisational stakeholders that have some 
degree of influence on the board recruitment process of particular boards. This study 
uncovered that in recent times there has been much focus on gender equality on 
Australian boards. It appears that Australian boards have been influenced by ‘old boy 
networks’ which has caused a disparity in the number of men versus women who are 
recruited onto boards. The study findings suggest there is a normative mindset 
(irrespective of gender) that some of the issues concerning Australian boards are caused 
by a gender imbalance on boards. This finding is consistent with Adams and Ferreira 
(2009) findings that female board members have better attendance records than their male 
counterparts and that having more women on boards improved the attendance of men. 
Adams and Ferreira (2009) also suggest that female board members are more likely to 
join monitoring committees and as a result gender diverse boards are more focused on 
monitoring. 
The findings of this study suggest that there is a practice of instigating a minimum 
number of women on boards which is understood as the eighty/twenty principle across 
different types of organisational boards in Australia (Ahmed et al. 2017). However, 
studies (Adriaanse 2016; Konrad, Kramer & Erkut 2008; Rossi, Hu & Foley 2017; 
Torchia, Calabrò & Huse 2011) suggest that in order for female board members to attain 
‘critical mass’ there needs to be at minimum 30 per cent representation of women on 
boards. The concept of ‘critical mass’ is credited to sociologist Kanter (1977) and in the 
board context is understood as the ability of female board members to influence the 
decisions of a board (Adriaanse 2016; Konrad, Kramer & Erkut 2008; Rossi, Hu & Foley 
2017; Torchia, Calabrò & Huse 2011).  
The qualitative findings of this study suggest that female board members face a 
number of challenges being a minority group on boards as the domination of ‘old boys 
networks’ is still present in boards. It appears that a female presence on boards is 
symbolic of the pressures being imposed by organisational stakeholders but may not 
achieve the intended objective depending on the ‘board dynamics’ which is understood 
as the interplay between board members (Pye & Pettigrew 2005; Walt & Ingley 2003). 
Konrad, Kramer and Erkut (2008) established a benchmark in the board context on the 
basis of their qualitative study that suggests that at three or more female board members: 
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1) gender is no longer a barrier to acceptance or communication; 2) women are more 
comfortable being themselves and associating with others; 3) the atmosphere becomes 
more supportive; 4) women are not seen as representing all women; 5) women are freer 
to raise issues and become more active; 6) women are more likely to be heard; and 7) 
there is a noticeable impact on content and dynamics in the boardroom and increased 
collaboration and inclusion (p. 147). 
In the context of board capital it is assumed that the whole is the sum of its parts and 
factors such as gender are held constant and are only captured if there are differences in 
human or social capital. The findings of this study suggest that board capital does not 
explain the decision-making mechanisms within boards as it appears that female board 
members change the boardroom dynamics as it relates to member interaction and 
decision-making, as discussed in more detail in Section 7.5.1 ‘the role of power in 
shaping board capital’. This finding is consistent with Ben-Amar, Chang and McIlkenny 
(2017) that found voluntary climate change disclosures increased based with the 
percentage of women on boards (p. 369) which supports the critical mass (Kanter 1977) 
theory in the context of boards.  
Based on the findings of this study, gender appears to be a factor that shapes board 
member behaviours. This is consistent with the findings of Dunn (2012) that ‘new female 
board members are better utilised than male board members and in the first year of the 
appointment of female board members they are assigned to both major and minor 
committees in comparison to male board members who in their first year of appointment 
are not selected to work on any committees’ (p. 16). The Dunn (2012) findings suggest 
there is a stereotypical treatment of women on boards and that this influenced board 
functionality. This was also evident in this study’s findings in that female board members 
are opposed to ‘special treatment’ such as being personally greeted or seated, as it appears 
this changes the power dynamics in an adverse way for female board members. 
Additionally, findings from this study suggest that female board members are being 
used to influence board dynamics and improve the behaviour of men. This finding is in 
line with the Ryan and Haslam (2005) study that found ‘during a period of overall stock 
market decline those organisations that appointed women to their boards were more 
likely to have experienced consistently bad performance in the previous five months than 
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those who appointed men’ suggesting that female board members are being recruited into 
difficult situations, referred to as the ‘glass cliff’ (p. 81).  
Also, the findings in this study suggest that because of the mandate of appointing more 
women onto boards Australian board recruiters have actively sought to increase the 
number of women on boards. However, there are challenges in identifying women that 
have the required human and social capital. It appears there may be some elements of 
tokenism within the Australian board recruitment system and there is some suggestion 
that female board appointments are not always on the basis of merit. The findings of this 
study suggest there are female board appointments on the basis of entitlement to meet 
the expectations of organisational stakeholders.    
The findings of this study have key implications for the conceptualisation of board 
capital as human capital on its own may not be able to explain a board’s capacity to 
provide resources to an organisation. Galbreath (2018) studied the Australian context and 
found there is an indirect relationship between female board members and organisational 
outcomes. The study (Galbreath 2018) asserts that female board members who are 
responsive to the interests of organisational stakeholders are able to influence board 
decisions relating to corporate social responsibility and improve the corporate social 
responsibility practices of organisations. 
However, it should be reiterated that this study found little transparency in the board 
recruitment process as board members are being recruited from closed social networks 
which may also influence the quality of women recruited onto boards. Existing board 
members are focused on recruiting people known to them and this is also the case when 
recruiting female board members. This is a key point as a study in the Norwegian context 
(Bertrand et al. (2014) that evaluated the passing of law mandating a 40 per cent female 
presence in leadership roles suggests that recruitment laws facilitate transparency and 
better candidate pools. The study (Bertrand et al. 2014) reported that ‘post-reform’ 
female board members were noticeably more qualified than their female predecessors, 
and that the gender gap in earnings within boards fell substantially (p. 1). 
The findings of Bertrand et al. (2014) suggest that when legislators, the highest ‘social 
institution’ (Turner 1997), impose transparency in the board recruitment process there is 
an improvement in the quality of female board members. Conversely, and in line with 
the findings of this study, Ahern and Dittmar (2012) suggest that organisational 
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stakeholders may be opposed to a mandatory rule as this implies that the quality of board 
members may be compromised if there are not sufficient candidates meeting the 
recruitment criteria. The study by Ahern and Dittmar (2012) was also conducted in the 
Norwegian context and reported a ‘significant drop in the stock market price upon the 
announcement of the mandatory rule which based on their findings resulted in fresher 
and inexperienced boards, increases in leverage acquisitions and decreases in operating 
profit in the organisations studied’ (p. 137). Findings emphasise the importance of 
context in understanding organisational boards. 
 The Role of Organisational Stakeholders in the Creation of Board Capital 
The study findings suggest that organisational stakeholders are key ‘influencers’ 
(Mitchell, Agle & Wood 1997) of the board recruitment system and seek to have 
standardised organisational boards, although taking a principles approach to facilitate 
more flexibility. A principles based approach does not impose hard rules but facilitates 
the use of discretion in practices.  This process of homogenising boards is best explained 
as ‘isomorphism’ (Dimaggio & Powell 1983; Mees & Smith 2018; Pillay, Reddy & 
Morgan 2016) in that the moral expectations of organisational stakeholders are shaped 
by normative beliefs and values. The concept of ‘isomorphism’ posits that organisations 
attain ‘legitimacy’ (Mees & Smith 2018; Pillay, Reddy & Morgan 2016) when they 
conform:  
Isomorphism is a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to 
resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions. At the 
population level, such an approach suggests that organizational characteristics are 
modified in the direction of increasing comparability with environmental 
characteristics (Dimaggio & Powell 1983, p. 149). 
Accordingly, the findings of this study suggest that board recruiters are applying a 
prescriptive approach to female appointments in that a woman is more likely to be 
appointed to a board if the board is filling an existing vacancy because a woman recently 
left or to influence the perception of organisational stakeholders that the particular board 
is adhering to the recommended principles of having a minimum number of women on a 
board. This finding is consistent with Farrell and Hersch (2005) which found that the 
‘likelihood of an organisation appointing a female onto a board in a given year is 
adversely affected by the number of females already on a board and the possibility of 
adding a female board member is substantially increased when a female board member 
departs the board’, asserting that board appointments are not ‘gender neutral’ (p. 85).  
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This study reveals that diversity is a priority for organisational stakeholders but with 
limited focus on gender and expertise. The findings of this study suggest that skill 
diversity can help to prevent ‘group think’ which is understood in the board context as 
conforming to the ‘status quo’ of a board which is often evident in ‘homogenous groups’ 
(Arfken, Bellar & Helms 2004; Coles, Daniel & Naveen 2015; Golden & Zajac 2001; 
O'Connor 2002; Rahim 2018). The term ‘group think’ was first coined by social 
psychologist Janis (1972) who explained that group think is: 
a mode of thinking people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive 
in-group, when the members striving for unanimity override their motivation to 
realistically appraise alternative courses of action… Group think refers to a 
deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgment that results 
from in-group pressures (p. 9). 
In line with Janis (1972) seminal work on group cohesion, the study findings suggest 
that boards are focused on board cohesion which appears to be associated with board 
productivity and as a result boards seek to minimise conflict by recruiting people who 
are assumed to be socially like themselves with membership of the same social circle. It 
appears that board diversity in the Australian context is restricted by ‘social norms’ which 
Elster (1989) asserts is ‘insensitive to circumstances, sticking to the prescribed behaviour 
even if new and apparently better options become available’ (p. 99). 
Findings of this study suggest there is concern within boards that diversity may cause 
irreconcilable differences that could adversely affect the productivity of boards although 
empirical studies have provided justifications for board diversity (Biggins 1999; Erhardt, 
Werbel & Shrader 2003; Kim & Lim 2010; Miller & Del Carmen Triana 2009; Mishra 
& Jhunjhunwala 2013). Based on the findings of this study it appears that recruiters are 
more concerned about group ‘cohesion’ than the negatives associated with group think 
(Festinger 1950). Group cohesion is defined as the ‘resistance of a group to disruptive 
forces’ (Gross & Martin 1952, p. 564). 
The findings of this study suggest that, although Australian boards are focused on 
diversity, the board recruitment system creates a diversity paradox where increased 
gender and skill diversity may not lead to actual board diversity suggesting that the 
problem of ‘group think’ (Janis 1972) may not be alleviated with a narrow focus on 
diversity. This finding is consistent with the findings of Bear, Rahman and Post (2010) 
on the influence of board diversity on corporate social responsibility practices. Bear, 
Rahman and Post (2010) found that board diversity was not positively associated with 
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corporate social responsibility strength ratings, although boards with more female 
members showed an increased sensitivity to corporate social responsibility and 
contributed to participative decision-making styles which improved an organisation’s 
corporate social responsibility rating. 
Board diversity was measured by ‘board resource’ (variety in professional 
background, experience and network connections), a proxy for board expertise with 
variables in line with the concept of board capital (Bear, Rahman & Post 2010, p. 213). 
The findings suggest that a narrow focus on diversity does not achieve better decision-
making (Bear, Rahman & Post 2010). The findings also reiterate the point of ‘critical 
mass’ (Adriaanse 2016; Rossi, Hu & Foley 2017) previously discussed, as the presence 
of a single female board member on particular boards was not adequate to influence 
corporate social responsibility practices (Bear, Rahman & Post 2010, p. 217). In their 
study on board diversity in the UK context Shehata, Salhin and El-Helaly (2017) found 
a negative relationship between gender and age diversity and organisational performance, 
providing credence for arguments of this study that a narrow focus on diversity will not 
achieve actual diversity that is suggested to improve decision-making. 
 The Role of Values in the Creation of Board Capital 
The findings of this study reveal that organisational values have some bearing on 
board member recruitment. There appear to be normative practices in particular 
organisations that influence the criteria for board membership. Findings suggest that 
board members are recruited based on subjective factors aimed at bringing together a 
group of individuals with similar attitudes that are perceived to be important in fulfilling 
organisational objectives. Particular recruiters have specific values that are linked to an 
organisation which influences the kind of board members they desire to attract.  
Findings of this study suggest that factors such as religious belief, sexual orientation 
and identity in particular social groups are used to establish candidate profiles which 
create the foundation on which the board recruitment system is structured. Board 
recruiters provide an ‘institutional logic’ to justify ‘best fit’ for board membersip 
(Dimaggio & Powell 1983; Mees & Smith 2018; Stavrou, Brewster & Charalambous 
2010). An institutional logic is:   
the set of material practices and symbolic systems including assumptions, values, 
and beliefs by which individuals and organisations provide meaning to their daily 
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activity, organize time and space, and reproduce their lives and experiences 
(Thornton, Ocasio & Lounsbury 2014, p. 2). 
Findings of this study suggest that recruiters are keen to have their board reflect the 
values that they consider important for their ‘social identity’ (Tajfel & Turner 2004). 
Findings show that organisations agonise over selecting members who exhibit standards 
that are in conflict with established principles. There appears to be a complex 
interrelationship between recruitment actors and the creation of structure and 
‘organisational culture’ which is understood as ‘the way we do things around here’ (Deal 
& Kennedy 1982, p. 4). 
Findings suggest that culture is embedded in organisations and influences the requisite 
structures such as boards that are used to attain organisational goals. However, there 
appears to be a degree of ‘social engineering’ (Portes 1998) aimed at replacing archaic 
forms of organisational control, where structures such as boards are used to influence or 
change organisational culture by focusing on particular factors such as diversity. This is 
a paradoxical finding that implies that boards are structured to influence organisational 
culture but also that ‘social norms’ (Elster 1989) that influence the composition of boards 
may prevent ‘re-socialisation’ (changes in group membership), or changes in the 
structuring of boards (McCorkle & Korn 1954, p. 88). These findings highlight 
limitations of the concept of board capital that does not provide critical insights about 
board recruitment practices. 
 
7.5 Research Question 2: Factors that Influence Board Dynamics 
The empirical evidence suggests that board dynamics are shaped by the quality of 
group interactions and the interpersonal relationships that are formed among board 
members. Depending on the board there may be pressure towards uniformity which may 
lead to group cohesion or conflict (Festinger 1950; Walt & Ingley 2003). Findings 
suggest that while it is beneficial to establish good working relationships, people have 
different personality traits and communication styles that challenge board members in 
maintaining healthy relationships. However, the chair of the board has an important role 
to play in managing the group dynamics and ensuring that all views are heard. Some 
boards function with more formality around board processes and use a democratic style 
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of leadership while others operate with more flexibility. Based on findings it appears that 
the chair of a board is in charge of establishing the group ‘modus operandi’.  
This study has identified four factors that shape board dynamics: group interaction 
process, power play, chair authority and the understanding of board roles. Empirically, 
this study found that boards have diverse relationships which include interactions with 
members of their internal and external environment. Although the conceptualisation of 
board capital (Haynes & Hillman 2010; Hillman & Dalziel 2003) assumes that board 
members’ human and social capital explains the contribution of board members and their 
influence on decision-making, the findings of this study suggest that there are complex 
systems at work that determine the nature and quality of interactions within boards.  
Based on the study findings it appears that board members use various means to exert 
control and this influences the functionality of boards. The key factor that influenced 
board dynamics was power which has bearing on the group interaction process: 
Power is not an attribute possessed by someone in isolation. It is a relational 
phenomenon. Power is generated, maintained, and lost in the context of 
relationships with others. Power involves the ability to produce intended effects in 
line with one’s perceived interest. This treatment of power does not, of course, 
assume that all behaviour is self-interested. Neither does it assume complete 
rationality by the individual seeking to generate power sources in order to deliver 
intended effects. Individuals are limited not only by their placement in the 
structures of which they are a part, but also by their partial awareness of how those 
structures operate (Pettigrew and McNulty 1995, p. 351). 
The findings emphasise that the organisational context is crucial to an understanding 
of board dynamics. Section 7.4.1 discusses the role of power in shaping board dynamics 
and Section 7.4.2 discusses the importance of understanding board roles and their 
influence on board capital.  
 The Role of Power in Shaping Board Capital 
Findings of this study show that power is not necessarily evenly distributed among 
board members and power regulates the ability of board members to use their perceived 
human and social capital. Some board members have more power than others and this is 
based on a number of factors including gender, social standing, board assignments, seat 
placements at board meetings and access to pertinent information. The findings of this 
study suggest that power is a factor that weighs meaningfully on the decision-making 
mechanisms within boards which in turn influences the contribution made by particular 
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board members. Board members, by virtue of being a part of the ‘inner circle’ (Useem 
1986), have interests that extend beyond the objectives of their own organisation and 
which include self-interest as well as the interests of influential organisational 
stakeholders. The study findings are in line with the arguments of Pettigrew and McNulty 
(1995) that: 
The power and influence of senior position holders is constrained by the 
countervailing influence of others inside and outside their own organisations, as 
well as by rules, traditions and other institutional arrangements (p. 848). 
This study uncovered that gender affects how board members are able to influence 
board activities. Based on the study’s findings it is suggested that women have less power 
and are at a disadvantage because of their social identity. Studies on social identity threat 
suggest that people have multiple social identities and one identity may be at risk of being 
devalued in a certain context (Steele, Spencer & Aronson 2002). Therefore in 
environments in which women are already negatively stereotyped, interacting with a 
chauvinist man can trigger social identity threat and undermine the contribution of female 
board members (Logel et al. 2009). Studies on board capital do not directly take gender 
into account and are not able to provide key insights about how board members interact 
and contribute to board activities. 
This study revealed that the power dynamics in boards are also influenced by seating 
arrangements in the boardroom. Board members designate the chair’s seat as the one with 
the most authority and any individual who is seated directly across from the chair is 
perceived to have equal or almost equal power to that of the chair. Seating is used to exert 
control in the decision-making process and board members perceive that their placement 
in the boardroom influences their ability to contribute to discussions and influence 
outcomes. This research finding has implications for board capital that does not explain 
the board decision-making process and the various norms that have bearing on board 
member participation. 
Additionally, the results of this study support the association of board members with 
a ‘Type A’ (hard driving, persistent, involved in work) personality behaviour pattern 
(Caplan & Jones 1975; Lohse et al. 2017; Mann 1959). This study uncovered that board 
members have competitive, ambitious and opinionated personalities that may create 
conflict and result in some individuals dominating boardroom processes. This finding 
suggests that boardroom dynamics are complicated in nature and human and social 
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capital (board capital) does not shed much light on the influences of dominant 
personalities on board practices.  
Findings of this study suggest that the simplicity of the board capital construct does 
not facilitate an understanding of how boards come to use their human and social capital. 
The concept of board capital assumes that all board members will have the ability to use 
their human and social capital towards a common goal. This study found no evidence to 
support the notion that there is a balance of power or that power is equitably distributed 
among board members. Instead, this study found that power shapes and influences how 
board members execute their duties. It is difficult to determine what board members set 
out to achieve as there is some disparity in board members’ understanding of their role.  
 Understanding Board Roles and their Influence on Board Capital 
This study identified that board roles differ across organisations which is consistent 
with Nicholson and Newton (2010). Findings highlight that there are inconsistencies 
regarding the awareness of board duties across different forms of organisations and as a 
result it is difficult to understand how boards add value to organisations. This finding has 
implications for the concept of board capital which, although the construct evaluates the 
heterogeneous characteristics of board members, it assumes that board roles are 
homogenous.  
Additionally, findings suggest that there are norms associated with particular board 
roles which shape board processes and the level of interaction between members. Board 
roles represent the: 
…standardised patterns of behaviour required of all people who occupy a particular 
position in an organizational system. Related to roles are norms that prescribe and 
sanction the behaviours of role occupants, and values that provide the ideological 
justification for the norms and roles (Hammer, Currall & Stern 1996, p. 664). 
This study found that board members experience ‘role conflict’ which is understood 
as an ‘incongruity of the expectations associated with a role’ (Van Sell, Brief & Schuler 
1981, p. 44). Although there is consensus that boards should not get involved in affairs 
concerning the day to day management of organisations, board members struggle to 
maintain clear boundaries. There is also the added pressure associated with meeting the 
needs of organisational stakeholders which causes ‘role strain’ and difficulty in fulfilling 
role demands (Goode 1960). These factors highlight limitations of the conceptualisation 
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of board capital which assumes that roles are clearly defined and are executed without 
pressure. Pettigrew and McNulty (1995) explained: 
The ability of an individual or set of individuals to deliver intended effects [is] a 
product of those individuals’ awareness, possession, control and tactics in using 
power sources (p. 852). 
The findings of this study suggest that role conflict, role confusion and role strain 
influence board dynamics and the ability of board members to contribute to board 
activities. The findings revealed that in particular boards there is no clear demarcation 
between board members and managers which causes tensions and conflict among the 
parties involved. Based on the research findings it appears that at times board member 
efforts are counterproductive because of duplication of duties. 
Accordingly, the findings of this study suggest that assumptions about board dynamics 
on the basis of inferences made about board members’ human and social capital and 
organisational outcomes may be overly optimistic. While studies (Chen 2014b; Dalziel, 
Gentry & Bowerman 2011; De Maere, Jorissen & Uhlaner 2014; Haynes & Hillman 
2010; Jermias & Gani 2014; Muttakin, Khan & Mihret 2016; Wincent, Anokhin & 
Örtqvist 2010) are statistically justifiable, they may be reporting spurious relationships.  
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 CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
The requisites for board membership should be business savvy, interest in the job, and 
owner-orientation. Too often, directors are selected simply because they are 
prominent or add diversity to the board. That practice is a mistake. Furthermore, 
mistakes in selecting directors are particularly serious because appointments are so 
hard to undo: the pleasant but vacuous director need never worry about job security. 
Buffett and Cunningham (2013, p. 43) 
8.0 Theoretical Implications 
his study makes a timely contribution to academic and societal concerns 
about the role of boards within organisations and provides key insights about 
board recruitment. Extant literature has primarily relied on secondary data 
about board composition to draw inferences about the board recruitment process 
(Baysinger & Hoskisson 1990; Bhagat & Black 1999; Johnson, Schnatterly & Hill 2013; 
Wang & Oliver 2009). The findings suggest that the process of board member 
recruitment is more assumed than practised. Discussions about board composition based 
on secondary data ignore contextual factors and do not consider factors that influence the 
criteria for board membership. Findings of this study suggest that recruitment holds the 
key to understanding variations in the relationship between boards and organisations, 
shedding light on some fundamental limitations of the concept of board capital. 
The findings of this study highlight the following limitations about the board capital 
construct: 1) human and social capital does not adequately explain how people are 
recruited onto boards; 2) the human and social characteristics of board members partially 
explain criteria for board membership as social identity is equally important; 3) the board 
capital construct is not able to provide insights about organisational or social context that 
has bearing on the board recruitment process; 4) proxies of human and social capital are 
not based on subjective board recruitment criteria such as values. 
The concept of board capital makes the following oversights: 1) board capital does 
not directly consider gender and as a result is not able to examine how gender influences 
board recruitment and dynamics; 2) the board capital construct does not lend itself to an 
evaluation of how board members contribute to organisations outcomes; 3) the board 
capital construct does not consider power and assumes that all board members have an 
equal opportunity to contribute to board activities; 4) the board capital construct provides 
T 
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no information about how board members come to understand their role and assumes that 
board activities across organisations are homogenous. 
The inherent economic rule of ceteris paribus causes the following problems: 1) board 
capital does not consider the input of managers or organisational stakeholders in board 
outcomes; 2) board capital makes assumptions about organisational goals and proxies of 
board performance are not based on an understanding of organisational context and as a 
result might not hold true; 3) board capital ignores the influence of social norms on board 
dynamics; and 4) board capital assumes that the collective is equal to the sum of its parts, 
with key roles that are integral to boards such as the influence of the chair essentially 
ignored. 
This study has provided key considerations for theorists seeking to gain a better 
understanding of boards and emphasises that knowledge of the impetuses of recruitment 
actors and board members is valuable in explaining empirical inconsistencies in 
examinations of board capital. This study has reported how and why board members are 
recruited onto particular boards and suggests that board recruitment choices have an 
associated opportunity cost.  
The study revealed that recruitment decisions may not be based on a thoughtful 
evaluation of board member expertise (human capital) as the board recruitment process 
favours particular individuals who have membership in certain social institutions or 
circles. As a result, human capital proxies are ex post facto rationalisations of recruitment 
decisions. It is not known what skills an organisation had to forgo in order to appoint 
someone of a particular social identity. Also, proxies of human capital can be 
manipulated to validate human capital claims by changing the performance measure. 
This study evaluated factors that influence board dynamics and found that power is a 
significant factor that influences board activities. The study revealed there are boardroom 
norms such as seat placement that influence the contribution of board members. The chair 
of a board appears to have legitimate power to regulate boardroom processes, however 
there are different elements or types of power (coercive, referent, expert) that may shift 
the balance among members shaping board dynamics (French, Raven & Cartwright 
1959).  
Being a qualitative study this investigation benefits from access to important actors 
with membership on different forms of organisational boards and personal experiences 
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of the board recruitment system. Access to governance actors has been difficult for past 
and current researchers in the field of corporate governance and this study advances 
research on the concept of board capital, board recruitment and board dynamics. 
By focusing on the relationship between board recruitment, dynamics and board 
capital, this study offers a nuanced approach to understanding boards and issues 
concerning corporate governance. This investigation sheds light on issues concerning 
board diversity by revealing that closed social networks restrict candidate pools and 
undermine efforts to improve board diversity. The study found that board members are 
integrally involved in the recruitment process and are keen to recruit members from 
within their social circles. The findings challenge traditional theoretical arguments that 
are based on hypothesised relationships between boards and organisations that lack key 
insights about the board recruitment process and the motivation of its actors.   
This study extends the scope of the concept of board capital, by means of a 
sociological analysis that investigates the merits and limitations of the construct. The 
findings show the paucity of human and social capital constructs in explaining the 
complex nature of boards. This study highlights that the current construct of board capital 
ignores intrinsic influences such as power that affect understanding of how boards 
function within organisations and how board members navigate and interact with their 
internal and external environment. 
Primarily, this study draws attention to the scarcity in studies that provide insights 
about the board recruitment process and raises awareness that there is only a vague 
understanding of how board members are selected, what board members set out to 
achieve and how they come to understand their role in organisations. The Adams,  
Hermalin and Weisbach (2010) survey of the governance literature on boards shows that 
the most frequently asked research questions about boards are what determines board 
composition and what influences board actions, highlighting the existing view that both 
factors are ‘jointly endogenous’ (p. 58).  
This study found that while the internal structuring and functioning of organisations 
influences board composition and decision-making there are exogenous factors such as 
influential organisational stakeholders and normative practices that affect the dynamics 
of boards. Empirical studies on boards neglect to deal with the distinction between board 
recruitment and board composition. Although both are mutually inclusive events where 
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one cannot happen independent of the other, investigations about board composition and 
organisational outcomes assume that the characteristics of boards explain the process of 
selection. In a socio-political context this study shows that there are context specific 
factors associated with board recruitment and highlights various relationships that have 
bearing on the composition, decision-making and functionality of boards.  
 
8.1 Implications for Corporate Governance Research 
This study has highlighted a need for a paradigm shift in the methodological structure 
of corporate governance research. Empirical approaches to understanding boards have 
primarily focused on using secondary data to provide causal inferences which lack key 
insights about organisational and social context. After over three decades of 
investigations and board initiatives, issues relating to board practices persist with 
corporate governance scandals increasing. Regulatory bodies are searching for ways to 
improve governance systems and practices but are challenged by the existing research 
agenda which has focused on causal-comparative studies. 
Qualitative research can assist regulators and practitioners to develop a more robust 
governance system informed by a knowledge of how boards actually work. There are too 
many grey areas in understanding board roles and the metaphoric black box remains 
regarding boardroom processes. A qualitative sociologically informed approach provides 
a foundation for recasting governance systems and approaches that have become 
redundant because of faulty assumptions. There need to be more empirical studies that 
recognise the value in socially constructed knowledge. There are too many factors about 
governance actors that remain unknown (such as what do they do) and which require a 
thoughtful assessment of the functioning of boards. 
 
8.2 Policy Implications 
This study underscores the need for transparency in the board recruitment process and 
suggests that recruitment actors require best practice guidelines to recruit and select board 
members as recruitment decisions have an associated opportunity cost. There appears to 
be the need to evaluate board roles which will provide role clarity and facilitate the 
establishment of a defined scope matching human capital needs. Like other recruitment 
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systems that are based on human resource best practices it may prove more prudent to 
have human capital drive board recruitment decisions instead of social identity. It is 
important that board recruitment is perceived as an equitable and non-discriminatory 
process so that members of society may be confident that critical governance systems are 
working as they should.  
Accordingly, this study provides important regulatory insights to policymakers 
regarding the board recruitment system. If the use of closed social networks is widely 
practised, this may promote nepotism undermining the existing policies that are focused 
on promoting board diversity. There is an apparent risk associated with the reported 
closed social network board recruitment practice that may prove counterproductive for 
policies that are aimed at improving board diversity. There may be observed increases in 
skill and gender diversity which disguises that there is no actual diversity of board 
members in practice.  
 
8.3 Implications for Further Research 
This qualitative research has afforded the opportunity to interact with key actors and 
board settings. However, there is a need to further investigate boards in the context of the 
‘managerial elite’ literature evaluating the role of elite actors in existing governance 
issues. There are few studies on managerial elites (Huse 2009; Nicholson & Newton 
2010; Pettigrew & McNulty 1995) in the board context and as a result there has not been 
much focus on how the distribution of power influences corporate governance. This study 
emphasises that power is an important factor that regulates board recruitment and 
dynamics and although there is an assumed sovereignty that is associated with boards, 
board members are principally agents serving the needs of organisational stakeholders.  
There are few studies that have gained access inside the boardroom and this study did 
not overcome this known hurdle. Although it is assumed that direct access may cause 
behavioural changes, ethnographic studies (Pugliese, Nicholson & Bezemer 2015; 
Samra‐Fredericks 2000) have proven useful in understanding board dynamics and 
practices. Based on the flexibility reported in the board recruitment process, it may prove 
worthwhile to investigate cultural factors that have contributed to this practice as this 
study revealed that context is of crucial importance in understanding board recruitment 
and dynamics.   
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Currently little is understood about board culture which is ‘the body of accumulated 
beliefs, assumptions, attitudes, values and experiences of a board that collectively 
manifest in decorum, protocol, norms, prevailing decision processes, and the 
concentration of power and privilege’(Dailey 2011). This study revealed that board 
culture plays a critical role in board recruitment and dynamics influencing an 
organisation’s approach to governance. There is however a need for further research into 
factors that shape board culture and their relationship to social and regulatory systems.  
Gaining knowledge of the decision-making process of boards continue to challenge 
researchers. While boards are recognised as a centralised unit of decision-making 
assumed to shape organisational culture, by changing structure or the way people think, 
it is not known how boards influence the risk appetite of managers and organisational 
agents. Researchers have not provided a clear understanding of how boards influence the 
type of structure an organisation implements (centralised versus decentralised). While 
there have been investigations into the relationship between organisational structures and 
operational safety the role of boards is not clearly defined.   
This study concludes that much more clarity is needed on board roles and about what 
boards primarily set out to achieve. Currently there is no distinction between what is 
expected from managers and board members. The focus on boards as a resource for 
influencing organisational outcomes appears to overshadow the focus of governance and 
perpetuates the notion that governance is about the provision of resources to 
organisations. Few researchers seem to be interested in boards as a socio-political system 
worthy of thoughtful interrogation. 
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Appendix 1: Interview Protocol 
Screening Questions 
How long have you been a board member on company boards? 
What are the activities associated with this role?  
 
Topic Topic Objective, lead questions and probing questions 
1 Governance and 
Boards 
Objective  
To identify the key elements of boards.  
Conversation starters 
• I am interested to know what you consider to be 
good governance.  
• Could you tell me what makes a good board 
member?  
 
Probes: 
o In relation to your role on boards, what are some 
of the factors that have allowed you to function 
effectively?  
o Could you state any specific education or training 
program that you consider to be important or any 
learnt factors that impact your performance? 
o Based on my observations, you serve on several 
boards, is there any change in your approach to 
each role?  
o Does your multiple board memberships impact or 
enhance your contribution as a board member? 
State both positive and negative impacts. 
o How important do you consider building and 
sustaining relationships in your role as a board 
member? 
o What are some of the social factors that enhance 
or impact your role as a board member? 
o Could you tell us a little about your role in the 
community? 
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2 Value  Objective 
To understand the value of the experience as a board 
member. 
 
Conversation starters: 
• How does one become a board member? 
• What is the value derived from being a board 
member? 
 
Probes: 
o In your experience what type of benefits or 
value can be derived from being a board 
member? 
o Is the value increased or improved with 
multiple board memberships? 
o What new knowledge or skills are gained from 
being a board member? 
o What were some of the learning gaps that you 
had when you started out as a board member 
and what measures have you taken to eliminate 
those gaps?  
 
3 Behavioural 
Intentions 
Objective 
Exploring the behavioural intentions of board 
members. 
 
 
Conversation starters: 
• Why did you seek to become a board member? 
• What do you set out to achieve as a board member? 
 
Probes: 
o Do these goals change with each organisation? 
o How do you ensure that organisational goals 
are aligned with other interests? 
o Do you solicit assistance from organisational 
associates or others in making decisions? 
 
4 Performance Objective 
Exploring how board members influence 
organisational outcomes 
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Conversation starter: 
• We have talked about what value/benefit offered 
and gained being a board member, how has your 
performance changed over the years? 
 
Probes: 
o What aspects of performance (business skills, 
communication skills, networking, and 
partnership) have you seen improved? 
o How do you help organisations perform better? 
o Is there a focus on innovation? Could you please 
give some examples?  
o How do you influence the innovative process? 
o How do you encourage innovation within 
organisations? 
 
5 Conclusion Any other points about the topics we have talked about 
today that you would like to add? 
Thank you 
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APPENDIX 2: ETHICS APPROVAL  
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